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Foreword 
Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government brings together empiri­
cal studies of the internal cohesiveness of political party groups in Euro­
pean parliaments, along with the leadership behavior that conduces to 
disciplined parties in parliament. The purview of these studies includes 
parliamentary party behavior in Great Britain, Ireland, Switzerland, 
Norway, Spain, Hungary, and the European Parliament, with less exten­
sive inclusion of parliamentary behavior in a number of other countries. 
The original papers upon which these chapters are based were first ex­
posed to the public view in a workshop, "Party Discipline and the Or­
ganization of Parliaments," that Shaun Bowler and David Farrell 
organized for the European Consortium for Political Research meetings 
in Bordeaux, France, in 1995. 
Students of American legislative politics are highly sensitive to the 
fact that the U.S. Congress and the state legislatures often do not exhibit 
party discipline in their voting behavior: members of the legislative 
party do not vote against members of the other party a very high pro­
portion of the time. Party government is not a preponderant feature 
of American legislative decision making. Although party voting is by 
no means insignificant or trivial in American legislatures, it plays a 
far more important role in the parliamentary parties in European 
assemblies. 
Central as party discipline and cohesion are to the performance of 
many European parliaments, the phenomena have not been investigated 
extensively. The studies in this anthology take a very large leap forward 
in knowledge about parliamentary party discipline. Because the parlia­
mentary cohesiveness of the governing majority may be a coalition of 
several party groups, the joint problems of cohesiveness and discipline 
in multiparty parliaments are intriguing and fertile. More broadly, these 
careful and cogent studies contribute to better understanding of the na­
ture of legislature or parliamentary politics altogether. 
In the American context, legislative parties may contribute primarily 
by addressing the policy or status preferences of their members, by sup­
vn 
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porting a legislative program either on ideological grounds or for the 
purpose of facilitating reelection of their members and leaders, or both. 
In European parliamentary systems, the legislative assembly has as its 
preeminent function the formation of a majority coalition—composed 
of one large party or several smaller ones—sufficient to establish and 
support a government. Accordingly, party discipline plays a signifi­
cantly different role in the parliamentary systems than in separated sys­
tems such as that of the United States, where the executive is chosen 
quite independently of the legislature. 
The studies in this book are illuminating. These authors move away 
from a crude consideration of parliamentary parties as unitary actors 
to investigate what goes on inside them in terms of the formation of 
intraparty consensus and leadership support. The true policy prefer­
ences and attitudes of the MPs may, for instance, be belied by an analy­
sis operating only at the party level, as illustrated by the views of the 
British MPs toward the Maastricht Treaty. Even the less well-under-
stood continental European parliaments exhibit very high, although 
varying, levels of parliamentary party cohesiveness. Indeed, some par­
liamentary parties harbor more loyal, better disciplined members than 
others. Moreover, national parliamentary parties are, in turn, nested in 
a transnational assembly, the European Parliament. These fascinating 
variations are investigated in innovative ways in the following chapters. 
Samuel C. Patterson 
Preface 
This book emerged from a series of papers presented at a workshop, 
"Party Discipline and the Organization of Parliaments " held during the 
Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, at 
the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux, France, April 27-May 2, 
1995. During the course offive days of stimulating discussion, it became 
clear to all of us around the table that there was a crying need for a 
comparative study on this important subject. It was agreed that the 
workshop organizers (Bowler and Farrell), together with the most force­
ful of the participants (Katz), should try to pull a selection of the papers 
together as an edited volume. As always happens with such exercises, 
we could not include all of the papers presented in the workshop, either 
because they were already committed elsewhere or because their subject 
matter did not quite fit the overriding theme of the book. But this does 
not take from the fact that each of these colleagues played a vital role 
in seeing this project come to fruition and we want to record a special 
thanks to them: Herbert Doring, John Huber, Stephen Ingle, Robin Ko­
lodny, Petr Kopecky, Lia Nijzink, Kaare Stem, Marc van den Muy­
zenberg, Ania van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska, and Matti Wiberg. 
Given the transatlantic dispersion of the authors and editors, the 
relative speedy completion of this volume is testimony to the wonders 
of e-mail, but more especially to the conscientiousness of our authors. 
Final completion was facilitated by David Farrell's stay at Harvard, in 
the first part of 1997, as a fellow at the Shorenstein Center on the Press, 
Politics, and Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government. We are 
grateful to Samuel Patterson for his advice and support throughout, to 
our reader for very helpful feedback and advice that helped to improve 
the manuscripts, and most especially to Charlotte Dihoff, Beth Ina, and 
the rest of the staff at Ohio State University Press. 
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PART I

Theories and Definitions 

Party Cohesion, Party 
Discipline, and Parliaments 
SHAU N BOWLER, DAVI D M. FARRELL, 
AND RICHAR D S. KATZ 
I; 1993, British Prime Minister John Major had to threaten .errant Conservative backbenchers with a suicidal snap elec­
tion to ensure their support in passing a parliamentary bill ratifying 
Britain's signature of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the Maas­
tricht Treaty). On a regular basis in postwar, prereform Italy, prime min­
isters fell at the hand of factions within their own party, which meant 
that the average life span of Italian governments could be measured in 
months rather than years (see chap. 11 of this volume). These are just 
two examples of a problem that all party leaders share: party discipline 
in parliament. In the first case we are dealing with what is supposedly 
the example of a "cohesive" parliamentary system; in the second, with 
what was one of the best examples of a parliamentary system that was 
far from cohesive (e.g., as shown by the range of factions in the Italian 
chamber). 
Cohesion and discipline matter in the daily running of parliaments. 
The maintenance of a cohesive voting bloc inside a legislative body is a 
crucially important feature of parliamentary life. Without the existence 
of a readily identifiable bloc of governing politicians, the accountability 
of the executive to both legislature and voters falls flat. It can be seen, 
then, as a necessary condition for the existence of responsible party gov­
ernment (Katz 1987; Castles and Wildenmann 1986). For some, the 
maintenance of a majority voting bloc is simply the necessary condition 
for winning the parliamentary game. Majorities rule, and whoever can 
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form (and keep together) a majority wins the legislative game, shaping 
policies and programs in order to keep on winning in the future. For 
others, and especially for those who write on coalition politics, the exis­
tence of strong and stable parties is an almost hidden assumption from 
which to begin theorizing about the existence of the broader, govern­
mental, coalition game. For a variety of scholars, then, the existence of 
unified blocs of legislators is a major part of the political landscape, 
constituting a central normative requirement, a beginning assumption, 
or a part of the parliamentary game. However, despite being so centrally 
important to the theory and practice of parliamentary government, dis­
cussion of this topic is relatively underdeveloped. 
This book aims at going some way toward filling this gap. We begin, 
in this chapter, by outlining what we understand these rather amorphous 
terms of cohesion and discipline to mean. The argument is developed 
through the drawing of three sets of distinctions. We start, in the first 
section, with some basic definitional distinctions between party coher­
ence and party discipline. This is followed, in the second section, by a 
discussion on levels of analysis, where we explore differing explanations 
of the sources of party coherence and discipline both inside the legisla­
ture and outside (or electorally). In the next section, a third distinction 
sharpens our focus on who, or what, is being "disciplined." 
Distinguishing Party Cohesion and Party Discipline 
In a now neglected but nonetheless valuable exploration of this topic, 
Ozbudun (1970) distinguishes between party cohesion and party disci­
pline. Often the two terms are used interchangeably in the literature, but 
Ozbudun makes a strong case that they are analytically distinct and 
should be kept that way. He sees them as referring to two quite distinct 
components, each of which contributes to a unified party bloc in parlia­
ment, but with different determinants and differing effects. Ozbudun 
(1970, 305) defines cohesion as "the extent to which . . . group members 
can be observed to work together for the group's goals." He breaks party 
discipline down into two parts: first, that "followers regularly accept 
and act upon the commands of the leader or leaders," and second, that 
the leader has "ways and means of inducing recalcitrant members to 
accept and act upon . .  . commands" (305). According to these defini­
tions, therefore, whenever we observe members of legislatures voting as 
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a bloc or otherwise acting in unison, this can be because the members 
agree with each other or because they are being made to act in accord 
with each other despite their personal preferences (or, perhaps, a combi­
nation of the two). 
Clearly, the two concepts are related. Presumably discipline is needed 
when cohesion is low and is not needed in its more coercive forms when 
cohesion is high. But getting those who disagree with each other to 
submit to the rigor of common discipline is no easy feat. As Ozbudun 
observes (1970, 331), "The only parties which have not adopted dis­
ciplinary measures are also the least cohesive ones." There is at least one 
obvious explanation for this: if members of a group disagree so very 
much, they are unlikely even to be able to agree that they should be 
forced to act in concert. 
We might think of the relationship between cohesion and discipline 
in the following way. Below some minimal level of coherence, it is impos­
sible, at least within the confines of democratic politics, to impose disci­
pline. Above some relatively high level of coherence, the imposition of 
discipline is pointless, since the members agree anyway. Between these 
two extremes—where cohesion is high enough so that members agree 
to some sort of broad organizational goals and structure, yet falls far 
short of unanimity—party discipline has scope to act upon a legislative 
grouping to produce unified action. 
Electoral and Legislative Discipline 
In the same way that these forces may apply at different times, they may 
apply at different points in the party political process. Here we elaborate 
a distinction between electoral and legislative politics and the different 
demands involved in fighting elections and winning legislative battles. 
Each of these differing demands has been offered as the root explanation 
for the rise of unified parties in legislatures, especially in the nineteenth 
century. The first category of explanation focuses on electoral politics 
and the rise of extraparliamentary organizations. The second category 
argues that it is within legislatures themselves that we find the rise of 
unified parties. This relates to Duverger's (1951) classic distinction be­
tween parties originating within parliaments and those emerging from 
the grassroots outside of parliament. 
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The Impact of Electoral Machines 
Many of the early party scholars noted the impact of extrapar­
liamentary organizations in producing distinct voting blocs within par­
liaments (e.g., Duverger 1951; Ostrogorski 1902). Best (1995) argues 
that the emergence of political parties in the constituent assemblies 
of Paris and Frankfurt in 1848 is directly attributable to the polar­
izing effect of mass politics. And the degree of polarization of the elec­
torate, and hence of the party system, is seen as a major determinant 
of the willingness of members to cross to the other side (e.g., Epstein 
1956; Kornberg 1967; Best 1995): for instance, in a highly polarized 
party system, the distance (whether psychological or political) be­
tween the parties may be so wide as to deter members from wanting to 
defect. 
Of course, one of the major impacts of extraparliamentary organiza­
tion is upon the selection of candidates for office. To the extent that 
nomination politics are controlled by the party machine (brought about 
by mass enfranchisement), the party can ensure the cohesion of a legis­
lative body by weeding out potential troublemakers. This is helped by 
the fact that the act of joining a party is explicitly contractual. In many 
cases, on joining a party or standing as a candidate, individuals must 
sign a pledge in which they declare that this is the only party of which 
they are a member and in which they promise to support the general 
aims and constitution of the party The following example is not un­
typical: "I hereby agree to be bound by the objective, federal and state 
platforms of the Australian Labor Party. I also agree to be bound by 
decisions of the state executive taken in accordance with these rules" 
(Australian Labor Party, South Australia Branch 1986-87, 12). 
The New Zealand Labour Party makes its candidates take similar 
pledges and can expel for six years "any member of the party who 
stands as a candidate in opposition to, or publicly campaigns against, 
an official Labour candidate" (New Zealand Labor Party 1984, 27). 
These features are not confined to modern or even antipodean experi­
ence. Ostrogorski wrote in the context of the late-nineteenth-century 
Birmingham caucus, which marked one of the earliest developments of 
a self-consciously disciplined cadre within the British system, although 
by several accounts this innovation was brought more strongly to the 
fore by the Parnellite block of Irish Home Rulers, whose members also 
had to sign an oath of loyalty to the party (Farrell 1973). Duverger, too, 
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notes the beginnings of constituency influence in this period when he 
discusses the example of a Mr. Forster in the Bradford of 1878 who 
fought against the incorporation of such a clause into the constitution 
of his local party: "Throughout the country there arose a lively contro­
versy over the problem of the relations between Members of Parliament 
and caucuses. Finally there was a compromise, quite favourable to the 
party. If Forster had not died during the following legislature he would 
not have been renominated by the party caucuses at the elections" 
(Duverger 1951, 188-89). 
Thus, members of a political bloc take part in a voluntary and con­
tractual relationship that essentially confers a series of obligations upon 
the individual to support the party. Fulfillment of many of these obliga­
tions is quite difficult to measure. For instance, the obligations can be 
couched in such vague terms that fulfillment is almost impossible to 
monitor. A typical example here is the requirement in the New Zealand 
Labour Party that candidates swear to "wholeheartedly support" fellow 
candidates (New Zealand Labor Party 1998, clause 242). Parties need to 
be careful in vetting before they select. It is a very important component 
in recruiting members to the legislature that there be some preexisting 
loyalty to the party itself. Kornberg's study of Canadian legislative par­
ties pays particular attention to the preexistence of loyalty and to the 
"internalization" of party loyalty (Kornberg 1967, 136). 
It is here, perhaps, that the real significance of extraparliamentary 
organizations comes into its own. One of the major impacts of extrapar­
liamentary organization is upon the selection of candidates for office, 
and control over candidate nomination plays a large part in controlling 
the composition of the legislative caucus (Schattschneider 1942, 64). To 
the extent that nomination politics are controlled by the center, the 
party can ensure the cohesion of a legislative body by vetting its parlia­
mentary candidates (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). To a certain extent, 
this may interact with the kind of electoral system in place. The party-
list proportional representation systems, for example, are likely to be 
associated with the central (or perhaps regional) allocation (and with­
drawal) of nominations. By contrast, district-based electoral systems 
(such as the single-member simple-plurality system used in the United 
Kingdom) tend to be associated with more localized control over nomi­
nations (see Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.5). 
The picture has been complicated in recent years by changes to party 
rules that apparently amount to an even greater role for party members 
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but that also reflect closer scrutiny of the process by the top leadership, 
which is both anxious to avoid potential embarrassments and seeking 
to maximize electoral returns through vote management strategies. This 
paradoxical process is perhaps best shown by the reforms within the 
"New Labour" Party in Britain that introduced membership mail voting 
for candidate selection, while at the same time permitting greater vetting 
rights to the party's national executive to weed out potential problem 
cases (see Webb 1994).1 The issue of local party control over candidate 
nomination was a cause of some difficulty to the British Conservative 
Party national leadership in the 1997 general election, when efforts were 
made to prevent one of its MPs from being reselected as parliamentary 
candidate due to intense media and opposition party scrutiny into accu­
sations of financial impropriety. Despite the best (and quite public) 
efforts of Conservative Party "high command," the local party went 
ahead and selected the candidate, as was their prerogative under the 
party's rules. 
Overall, then, whether the process of candidate nomination is con­
trolled locally or nationally should have a clear impact upon where the 
legislative member directs his or her loyalty. Local party organizations 
and local caucuses can be quite disruptive, allowing, and possibly com­
pelling, local members with a strong local following to disobey the legis­
lative line. To the extent that this is the case, the much-vaunted system 
of British parliamentary cohesion (certainly in the Conservative Party 
of today) is likely to be far less secure than perhaps expected. Local 
nomination means not only that legislators have a local base from which 
to oppose strong leaders but also that they face local demands that may 
lead to dissent. As Whiteley and Seyd demonstrate in chapter 3, in the 
current climate of deep division within the British Conservative Party 
over the European issue, it is quite a rational strategy for a Conservative 
backbench MP to defy the national leadership, for the very reason that 
the MP will enjoy the support of local party activists. Such an occur­
rence is much less likely when nominations are centrally controlled. 
Wherever one's place on the party list is determined by party leaders, 
the minds of candidates are likely to be much more concentrated on 
loyalty to the party line (Bowler, Farrell, and McAllister 1996). This 
leads to the rather straightforward hypothesis that centralized nomina­
tion procedures should lead to greater party cohesion. Though it is not 
an easy hypothesis to test, several chapters in this volume certainly lend 
support to the importance of the electoral system (i.e., the distinction 
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between proportional representation list systems and single-member 
simple-plurality systems) as a relevant factor in explaining differing lev­
els of parliamentary coherence. 
Parliamentary Incentives 
A second branch of explanations locates the sources of coher­
ence at the level of the legislature itself. Cox and McCubbins (1993) 
present what is perhaps the fullest argument in favor of this view. Par­
ties, they argue, operate as a kind of legislative cartel aimed at making 
rules favorable to their own members. While their argument is applied 
to the case of the twentieth-century U.S. Congress, it is quite clear, from 
historical accounts of the eighteenth-century British parliament, that a 
similar argument held there too as rival Whigs and Tories jockeyed for 
control of the executive (Holmes 1987). 
Party leaders, one presumes, would like nothing better than a major­
ity in the legislature made up of like-minded individuals willing to vote 
early and often in accord with the leader's suggestions. The more typical 
state of affairs, however, is something far less idyllic from the party lead-
er's point of view. Once a legislature has been elected, the problem re­
mains of getting legislators to act in concert (see chap. 2 of this volume). 
After all, once elected, members of a given legislative body are formal 
equals, typically not allowed to take advice or instruction from those 
outside the chamber; they may need to be encouraged even to attend 
roll calls and meetings, let alone to vote or participate in other respects. 
And several studies show that, at least when answering survey questions, 
parliamentarians bridle very quickly at the idea that matters of personal 
conscience can be subjected to the discipline of the party line (see espe­
cially Kornberg 1967, 132). This necessarily makes unity in the face of 
difficult political decisions that much harder to attain. A prime example 
of this point is offered by the ongoing debacle within the British Con­
servative Party over European integration (see chaps. 3 and 4 of this 
volume). 
Worse still is the constant threat of defection. Even if one argues that 
there are advantages to be gained from banding together, as for instance 
has been suggested by coalition theorists, the problem still remains that 
members of the "in" group may be lured away by the blandishments 
and offers of the "out" group in order to gain a better (individual or 
private) payoff. Thus, parenthetically, even as coalition theorists discuss 
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coalitional behavior within European legislatures (Laver and Schofield 
1990), they presuppose the existence of parties whose own stability as 
coalitions they may not be able to explain (see, however, chap. 2 of this 
volume for one explanation; see also chaps. 11 and 12 of this volume 
and Aldrich 1995). 
When discussing the cohesion of legislators, considerable attention 
is paid to the array of carrots and sticks that leaders use to create or 
enforce discipline. We can discuss these in two broad groups, as generic 
incentives and as procedural devices. 
Typically, legislative leaders have at their disposal a range of induce­
ments to place in front of individual members. Patronage and commit­
tee appointments (and withdrawal of same) are the most commonly 
used, especially in parliamentary systems, where, provided the party is 
in government, plum jobs within the executive itself are available, as are 
jobs for supporters or public works for members' districts (see Blondel 
and Cotta 1996). Also available to leaders (in government and opposi­
tion) are whips' offices, organizations that allow leaders to identify and 
deal with potential rebels. It was the business of the Chief Whip, wrote 
one, "to know all about every man in his party who counted, and to 
have a wide and correct view of what was going on in the opposite 
party. . .  . It was his duty to scent dissatisfaction, the formation of dis­
loyal cliques, and, in short, any danger to the party arising from dislike 
of particular measures, personal jealousies and ambitions, irritations 
caused by personal inefficiencies of ministers, and all possible causes of 
mischief arising from complexities of human nature" (Gladstone 1927, 
520). 
The creation of the whips' office represents one of the great parlia­
mentary innovations, predating the rise of modern or mass parties. This 
is an organization specifically devoted to the maintenance of unified 
action by a political bloc. Holmes (1987, 300) traces it back to the 
"whipping of sorts" among Whigs and Tories at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, when the major problem was simply getting sup­
porters to show up in London. A regional whipping structure was estab­
lished in which individuals were responsible for fellow members from 
the same region. This helped to mobilize supporters of the parties and 
to provide access to the kinds of social incentives and gatherings—such 
as the prestigious Kit-Cat Club—that might sway the minds of reluctant 
MPs. Gladstone (1927, 522) dates the existence of permanent appoint­
ments concerned with patronage to as early as 1711. More contempo­
rary accounts provide a similar description of the range of activities and 
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inducements of the whips, even down to the persistence of a regional 
structure (Silk 1987, 47; see chap. 7 of this volume for discussion of the 
Spanish portavoz). 
Procedural measures, depending upon parliamentary maneuvers, 
can be equally influential tools in bringing about bloc unity. Some mea­
sures can be quite rudimentary, such as the use of open roll call votes 
where member loyalty or disloyalty can be monitored (as discussed for 
the Swiss case in chap. 5 of this volume). A good reason why such a 
measure might be wanted by the party leadership is provided by the 
practice in Italy over much of the postwar period, where secret voting 
in the parliament facilitated extensive "sniping" as members voted 
against their own party line in blissful anonymity. Introducing votes of 
confidence can be seen as quite a blunt instrument with which to club 
members of the governing party into line, but it is a measure that Prime 
Minister John Major found useful on not a few occasions in recent Brit­
ish parliamentary practice. 
Other procedural maneuvers may be more subtle as party leaders 
manage legislative votes in such a way as to ensure that divisive issues 
are simply not brought to the floor or alternatively are not posed as 
party-political issues, thereby avoiding the appearance, and even the 
possibility, of disloyalty (e.g., Gladstone 1927; Loewenberg 1967; Silk 
1987). An example of this practice is offered by the Irish parliament, 
in which, on controversial matters relating to public morality, MPs are 
permitted to vote according to their individual "conscience" and no 
whip is imposed; similar examples are provided by the Norwegian case 
(as discussed in chap. 6 of this volume) and also by the British House of 
Commons during its regular votes on whether to reintroduce hanging. 
The French Fifth Republic's constitution provides yet another escape 
route for the government: in certain areas the government is allowed to 
bypass the floor entirely and rule by decree, thereby blunting the scope 
for disloyalty in the governing party. 
Legislative and electoral behavior are, of course, interrelated. If the cen­
tral party leadership controls nomination or use of the party label at 
election time, then the range of carrots and sticks available to it widens 
perceptibly. Cox's (1987) study of the nineteenth-century British parlia­
ment sets out an argument in which developments inside the chamber 
and among the wider electorate are interconnected. In a sense, for Cox 
the responsible party model of government does not simply require 
party loyalty in the legislature; it creates it. He describes a process where 
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the cabinet becomes ever more important as an actor in its own right. 
In the light of this, the voters pay much more attention to the govern­
ment of the day and much less attention to constituency service matters. 
In putting less pressure on members to serve local interests and directing 
more attention to party politics matters, electoral competition removed 
an important impetus to dissent and increased the pressure to conform. 
Part of the beauty of this system is that disloyal parliamentarians can 
be punished not only by the party leaders but also by the voters. 
To the extent that electoral incentives, and in particular reelection 
incentives, shape legislators in fundamental ways, these are clearly the 
most important incentives to have in favor of unity. For instance, the 
ability of dissident British parliamentarians to insulate themselves from 
disciplinary measures has been noted. Epstein (1956, 372) cites a couple 
of cases in which the Labour Party of the 1950s was unable to discipline 
members after the rebels had received assurances of support from local 
party organs (something that would be unheard of in the Labour Party 
of Tony Blair). If elections stress the local and particular, then one 
would reasonably expect reelection-motivated candidates to be less will­
ing to submit to the confines of party discipline for prolonged periods. 
On the other hand, if elections turn on governmental performance, and 
if party organization reinforces this, then we are likely to see something 
quite different. This discussion suggests a number of straightforward 
cross-system comparisons that are explored throughout this volume: for 
example, that we should expect unity to be higher in parliamentary sys­
tems than presidential ones; party leaders to be able to discipline legisla­
tors more easily in party-based systems than in candidate-based systems 
(see Katz 1986 for discussion on preferential electoral systems); cohe­
sion to be more difficult to maintain in systems characterized by high 
levels of localism or clientelism; and the "nationalization" of electoral 
politics to have aided central party cohesion (i.e., a possible temporal 
dimension). 
In addition to the costs of electoral punishment incurred by specific 
individuals within some settings, defections may also raise suspicion 
among other actors. Coalition theorists, for example, typically make the 
assumption that any given member of a coalition may be bribed away 
to join a rival. But perhaps there are restrictions on the degree to which 
coalition members wish to be seen as bribable. Prospective coalition 
partners themselves would presumably rather ally with reliable partners. 
A single defection from a coalition may not imply massive unreliability; 
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Table 1.1 
Party Cohesion as a Function of Party Competition 
Competition 
One-Party Weak Two 
State Minority Parties 
Cohesion 
Strong 1 31 63 
Moderate 1 31 32 
Weak 86 38 5 
N 14 13 19 
Source: Golombiewski (1958, 501). 
Note: Observations are U.S. states. 
persistent defections, however, can easily be seen as an indication of 
likely future behavior. Given a choice, political entrepreneurs, who are 
in the process of building coalitions, would rather not team up with 
unreliable partners. Hence, in coalition systems, actors wishing to be­
come part of a winning coalition may suppress tendencies to jump ship 
or to be seen as too openly quarrelsome for fear of being seen as 
"difficult" partners. 
Party competition more generally understood can also be seen as 
one of the factors shaping party cohesion and discipline. Competitive 
pressures—the fear of losing (a majority or a vote) and the hope of 
winning—can promote a powerful concentration of attention. Not all 
acts of dissent need be closely watched and quelled. Elections help pro­
vide some guide to how monitoring should take place and how much 
effort should be expended on trying to maintain party coherence: moni­
toring and coercion, after all, are rather costly activities. One way in 
which costs to the leadership can be reduced is simply not to enforce 
discipline when there is no point. This can be illustrated by some evi­
dence provided by a U.S. study from 40 years ago. 
In his study Golombiewski (1958, 501) makes the point that "party 
cohesion is a direct function of the degree of competition between polit­
ical parties." His empirical evidence certainly seems to bear this out. 
As table 1.1 shows, there is a clear relationship between coherence and 
competitive position, and this is particularly evident in the case of one-
party states (see also Mezey 1995, 204-5). If a party has little or no 
chance of winning or losing power, then there would seem to be no real 
point in maintaining unity or even trying to impose costly disciplinary 
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measures. There is, however, a hidden asymmetry between the position 
of a losing and a winning party. If a party cannot gain a majority, then 
imposing discipline may well be pointless (since, by definition, the party 
cannot win). On the other hand, a party with a massive majority can 
still lose power through massive defections. Some kind of unity should 
therefore be maintained in majority parties but may be allowed to slip 
in the smaller parties. 
It is not only the position of the leadership with regard to cohesion 
that is affected by the party's competitive position; there are also effects 
on the individual parliamentarians, as shown by the often-noted phe­
nomenon in the United Kingdom that party cohesion is easier to main­
tain when the government has a small majority than when it has a big 
one. A specific example of this is provided by the Irish Fianna Fail party 
after its stunning electoral victory in 1977, when it won more than 50% 
of the popular vote and a substantial majority of seats in Parliament. 
As the electoral returns were flowing in and pundits were pontificating 
on what they saw as the unassailable position of the party leader, Jack 
Lynch, he was less sanguine, expressing doubts about his ability to 
maintain discipline over a parliamentary party in such a secure position 
(Farrell and Manning 1978). His doubts proved well founded. Within 
two years of his stunning electoral victory, he was thrown out of office 
as the result of a backbench coup (Farrell 1987). 
So far, we have argued for the existence of an important definitional 
distinction between cohesion and discipline. The second distinction, be­
tween levels of analysis, to some extent overlies the first. Getting and 
keeping control over who gets into the legislative caucus can help (or, in 
some cases, can hinder) cohesion. Once in the parliament, however, the 
cast of players is fixed and cannot be changed. This raises one final area 
of concern: just who is being disciplined? 
Party Discipline: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
The discussion so far has been couched largely in terms of the ability of 
legislative leaders to mobilize and produce a unified voting bloc when 
the occasion demands. The "problem" of party discipline phrased in 
this way is the standard one: How can leaders keep backbenchers in 
line? But there is another way of looking at the problem: How can back­
benchers discipline leaders and get them to promote policies and posi­
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tions that are to the backbenchers' liking? The rank and file may be 
wary of a "leadership" (broadly defined) that seeks to desert the "true" 
grassroots cause by following an electoral agenda entailing the watering 
down of ideological content. Mezey (1993, 346) comments, "Party disci­
pline may be partially the product of anticipated reaction—that is, lead­
ers deciding not to propose policies that they know their followers will 
oppose." 
In this regard, factions and factionalism can be seen as especially 
important. If acting as a disciplined bloc is valuable within a parliament, 
it should also be valuable within a party (McAllister 1991). Factionalism 
has long been a subject of considerable interest to scholars working on 
predominant party systems. For this reason, much of the work on fac­
tions focuses on such cases as Italy, Japan, and the U.S. southern states 
(see Katz 1980; Key 1949; Sartori 1976; Thayer 1969; von Beyme 1985). 
More or less by definition, factions exist to voice claims within the party 
as a whole. These claims may be aimed at personalities or policies, and 
according to Panebianco (1988) they carry with them dangers of indisci­
pline and incoherence within parties. While this line of argument clearly 
has some merit, there are reasons for thinking that factions can help 
rank-and-file members discipline their leadership, either by providing 
faction leaders to take part in policy discussions (reporting back to their 
members) or by making it clear to party leaders that a block of votes 
will desert if some policy line is crossed. In this sense, factions help party 
leaders understand where their support or opposition lies within the 
party and the levels of this support or opposition—factors that were 
crucially important to British Prime Minister Major in trying to hold 
the line on Europe within his divided party (see chaps. 3 and 4 of this 
volume). Factions can also provide useful testing grounds for up-and-
coming party leaders (Loveday and Martin 1966). 
Rather than being necessarily harmful, then, factions can have some 
use in helping to show party leaders which policies and actions are toler­
able and which are not. Similarly, the very presence of factions can help 
the rank and file themselves understand what is permissible by making 
them aware of the size of dijfferent voting blocks within the party. Rather 
than simply quitting the party and forming or joining a rival, a group 
of dissenters might instead decide to stay with the party and try to 
change its direction from inside. The nature of party competition may 
also have a role to play here. It could be argued that as the ideological 
divide between parties increases, so too does factionalism within each 
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party; otherwise, as parties blur into each other, dissidents may find it 
easier to jump ship. In Hirschmann's terms (1970), factions can be seen 
as an example of "voice" in preference to "exit." 
By the same token, whips' offices need not simply be organizations 
to impose discipline by the leaders upon the rank and file but can also 
be viewed as organizations through which the rank and file keep the 
leaders informed. Again, early English evidence seems to bear this out. 
If getting supporters to actually vote was a problem for the eighteenth-
century Whigs and Tories, so was getting policies endorsed by these 
supporters (Holmes 1987, 289-93). It was found necessary to take ac­
count of backbench opinion, to canvass support, and to seek to per­
suade. Coordination meetings were established to bring more sup­
porters on board. The whips' office thus existed as much to provide 
leaders with information relating to where the backbench could be led 
as to provide backbenchers with directions over where the leader 
wanted to go. 
In short, party cohesion and discipline are very much two-way 
streets, and certainly much more so than the emphasis on whipping— 
with its connotations of disciplining the unruly rank and file—might 
suggest. While it may be true that there is an asymmetry between leaders 
and followers, given that the former have access to patronage and the 
ability to play divide and rule, whereas the latter must overcome prob­
lems of collective action and rivalry, leaders can still be disciplined by 
the rank and file. 
To return to Hirschmann (1970) for a moment, there is, of course, 
always the option of "exit": disillusioned MPs can jump ship, either 
moving to a new party or becoming independents. This phenomenon, 
entitled variously as "faction hopping," "fraction hopping," or "political 
tourism" (or being "flicked off" in the case of Bulgarian MPs ejected 
from their parliamentary parties; see Karasimeonov 1996, 55), has been 
a prominent feature of parliamentary life in the new democracies of 
East and Central Europe (see the various articles in Journal of Legisla­
tive Studies 1996; contrast this with the virtual absence of faction hop­
ping in Norway, discussed in chap. 6 of this volume). In chapter 8 of 
this volume, Agh shows how in the Hungarian case, as the process of 
what he calls "parliamentarization" has unfolded, the number of MPs 
switching parties has plummeted to negligible levels. This is consistent 
with earlier cases of parliamentary institutionalization (on postwar 
West German experience, see Schtittemeyer 1994). 
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Party Cohesion and Discipline 
Even this brief review suggests that the topic of party cohesion and dis­
cipline is a much richer subject for study than might at first be assumed. 
Complicating this picture even more is an interpretation of party cohe-
sion/discipline as a dynamic process rather than as the necessarily static 
property of a party. Some of the features identified in this chapter sug­
gest that some elements contributing to party cohesion are more or less 
permanent features of the political landscape. Nomination procedures, 
for example, can exist unchanged for lengthy periods, as can the elec­
toral systems to which they are related and the many rules of parlia­
mentary procedure. These kinds of factors, then, can contribute to a 
snapshot picture of party cohesion at any one time, possibly even over 
the relatively long haul. 
But our description would suggest that the balance between cohe­
sion and discipline or, perhaps more accurately, between the two fea­
tures' degree of presence or absence, provides a more unstable and 
shifting set of political problems. In this light, an understanding of party 
cohesion and discipline might require a fuller appreciation of these dy­
namics. For example, certain political problems are likely to depend, at 
least in part, upon the competitive position of a party in both legislative 
and ideological terms. Close-fought races between fiercely ideological 
rivals are, one presumes, likely to help foster cohesive parties. On the 
other hand, as either of these two measures of competitiveness slackens, 
much more may be demanded of disciplinary measures. As majorities 
mount, for example, it seems less important to ensure that each and 
every party member toes the line exactly: some examples of dissent can 
be tolerated much more readily. And here, in these different sets of cir­
cumstances, may well lie an account of the different types of party 
leadership. 
Leaving aside the idiosyncracies of personality, it is possible to see 
distinct themes of party leadership. At times, party leaders may seem 
more like generals guiding their disciplined troops into the lobbies. Ex­
amples such as Margaret Thatcher or Newt Gingrich suggest a highly 
cohesive and willing body of legislators, willing to do or die. In these 
ideologically charged circumstances, where perhaps also nomination 
procedures have produced a willing body of supporters, leadership may 
be less a matter of leading than of leashing. At other times, however, 
parties are not nearly so compliant. For instance, in the context of 
18 - Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 
highly diverse intraparty ideological divisions within the British Labour 
Party during the 1980s, or perhaps the Conservative Party of today, the 
generalissimo style of leadership is unlikely to work. Rather, a model of 
leadership in which the peace is kept, possibly simply an agreement to 
keep to the status quo, becomes the hallmark of leadership by consen­
sus. The leader keeps the party together, but basically by herding people 
together while letting the party go where it wants (e.g., Sam Rayburn as 
Speaker of the U.S. House; John Major as Conservative Party leader 
in Britain). 
Of course, legislative settings are hardly all or nothing. "Generals" 
and "shepherds" may be pure types, but pure types are rarely seen, and 
then often fleetingly. We are more likely to find party leaders shuttling 
between these types. In very fragmented settings, with multiple parties 
and multiple factions, or possibly simply a party in a minority position, 
leadership may become primarily a matter of tactics above all; it may 
then become the task of stitching together a temporary coalition for the 
purpose of achieving a specific goal. 
Outline of What Follows 
In a recent overview of the state of the discipline, Michael Mezey (1993, 
356) makes the telling observation that "most of the legislative literature 
is firmly rooted in time and place, and for much of the subfield the place 
is Washington, D.C., and the time frames are usually current." This vol­
ume goes some way toward meeting both objections by its coverage of 
a wide set of different cases outside of the United States and also by 
its treatment of parliamentary systems at different stages of historical 
development. While some of the chapters focus on relatively familiar 
settings, such as the United Kingdom or Italy, many of the other chap­
ters examine less well-known examples, such as Spain, Switzerland, 
Hungary, Ireland, and Norway. Some cases involve well-established par­
liamentary systems; other cases—notably Hungary, Spain, and the Eu­
ropean Parliament—have much more recent origins. 
In addition to the wide range of settings, this volume also provides a 
number of different perspectives on the topics of party cohesion and 
discipline. As this introduction has suggested, there are a variety of 
different dimensions to the topic of parliamentary cohesion, involving 
relationships between the party grassroots and the legislative caucus, the 
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use of roll call votes, and other procedural devices. These themes, 
among others, are taken up in the chapters that follow. 
We begin, however, with a more abstract and detailed focus on the 
question of why should we expect to see party cohesion. If legislators 
are formal equals, and if the temptation to jump ship is ever present, 
why should we see parliamentary parties exist and persist in unified 
form for such long periods of time? The next chapter, by Laver and 
Shepsle, suggests one set of answers to this, based on the idea of disci­
pline acting as a "kind of gravitational force" pulling legislators together 
into parties. Once some rudimentary form of party organization exists, 
the benefits available to such a group provide powerful inducements to 
members and enemies alike. There are clearly many benefits to acting in 
concert. By operating as a single voting bloc, a party can seek to control 
policy, committees, procedures, and even government. Once the bloc 
has gained access to such things, it is also in a position to reward loyal 
friends and punish traitors. 
Laver and Shepsle's "portfolio allocation" approach makes a sig­
nificant contribution to the study of coalitions, particularly in that it 
removes the standard assumption of parties as unitary actors, per­
mitting a focus on the motivations of individual politicians. Laver and 
Shepsle's chapter has the added significance of helping to group much 
of the discussion in the remainder of this volume. Their analogy of par­
liamentary parties "emerging from the primeval slime" can be read in 
two ways. 
First, as headlined in Agh's chapter on Hungary (chap. 8), and as 
discussed in the Spanish case by Sanchez de Dios (chap. 7) and in the 
two chapters on the European Parliament (chaps. 9 and 10), the Laver-
Shepsle analogy can be seen as relating to the establishment and insti­
tutionalization of cohesive parliamentary parties in emergent political 
systems. Second, it can be viewed in a more day-by-day sense, as relating 
to the establishment and survival of governments in multiparty par­
liamentary systems. As Mershon (chap. 11) and Mitchell (chap. 12) 
demonstrate, there is good reason for coalition theory to finally stop 
treating political parties as monolithic, unitary actors, for they evidently 
are not. In multiparty systems, which exist across much of Europe, gov­
ernments emerge out of deals struck between party leaders who have 
one eye firmly fixed on their backbenchers. Ultimately, the survival of 
the government will depend on the maintenance of coalition discipline. 
In short, without party cohesion in parliament, a coalition government 
in unlikely to have much of a future. 
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NOTE 
1. For comparative treatment of recent changes in party rules on candi­
date selection, see Mair (1994) and Gallagher and Marsh (1988). 
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How Political Parties Emerged 
from the Primeval Slime: Party 
Cohesion, Party Discipline, and 
the Formation of Governments 
MICHAEL LAVER AND 
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE 
B;I y far the easiest way to construct models of interparty com­petition is to assume that parties behave as if they are uni­
tary actors, which is of course not at all to assume that they actually are 
unitary actors. It clearly can sometimes make sense to treat life inside a 
political party as a black box. Most obviously, if members of a party 
are willing to submit themselves to party discipline, then the party may 
well look like a unitary actor in terms of its dealings with the outside 
world. 
In relation to government formation, for example, individual politi­
cal parties are almost always either in the government or outside it. It 
is very rare indeed for one fragment of a party to be in government 
while another is in opposition (Laver and Schofield 1990). We can thus 
describe the membership of coalition governments in terms of which 
parties are in the coalition and which are not—treating each party in 
this sense as if it were a unitary actor. 
Although many interesting political phenomena can be described by 
treating parties as if they were unitary actors, we clearly do need to 
consider what goes on inside parties if we want to include an account 
of party decision making in a model of some political process. The dan­
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ger of the unitary actor assumption in this context is that it may encour­
age us to take a quite unwarranted anthropomorphic view of how 
parties decide. For example, we may be seduced into thinking that a 
party will behave "in its own best interest"—and this is indeed an as­
sumption shared by most models of interparty competition. This is 
effectively to assume that a party in some sense has its own utility func­
tion and a decision-making process designed to maximize this. Yet a 
political party comprises a group of individuals, and each individual 
not only has his or her own utility function but is clearly capable of 
autonomous action. Given this, the well-known logic of collective ac­
tion implies that it is far-fetched to assume that individual members of 
this group will always act to maximize their collective utility. For this 
reason, we must obviously have a model of intraparty decision making 
before we can forecast how a political party is likely to behave in some 
specific circumstance. In this important sense, we need a model of intra-
party politics before we can develop a realistic model of interparty 
competition. 
An interesting early foray into this field was made by Gregory Lueb­
bert (1986), who set out to develop an account of government formation 
that assumed, among other things, that a party leader is motivated 
above all else by the desire to remain party leader, even if this means on 
occasion sacrificing what to others might seem to be the best interests 
of the party. Empirically, it has been argued that certain Irish party lead­
ers, for example, have taken their party into coalitions in circumstances 
when their party could quite possibly have governed alone, but only 
under another leader (Laver and Arkins 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996). 
There is no job market for party leaders analogous to the market for 
company CEOs; parties do not transfer party leaders in the way that 
soccer teams transfer star players. It is thus clear that most party leaders 
have nowhere to go in politics but downhill and are likely to fight very 
hard to stay on top, even if their parties suffer some collateral damage 
in the process. Immediately we see that the interests of a party leader 
may well diverge from those of other sections of the party; only if we 
have an account of intraparty politics can we explore this type of phe­
nomenon systematically. 
It seems very likely on the face of things, of course, that it is not only 
party leaders who will have a distinctive political agenda. Those who 
would like to be party leader may have different views; so may the par-
ty's cabinet ministers, those who would like to be cabinet ministers, 
rank-and-file legislators who are concerned above all else with their re­
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election prospects, candidates who would like to be rank-and-file legis­
lators as soon as possible, activists who joined the party to have some 
impact on policy, rank-and-file members who view the party as a sort 
of social club, and so on. To the extent that each of these types of intra-
party actors has a say in what parties decide to do, its diverging views 
must be taken into account. 
We set out in this chapter to explore ways in which an analysis of 
intraparty decision making might illuminate one important feature 
of intraparty politics—the making and breaking of governments in 
parliamentary democracies. We have elsewhere developed a model of 
the making and breaking of governments (Laver and Shepsle 1996). 
An important feature of our model is the assumption that the effective 
preparation, making, and implementation of policy decisions in par­
liamentary democracies depend in important ways upon the policy pref­
erences of the cabinet minister in charge of the government department 
with jurisdiction over the policy area at issue. In the present context, 
this assumption is crucial because it means that the basic units of analy­
sis are cabinet ministers and potential cabinet ministers, not political 
parties. Normally, one simplifies the analysis by assuming that all actual 
and potential cabinet ministers belonging to the same party have the 
same policy preferences, but this comes very close to making the unitary 
actor assumption. We discuss how this assumption can be relaxed in 
our earlier treatment of cabinet government (Laver and Shepsle 1996); 
in the present chapter, we elaborate in greater detail the consequences 
of intraparty preference heterogeneity for government formation and 
legislative party competition. 
We develop this argument as follows. In the section "What Are Polit­
ical Parties Made Of?" we discuss the basic building blocks of a model 
of intraparty politics: the external environment that sets the context for 
party decisions, the diversity of tastes within parties, the sections of the 
party with an input into decisions, the decision-making regime within 
the party, and the meaning and extent of party discipline. In the section 
"Intraparty Politics and Government Formation," we sketch our model 
and discuss why, in the context of government formation and for two 
quite different intraparty decision-making regimes, factions with diverse 
tastes might nonetheless submit to the discipline of a single party. Fi­
nally, we draw some conclusions from all of this about the strategic 
forces that might draw and hold parties together as units and that might 
indeed provide some of the basic logic that underlies the formation of 
political parties in the first place. 
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What Are Political Parties Made Of? 
The External Environment 
Political parties have many roles in parliamentary democracies. 
Not only do they supply members of governments and other political 
elites, but they also offer stimuli for voters at election time, construct 
interpretations of important events, provide important social networks, 
and so on. It is inconceivable that we could model the functioning of 
some abstract notion of a "political party" without having a clear sense 
of the particular role or roles in which we are interested. 
As we have already indicated, our main concern in this chapter is the 
making and breaking of governments, which we take to be one of the 
pivotal processes in parliamentary democracy. To a very large extent, 
therefore, the environment in which we are interested comprises the leg­
islature, the executive, and the relationship between these. While other 
environments (especially the electoral environment) are obviously im­
portant for a full understanding of the functioning of political parties, 
the setting that we focus on here is the formation of governments in 
parliamentary democracies. 
One result of this is that, to the extent that we do consider electoral 
feedback to party decision making, we take it as an exogenous input to 
the making and breaking of governments rather than as an interaction 
effect that forms an intrinsic part of our model. In short, we assume that 
politicians thinking about government formation regard the electorate 
rather as they regard Nature, as a machine meting out rewards and pun­
ishments in some probabilistic manner. The key interactions in our 
model take place between party politicians in parliament. 
Tastes 
The most fundamental reason why political parties are not uni­
tary actors is that different politicians have different tastes. If all poli­
ticians in the same party had identical tastes, there would be no 
intraparty conflict of interest and thus no policy basis for intraparty 
politics. The fact that it does not seem very reasonable to assume that 
all politicians in the same party have identical tastes is what put intra-
party politics on the agenda. 
Of course, when we come to model politics within parties, we do not 
do this in the abstract but have some particular context and purpose in 
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mind. Thus, we must consider the diversity of those tastes in a party 
that are systematically relevant to the purpose at hand. Just because one 
politician likes steak very rare while another likes it burnt to a cinder, 
we need not assume that this has a bearing on intraparty politics. We 
must confine our attention, in short, to a diversity of relevant tastes. 
This, like so many other things in political science, is easy to say but 
impossible to do, since what will ultimately turn out to be relevant to 
our main interests is not necessarily self-evident at the outset. It is hard 
to specify, a priori, which are and which are not relevant tastes. To make 
some progress, however, we probably will not raise too many eyebrows 
if, when we consider government formation, we confine ourselves to 
tastes about public policy on issues that will certainly, or might conceiv­
ably, come up for decision by governments within the time horizons of the 
actors concerned. Diversity of tastes on such issues is what makes poli­
tics within parties relevant. An important implication of this is that 
changes in the relative importance of issues can change politics within 
parties. Arguably, for example, the increasing salience of European pol­
icy ultimately undermined Margaret Thatcher's position as leader of the 
British Conservative Party. Ultimately, this led to a sudden and dramatic 
replacement of a party leader who had once seemed invulnerable, and 
it would have done so even if the party had comprised precisely the 
same members as before with precisely the same policy positions on 
Europe (Garry 1995). 
Factions 
Politicians within parties often align themselves with groupings 
that we can think of as factions. Factions can be based upon almost 
anything. Since we are concerned here with the tastes of politicians with 
respect to current or anticipated issues in public policy, however, we 
concentrate on factions comprising politicians with similar tastes in 
public policy. What precisely we mean by similar, of course, will deter­
mine how many factions we are likely to recognize for a given distribu­
tion of opinion within the party. At one extreme, if we draw very fine 
distinctions, every member of every party can be shown to have different 
views about everything of relevance. With this approach, there will be 
as many factions as there are politicians. At the other extreme, a hungry 
tiger might regard all politicians as the same, fail to observe any dif­
ferences of taste between them, and effectively put them all into one 
faction. 
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The way in which one sees the factional structure of a political party, 
therefore, depends very much on one's point of view. For the most part, 
this is a problem of operationalization that should not concern us too 
much at this stage. What we do need to settle now is that parties can be 
thought of as comprising factions of politicians with similar tastes in 
public policy. These factions range in scale, according to exigencies of 
the analysis, from a single politician to the party as a whole. We will 
need to determine the factional structure of a party as an operational 
matter before we can analyze a particular case, but for the time being 
we will take this as given. 
Decision-Making Regimes 
Once we recognize different factions with different tastes within 
a party, it becomes important to know how these factions interact to 
determine courses of action for the party. Specifically, we need to know 
about the formal rules by which the party makes its decisions—its 
decision-making regime. Obviously, parties can operate on the basis of 
any one of a huge number of possible decision-making regimes, each of 
which could be modeled. For the sake of simplicity, however, we con­
sider two possible decision-making regimes in what follows. 
The first of these requires us to make the smallest step possible from 
the unitary actor assumption: it involves parties in which decisions are 
taken by an autocratic party leadership. All party decisions are assumed 
to be taken either by a single autocratic leader or by a leadership fac­
tion, all members of which share the same tastes. On the face of things, 
this may not seem to depart at all from the unitary actor assumption, 
but it does so in one important respect. The diversity of tastes in the 
party means that there are nonleadership factions to which it is possible 
to assign control over key aspects of public policy. This can have an 
important bearing upon government formation, as we show below. The 
first decision-making regime that we consider, therefore, involves auto­
cratic decisions by the leader or leadership faction, given diversity of 
tastes among party politicians. 
The second decision-making regime that we consider requires us to 
make a very large step from the unitary actor assumption and see a 
party as a microcosm of the wider political system. We might think of 
this regime as a "delegate conference" regime, in which all key decisions 
are taken by a representative body, which might even be the legislative 
party as a whole. Each faction within the party has a weight, and the 
party has a decision rule that specifies how such weight should be aggre­
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gated. There are many possible decision rules, of course, but we concen­
trate here on majority voting. Decisions within the party under this 
regime, in short, are taken by majority vote at a representative delegate 
conference. 
While many other decision rules not only are theoretically possible 
but actually exist within real-world political parties, we begin our ex­
plorations by focusing on these two. Since they represent quite distinct 
extremes, they enable us to see as clearly as possible the extent to which 
the intraparty politics of government formation is affected by the party's 
decision-making regime. 
Discipline 
We take party discipline to involve a member's abiding by a 
decision taken by the party's decision-making regime, whether or not 
he or she supported the particular decision taken. Perfect party disci­
pline arises when all members abide by all party decisions, including all 
of those that they opposed during the decision-making process and that 
run counter to their private preferences. Complete indiscipline arises 
when every member acts regardless of any decision taken by the party, 
in accordance with private preferences—in effect, as if the party did not 
exist at all. In an undisciplined environment, members may of course 
act in accordance with party decisions, but they do this because of the 
correlation between party decisions and private preferences, not as a 
result of deferring in their actions to party decisions. 
One of the central issues that our model illuminates is why a politi­
cian would in fact submit to party discipline rather than behave as an 
independent actor. Essentially, as we shall see, this happens because 
party discipline creates more powerful bargaining units that are able to 
drag eventual government policy outputs on a wide range of issues 
closer to the ideal points of those subjecting themselves to the disci-
pline.1 The next section develops this argument. 
Intraparty Politics and Government Formation 
Outline of the Portfolio Allocation Model 
of Government Formation 
The portfolio allocation model of government formation has 
been extensively described and empirically elaborated elsewhere (Laver 
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and Shepsle 1996). We do no more here than briefly summarize its key 
features for the purposes of setting up our argument about party 
discipline. 
The portfolio allocation approach is based fundamentally on the dis­
tinctive roles of legislature and executive in Western parliamentary de­
mocracies. While the executive is formally responsible to the legislature 
and must resign if it loses a vote of confidence or no confidence, almost 
all policy making and implementation takes place within the executive. 
If a government makes any policy a matter of confidence, then the legis­
lature can change government policy only by changing the government. 
While most European executives operate formally on the principle of 
collective cabinet responsibility, most of the actual process of making 
and implementing policy inevitably takes place within government de­
partments. Only government departments, each the political responsi­
bility of a cabinet minister, have the resources and technical competence 
to develop implementable policy proposals within their jurisdictions. 
Cabinet ministers thus have two roles. They are members of a body 
(the cabinet) that takes collective responsibility for government policy; 
they are also individually responsible for the departments that do much 
of the work of developing and implementing real-world policy propos­
als. It is in this important sense that cabinet decision making is not col­
lective. By virtue of their role as department heads, cabinet ministers 
have disproportionate influence on the substance of cabinet decisions 
within their jurisdiction. This has the important implication that sub­
stantive policy outputs in a given area will change with the changing 
tastes of the minister put in charge of the department with jurisdiction. 
If we assume that the tastes of actual and potential cabinet ministers 
are common knowledge (revealed, in effect, during the apprenticeship 
that politicians must serve before being added to the roster of minis­
trables), then the making and breaking of governments is informed and 
influenced by forecasts of the policy outputs resulting from the appoint­
ment of each ministrable to each government department. 
This postulated relationship simplifies the job of analyzing govern­
ment formation, since it implies that there is in fact a finite number of 
possible cabinets, representing the number of ways of allocating a given 
number of ministrables to a given number of cabinet portfolios. A very 
much simplified characterization of this portfolio allocation problem, 
assuming two key policy dimensions (finance and foreign policy) and 
three sets of ministrables (to be thought of as parties or factions), is 
shown in figure 2.1. For the time being, we assume that each set contains 
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Figure 2.1 A Finite Set of Portfolio Allocations 
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ministrables with identical preferences on the two key policy dimen­
sions. That is, each set of ministrables can be taken for now to constitute 
a unitary party. 
Assuming that each policy dimension is under the jurisdiction of a 
different cabinet portfolio, figure 2.1 shows that there are in effect just 
nine portfolio allocations with substantively different implications for 
public policy. Both portfolios can be given to the same set of minis­
trables. If both are given to party A, then government policy is forecast 
to be at AA. If both are given to party B, government policy is forecast 
to be at BB. Alternatively, one portfolio can be given to a politician 
from one party, while another portfolio is given to a politician from 
another party—in effect, this is a coalition cabinet. If the finance portfo­
lio is given to a politician from party A and the foreign affairs portfolio 
is given to a politician from party B, then forecast government policy is 
at AB, and so on. Each of the nine points on the "lattice" in figure 2.1 
is a distinct government, with the first letter in the label identifying the 
party assigned the finance ministry and the second letter identifying the 
party controlling the foreign ministry. 
The portfolio allocation approach takes this finite set of governments 
as its raw material and uses two simple and uncontroversial assumptions 
about the making and breaking of governments to derive a model of 
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Figure 2.2 The "Winset" of a BA Cabinet 
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government formation. The first assumption is that an equilibrium cabi­
net must be able to win legislative majorities on votes of confidence or 
no confidence. Note that this definitely does not imply that the cabinet 
itself must comprise parties with a legislative majority between them. 
The second assumption is that no party can be forced into government 
against its will. Note that this means that every party has an effective 
veto over the formation of any cabinet in which it participates. 
We will not repeat the full implications of the model and their deriva­
tion here (see Laver and Shepsle 1996 for this). Two key results are cru­
cial for the argument that follows, however. Figure 2.2 shows how three 
parties A, B, and C, any two of which are required to form a legislative 
majority, feel about BA, the cabinet giving the finance portfolio to party 
B and the foreign affairs portfolio to party A. Party A prefers any cabi­
net inside the indifference curve aa, each of which is closer to its ideal 
policy than BA; Party B prefers any cabinet inside curve bb; and party 
C prefers any cabinet inside curve cc 
Any two parties command a legislative majority between them, and 
the shaded area in figure 2.2 shows those parts of the policy space pre­
ferred to the policies of a BA cabinet by some pair of parties and thus 
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preferred to the policies of BA by some legislative majority. This is the 
"winset" of BA. Note that, although the (shaded) winset of BA is quite 
large, it contains the forecast policies of not a single one of the eight 
alternative cabinets. This implies that cabinet BA is in equilibrium, 
since, if BA were the status quo cabinet, then some legislative majority 
would have both the incentive and the ability to block any move leading 
to an alternative cabinet. 
The BA cabinet has the distinctive property that it is at the dimen-
sion-by-dimension median (DDM) position in the policy space, in the 
sense that it comprises the party containing the median legislator on 
each key policy dimension. A DDM cabinet whose winset contains no 
alternative cabinet is obviously an important equilibrium feature of the 
government formation process. If it is the status quo, it should remain 
the status quo. Laver and Shepsle (1996) show that for any cabinet not 
at the DDM, at least one alternative cabinet can be found that is pre­
ferred to it by some legislative majority. 
A striking feature of Laver and Shepsle's theory, however, is that the 
DDM cabinet with an empty winset is not the only candidate for equi­
librium. To see why, consider that parties can veto the formation of 
cabinets in which they participate, the implications of which are shown 
in figure 2.3. 
This shows how the same three parties feel about another cabinet— 
the "minority" administration in which both key portfolios are con­
trolled by party B. Once more, party A prefers any cabinet inside curve 
aa; party C prefers any cabinet inside curve ca Obviously, party B pre­
fers no alternative cabinet to the one in which it gets both key portfolios. 
The shaded area is the set of policies preferred by both party A and 
party C to those of a cabinet comprising only party B. Note that two 
cabinets, BA and BC, lie inside this shaded area. In other words, BA 
and BC are preferred to BB by both party A and party C, who between 
them control a legislative majority. If BB were the status quo cabinet for 
some reason, why would parties A and C not combine to defeat it and 
install either BA or BC instead? 
The short answer is that parties A and C, despite their legislative 
majority, do not have the power to install either BA or BC, since party 
B, a member of both alternative cabinets, can veto each of these. This 
creates the intriguing situation in which the only alternatives to BB that 
command majority support can be vetoed by party B, which has both 
the incentive and the ability to prevent these from replacing BB. Laver 
and Shepsle (1996) call a party in this position a "strong" party. 
1 
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Figure 2.3 BB Is a "Strong" Party 
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A strong party is one that can veto any alternative cabinet that is 
preferred by a legislative majority to the cabinet in which the strong 
party gets all key portfolios. If the strong party's ideal cabinet is the 
status quo, and if its threats to veto such alternatives are credible, then 
the strong party's ideal cabinet is in equilibrium. Laver and Shepsle 
(1996) show that there can be at most one strong party in any party 
system but that there may be no strong party for particular configura­
tions of parties. 
Laver and Shepsle thus derive two equilibrium concepts—the DDM 
cabinet with no alternative cabinet in its winset and the strong party 
cabinet. There will always be a DDM cabinet, although this does not 
always have an empty winset and thus does not always represent an 
equilibrium. There is often a strong party. And there may be both a 
strong party and a DDM cabinet with an empty winset. In such cases, 
strategic standoffs can occur, though we may assume that sophisticated 
political actors have good information about which parties are likely to 
win such standoffs. While there is much more to the portfolio allocation 
approach than we have outlined here, we now have sufficient tools to 
use the approach in an exploration of the impact of the government 
formation process on party discipline. 
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Party Discipline and Bargaining Power 
The portfolio allocation model can easily be adapted to take 
account of intraparty politics because it is fundamental to the approach 
that government ministers have a combination of agenda power and 
implementation authority sufficient to pull policy outputs within their 
ministry's jurisdiction toward their preferred policy position in predict­
able ways. Assuming that parties are unitary actors amounts to assum­
ing that all ministerial candidates from the same party are forecast to 
implement the same policies in a particular jurisdiction. This must be 
either because all ministers from the same party have the same policy 
preferences, which seems rather unlikely, or because parties are able to 
control absolutely the actions of their own ministers within their depart­
ments, which is also implausible. Once we make the plausible assump­
tion of a diversity of tastes within parties, then a deeper consideration 
of intraparty politics is obviously needed. 
In assuming a diversity of tastes within parties, we are stipulating 
that each party has a roster of senior politicians, each with a particular 
policy reputation, from which it selects ministerial nominees to the cabi­
net. These politicians are important resources for the party, since they 
allow the party to underwrite certain policy positions in government by 
making the appropriate ministerial appointment. 
A vital consequence of any intraparty diversity in policy positions is 
thus that it allows the party to make different ministerial nominations to 
a given portfolio and thereby to generate different forecasts of the policy 
implications of including the party in government. To get an empirical 
sense of this, consider the following extract from an analysis in the Fi­
nancial Times (June 3,1996) of the policy consequences of different pos­
sible ministerial nominations to the Israeli cabinet that formed after the 
1996 elections: 
How Mr. Netanyahu carries out his task . .  . will be the first real 
indicator of the policy direction of Israel in the key issues of Middle 
East peace, the national economy, and the religious-secular status 
quo. . .  . Mr. Netanyahu's first task is to decide how to distribute the 
big three posts—finance, defence and foreign affairs.... The prime-
minister elect has promised the defence ministry to Mr. Yitzhak Mor­
dechai.. . . However, senior generals . .  . have let it be known that 
they will resign if Mr. Mordechai became defence minister.... [A] 
Treasury run by Mr. Sharon would be problematic. He is on the ex­
treme right wing of the party and is a champion of the country's need 
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to keep hold of Arab lands and build a greater Israel by massive new 
investment in Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Such a policy 
would not only threaten the Middle East peace process but would 
kill urgent efforts to cut the budget so as to reduce inflation. . .  . If 
Mr. Netanyahu were to decide to place at thefinance ministry a more 
moderate Likudfigure, such as Mr. Dan Meridan, the favourite can­
didate of the business community, that would mean some other post 
for Mr. Sharon. 
The analysis goes on in this vein, and similar articles have been writ­
ten during the formation of cabinets in most parliamentary demo­
cracies. By responding to the different policy forecasts generated by 
different possible ministerial nominations, a party may seek to improve 
its strategic prospects in government formation. We explore the implica­
tions of this matter for party discipline by relaxing the unitary actor 
assumption in two stages. 
First, we relax it very gently by considering parties that include a 
diversity of tastes but that are very centralized in the sense that they 
are run on authoritarian lines by their leadership factions. This has the 
consequence that all strategic decisions are taken in terms of indiffer­
ence curves centered upon the ideal point of the leadership faction but 
that party leaders can take advantage of the diversity of tastes among 
their stable of ministrables. 
Second, while retaining the assumption of diversity of tastes, we con­
sider parties in which power is more decentralized. We take the specific 
(and very decentralized) example of a party that takes all strategic deci­
sions on government formation by way of majority voting at a delegate 
conference proportionately representing all tastes within the legislative 
party. In either case, we take party discipline to involve abiding by the 
party's validly taken strategic decisions, even when those concerned 
would choose a different course of action if they were not party 
members. 
Diversity of Tastes in Autocratic Parties 
Figure 2.4 shows a system with six independent political ac-
tors—A15 A2, Bls B2, Cj, and C2—each with one-sixth of the total 
weight. Actors may be individual politicians or factions comprising pol­
iticians with identical tastes. One actor may fuse with another by giving 
its legislative weight to, and submitting to the strategic decisions of, the 
other actor. Both actors remain in politics, and their ideal points remain 
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Figure 2.4 A System with Three Parties, Each with Two Factions 
A2 
A; 
B2 
unchanged. Indeed, fusions are reversible, so that one faction may split 
from another with which it previously fused if the strategic environ­
ment changes. 
Once a fusion has taken place, there is now one two-faction party 
where before there were two one-faction actors. The autocratic decision-
making regime means that the party leadership is controlled by one fac­
tion and that all of the party's legislative weight can be deployed by this 
faction. The nonleadership "out" faction has tastes but no legislative 
weight. This is why we need consider only the indifference curves of the 
leadership faction to determine the strategic decisions that underpin the 
making and breaking of governments. In the present context, the key 
question that we must answer concerns whether it will ever be rational 
for one actor to cede its legislative weight and strategic autonomy to 
another in this way. If it is rational to do this in certain circumstances, 
then we have uncovered a strategic logic behind such fusions, and indeed 
behind a more general process that may cause political actors to bind 
themselves together into larger political units. 
Figure 2.5 shows that it can indeed be rational to do this in certain 
circumstances. If each actor is independent, then there is no strong 
party. Consider now the situation that arises if there is a fusion between 
one of the three pairs of adjacent actors, with the leadership of the new 
party being given to one or the other actor. (There are, of course, many 
other potential fusions, but for the sake of clarity we do not consider 
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Figure 2.5 B, and B2 Find It Rational to Fuse 
them here, since the restricted set of examples just mentioned allows us 
to make our main point.) We can investigate the effects of each possible 
merger.2 When we do so, we find that mergers of either the A or the C 
pairs of actors, if all other actors stay independent, do not make much 
of a strategic difference but that a merger between the two B actors has 
a dramatic strategic effect. Whichever B faction is given the leadership, 
party B becomes a strong party as a result of the merger. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates this. The winset of Bl before any merger is 
shown as the shaded area. This is the intersection of any four of the 
indifference curves of the Al5 A2, B2 Cl9 and C2 factions through Bi (the 
respective curves are labeled in lower case). B} is not a strong party 
because its winset contains several points in which it does not partici­
pate and that it therefore cannot veto. These are B2A15 B2A2, B2C2, and 
R f 3 
Every one of these points, however, involves the participation of B2. 
If B2 joins Bj and submits to B/s discipline, then B{ can also veto cabi­
nets involving the participation of B2. In effect, B{ can prohibit B2 from 
going into cabinet, and as a result, the new fused party B is a strong 
party. If it can win strategic standoffs against the other actors, it may be 
able to impose policy positions involving only actors from party B, The 
result would be that cabinet policy would be pulled toward both B} and 
B2 as a result of the merger, an outcome preferred by both factions. 
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Figure 2.6 Parties C, and C2 Fuse, Undermining the Position of B, 
JWzar has happened is that B2 has produced an outcome it prefers by ceding 
its weight and strategic autonomy to Bv It thus appears rational for B2 to 
fuse with Bx and to submit to the discipline of a party dominated by Bv 
This is the central theoretical point of this chapter. 
This is not the end of the story, however, for now things gQt compli­
cated! Consider the potential responses of the other actors to the merger 
of Bj and B2 and the consequent creation of a strong party B. There is 
nothing much that the two A actors can do, but if the two C actors 
merge and if party C's leadership is controlled by Cl3 then party B ceases 
to be able to impose BJSV This is because, when C2 cedes its weight and 
strategic autonomy to C19 C2's indifference curve is effectively deleted, 
and C2's weight is added to C1 when winsets are calculated. The effect is 
to increase the size of the BJBJ winset, as shown in figure 2.6.4 There is 
now a set of cabinets in the winset of BJBJ that do not involve party B 
and that B therefore cannot veto. 
As it happens in this case, party B is in fact a strong party because 
it has a strategic response to this move by the C actors. The leadership 
faction, B p can cede the foreign affairs portfolio to the "out" faction, 
B2. As figure 2.7 shows, if this happens, then B remains a strong party. 
All alternatives in the winset of B  ^  involve the participation of one 
or other of the B factions, which the leadership of party B can veto. 
Thus, the fusion of the B factions does indeed appear to be a rational 
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Figure 2.7 Party B Is Strong if B, Cedes a Portfolio to B2 
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move, increasing the probability of government outputs favored by 
both factions. Note, moreover, that the fusion of the C factions also 
appears to be rational, pulling the eventual equilibrium toward both of 
them. 
The theoretical example in figure 2.7 highlights a clear strategic logic 
for an intriguing empirical feature of the process of nominating party 
notables to cabinet portfolios in the real world—the fact that party 
leaders sometimes nominate their internal party opponents to high pub­
lic office. A typical seat-of-the-pants explanation for this phenomenon 
is that party leaders like to have their opponents "inside the tent pissing 
out, rather than outside the tent pissing in" and that in this way they 
not only keep an eye on political opponents within the party but use the 
doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility to silence their opposition. 
The portfolio allocation approach shows us that interparty politics may 
also have an important impact on intraparty ministerial careers. A given 
government may be in equilibrium only if particular ministerial nomina­
tions are made to certain key positions. A particular ministrable may 
have too soft a reputation on balancing the budget to be made finance 
minister in a particular equilibrium cabinet, for example, or too hawkish 
a reputation to be put in charge of defence or foreign affairs. Alternative 
ministerial nominations from within the party, which may come from 
the ranks of the party's "out" factions, may be needed to sustain it in 
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office by making its policy positions acceptable to other parties. In this 
way, interparty politics affect the intraparty allocation of cabinet 
positions. 
Diversity of Tastes in Democratic Parties 
Politics within "autocratic" parties, as we have modeled it, es­
sentially consists of a leadership faction setting both policy and legisla­
tive strategy, constrained only by the possibility that factions will leave 
the party if some alternative becomes more attractive. We model politics 
within "democratic" parties, in contrast, as a microcosm of politics in 
the legislative system as a whole: 
• Decisions within the party are taken by majority vote at a party 
meeting that is representative of the legislative party as a whole. 
• Party discipline implies that all members of all party factions will 
abide by party decisions once taken. 
• Ministrable politicians from factions within a party can be required 
by the party to hold cabinet portfolios. Factions are thus different 
from parties in the wider system in this sense. What they do within 
their department, however, is beyond party control (see above). 
Given this model of decision making, democratic intraparty politics 
becomes distinct from autocratic intraparty politics only when there 
are three or more factions, each with less than majority weight in the 
party—otherwise, the majority faction behaves as if it were the leader­
ship faction in an autocratic party. 
Figure 2.8 shows a modified version of the previous example. To 
keep things simple, parties A and C are seen as unified parties, located 
at Aj and Cx respectively. Party B, however, has three factions, B p B2, 
and B3, none with majority weight within the party. Any two of the 
factions are decisive within the party's decision-making regime. 
If any or all of the three factions leave the party, then there is no 
strong party in the system, and B  ^  is the only candidate for a cabinet 
equilibrium in our model, a DDM with an empty winset, shown by the 
shaded area. This seems a likely outcome of the government formation 
process. 
If the three B factions accept the discipline of a single party with a 
democratic decision-making regime, then the situation is quite different. 
There are nine ways in which the two key portfolios can be given to the 
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Figure 2.8 The Strength of a United Party B 
three B factions. As the heavy indifference curves show, any one of these 
nine allocations would make B a strong party (The curve labeled aa 
shows how party A feels about the one of these nine allocations that is 
furthest from its ideal point; the curve labeled cc shows how party C 
feels about the allocation furthest from its ideal point.) These two curves 
show the outer bounds of the winsets of the nine party B allocations, 
and some party B faction participates in every point within these 
bounds, making a fused party B strong, whichever of the points it se­
lects. In this important sense, which of the nine points it selects is en­
tirely a matter for party B. 
Figure 2.9 therefore concentrates upon the internal politics of party 
B. It shows that within party B, the Bx faction is a strong faction in the 
sense that it participates in any intraparty portfolio allocation in the intra-
party winset of its ideal point If the B{ faction can win standoffs with 
the other factions, then it may well be able to impose its ideal point as 
party policy, and we know from the original Laver-Shepsle propositions 
that even if the strong faction cannot win standoffs, party policy will be 
either B  ^  or BjB2. Since all of the B factions prefer both of these points 
to BJAJ—the likely cabinet equilibrium if any of them split from party 
B—it is rational for them to submit to the discipline of party B. Whether 
party B's policy position is B  ^  or BjB2 will depend upon the ability of 
the strong Bj faction to win intraparty standoffs with the other B 
factions. 
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Figure 2.9 The Strength of the Bj Faction inside Party B 
The theoretical possibility of strong party factions, highlighted in the 
example shown in figure 2.9, is one possible explanation for what can 
often appear to be the dominant position of some particular faction 
within a given party. Within the party, the dominant faction occupies 
an equivalent strategic position to that of a strong party in the wider 
legislative party system; note that the dominant faction's position may 
well be a product of the configuration of parties in the political system 
as a whole. This type of analysis has potentially far-reaching conse­
quences, since the identity of the strong faction should have a major 
impact on the policy positions taken by single party governments, while 
the fact that this identity is affected by the configuration of the wider 
party system shows ways in which changes in the legislative party sys­
tem outside a one-party government may affect policy developments in­
side it. 
The key to the previous example was that all of the B factions pre­
ferred the predicted equilibrium cabinet arising from submitting to the 
discipline of party B to the predicted outcome if they defected. As might 
be expected, this is not always the case. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show a 
slight modification of the example in figures 2.8 and 2.9; the B3 faction 
is somewhat closer to the center of the policy space and thus somewhat 
further from the other B factions. 
We immediately note several important differences between the two 
situations. If we consider only policy points within party B, Bj remains 
a strong faction. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that 
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Figure 2.10 The B3 Faction Prefers Coalitions with Other Parties to B/s Ideal 
Point 
Figure 2.11 Party B Remains a Strong Party if It Stays United 
B3 now actually prefers both I^A! and B  ^  to B ^  , the ideal point of 
the Bj faction. While B1 can veto BjA^ it cannot veto B3AJ. It looks 
likely that B, will not be able to impose I^B,, although BjB., is preferred 
by B3 to either B3A! or B ^  . Figure 2.11 shows that if BjB2 is adopted 
as party B's policy position, then party B remains strong. Indeed, since 
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Figure 2.12 The B3 Faction Would Be a Strong Party if It Defected from 
Party B 
B3B3 is now in the (shaded) winset of the DDM cabinet, BJAJ, party B's 
strong party status is enhanced in the sense that at least one rival candi­
date for an equilibrium cabinet has been removed from the picture.5 
A much more significant difference between the two cases, however, 
is revealed by figure 2.12, which shows that the B3 faction would be a 
strong party in the wider party system if it defected from party B. It partic­
ipates in every cabinet in the (shaded) winset of its ideal point. 
If B3 expects to be able to win standoffs with the other parties, then 
it may well be rational for it to defect from party B—although in antici­
pation of this, the other B factions might agree to set party policy at 
B3B3. If B3 does not expect to be able to win standoffs, then the equilib­
rium cabinet will nonetheless be in the shaded winset of B3B3. Note that 
neither B  ^  nor B  ^  is in this winset, although B  ^  is. If B3 is not 
expected to win standoffs, then the other B factions could preempt B3's 
defection by setting party B policy at BjB3. Nonetheless, the real pros­
pect of the defection of B3 does have a significant impact both on the 
policy position of party B and the eventual equilibrium cabinet. 
In more general terms, figures 2.11 and 2.12 show that the portfolio 
allocation approach offers the possibility of being able to model the im­
pact of the government formation process on the incentives for factions 
to defect from existing parties. If a particular faction would find itself 
in a powerful strategic position in the government formation process as 
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a party in its own right if it were to defect, then such defection not only 
would seem rational but might force other party factions to make major 
policy concessions to avert this. Once more, changes in the configura­
tion of the wider legislative party system may, by changing the balance 
of power within parties in this way, have a major impact on intraparty 
politics (for further discussion, see chaps. 11 and 12 of this volume). 
Conclusion 
Unlike most other theoretical accounts of party competition, the port­
folio allocation approach focuses upon individual politicians rather 
than on monolithic parties. This allows us to address the issue of intra-
party politics in general and of party discipline in particular. What we 
see when we look at party competition in this way is quite fascinating. 
First, we see that a party may gain strategic leverage from having 
politicians with both diverse tastes and the discretion to do something 
about these if they get into government. By changing ministerial nomin­
ees, the party can change the policies that it is forecasted to implement 
if it gets into office, to its strategic advantage. 
In the present context, the most important thing we see, however, is 
that there are incentives for independent parties or factions not only to 
fuse but also to submit to the discipline of other factions with different 
tastes, ceding strategic autonomy in the expectation of generating more 
favored government policy outputs than would otherwise arise. The 
strategic benefits of party discipline thus act as a kind of gravitational 
force, providing a logic that holds together what on the face of things 
may appear to be diverse parts of a single party. Indeed, if we imagine 
a primeval political soup through which political actors were scattered 
at random, then the processes described above should lead to a series 
of combinations of actors into ever-larger entities that come to look 
more and more like the political parties we have come by now to know 
and love. At the same time, our approach, as we saw in the final example 
that we discussed, can identify circumstances in which it may be rational 
for a faction to defect from a party and set up in business on its own. 
Obviously, what have been presented here are no more than sketches 
of what might be at work. Much needs to be done on developing a 
formal model of the processes sketched above. What the examples show 
clearly, however, is that our model of government formation can be used 
to generate an account of the role of party discipline as the strategic 
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force that binds factions together into larger and more effective legisla­
tive players in the government formation game. 
NOTES 
1. Of course, there are many explanations, in both the formal theory and 
the more substantive literatures, for the emergence and maintenance of par­
ties. Formal theoretical arguments, for example, often emphasize the repeat-
play nature of electoral/governance cycles and the "brand name" benefits that 
a party label provides to prospective and incumbent legislators (see Cox and 
McCubbins 1993). What distinguishes our explanation is that it depends en­
tirely on politics inside Parliament, so that policy-oriented parliamentarians 
would want to coalesce into factions and parties even if there were no electoral 
benefits from so doing. 
2. We do this using a custom-written computer program, WINSET, which 
identifies strong parties, empty-winset DDMs, and other strategic features of 
a given party configuration. The WINSET program, which runs under DOS, 
is freely available for personal research and teaching use via Internet. The 
program itself, program manuals, and sample data files can be downloaded by 
connecting to FTP.TCD.IE, logging on as user "anonymous" and supplying 
a complete e-mail address as a password. The latest release versions of all files 
are located in the directory /PUB/POLITICS, which contains a README 
file describing what is available. 
3. The situation fpr B2 before a merger is similar. 
4. Because B2 has fused with B,, its indifference curve is also deleted in 
figure 2.6. 
5. That is, the DDM cabinet no longer has an empty winset. 
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PART I I

The "Westminster Model 

In the U.S. literature on Congress, it used to be common practice to 
draw comparisons between the relatively low levels of party cohesion 
in Congress and the highly cohesive "Westminster model," in which 
parliamentary discipline and cabinet collegiality combined to ensure a 
relatively smooth passage of legislation through the British House of 
Commons. Furthermore, the belief of the U.K. political science tradi­
tion, from Samuel Finer onwards, was that any of the rare incidents of 
internal party division and factionalism were a feature more of the La­
bour Party than of the Conservatives. It is not only the U.S. literature 
that treats the United Kingdom as an ideal type. For instance, in his 
book Democracies (Yale University Press, 1984), Arend Lijphart uses 
the Westminster model as the basis for his "majoritarian" system, one 
of the characteristics of which is a "cohesive majority party" ensuring 
cabinet dominance. 
Recent literature has started to blunt some of the sharper edges of 
these U.S.-U.K. contrasts. Scholars in the United States have begun 
to assert the importance of party, while work in the United Kingdom 
has gone some way toward undermining the view of British parliamen­
tary parties as monoliths (see the citations in chaps. 3 and 4 of this 
volume). Here we present two chapters that go even further toward 
undermining the received view of the Westminster model as one that 
should form the ideal type in contrast to that of the United States. Brit­
ish parties have revealed evidence of "seismic" differences, and, if any­
thing, this has been a far greater problem of late for the Conservative 
Party than for Labour. The two chapters in this part set out the nature 
and extent of these divisions. They also discuss their causes, a combi­
nation of both the issue of European integration (the principal factor) 
and, as Whiteley and Seyd (chap. 3 of this volume) point out, institu­
tional developments in British politics (such as the rise of candidate-
centered local politics and the decline of local government) that have 
served to ennoble the constituency politician. 
According to Whiteley and Seyd's analysis of the attitudes of party 
members—and contrary to the long-held canons of British political 
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science—the local Conservative selectorates appear quite prepared to 
sanction dissension by their parliamentary representatives: "An MP 
who gratifies local sensibilities, and who does a reasonable amount of 
constituency service, can persistently rebel in the House of Commons, 
without being unduly concerned that this will lead to his or her de­
selection." And it was clear from Baker, Ludlam, and Gamble's (1994) 
survey of Conservative politicians during the 1992-97 parliament that 
a large group of these MPs looked set to rebel. In the course of the 
1997 general election, that rebellion occurred when more than 200 
Conservatives defied explicit orders from the party leadership and pub­
lished personal manifestos against the proposal for a single European 
currency, forcing the hand of the party leadership over the issue and 
ultimately contributing to the party's election defeat. 
Discipline in the British 
Conservative Party: The 
Attitudes of Party Activists 
toward the Role of Their 
Members of Parliament 
PAUL F. WHITELE Y AND PATRIC K SEYD 
B;
iritish parliamentary parties are renowned for their disci-
spline and cohesion (Beer 1965). Since the development of 
the modern mass-based party system in the late nineteenth century, MPs 
have been elected to the House of Commons as representatives of a 
political party and, as such, have been very generally bound to their 
party's election manifesto. Their party loyalty, as measured by "whipped 
votes," has been high. Never, however, has party cohesion been absolute. 
Factions, tendencies, and cliques (Rose 1965) have prevailed within the 
parties, and opinions have often been expressed either through Early 
Day Motions (Berrington 1973) or, on occasion, by rebellions in the 
division lobbies (Norton 1978, 1980). When rebellion against party in­
structions has occurred in the division lobbies, both Conservative and 
Labour Party leaderships have possessed the ultimate sanction of with­
drawal of the party whip as a means of maintaining party loyalty. Since 
the powers of both selection and reselection of parliamentary candi­
dates reside with local party activists, for this sanction to be effective, 
either the party leaderships must have the power to order local party 
activists not to select a parliamentary rebel, or the local activists 
must share their leadership's views and refuse to reselect the rebel. As 
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is well known, without party endorsement, an individual's chances of 
reelection to the House of Commons as an independent are almost 
negligible. 
Nevertheless, Norton (1980) has noted the growth of intraparty dis­
sent within the parliamentary parties during recent decades. This devel­
opment might be partly explained by a rise in candidate-centered local 
parties, in which the local party activists are willing to sustain rebels 
under certain circumstances. For example, recent changes in the parlia­
mentary selection procedures in the Labour Party, in particular the in­
troduction of primaries or local ballots, may strengthen the position of 
local MPs vis-a-vis the party leadership. Another explanation may be 
that a shift has occurred in intraparty power relationships such that the 
parliamentary leadership has lost some of its authority in imposing its 
views on local parties. A third possibility is that since MPs are increas­
ingly preoccupied with local constituency service (Cain, Ferejohn, and 
Fiorina 1986), this gives them a stronger local political base from which 
to defy the party leadership. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the attitudes of local Con­
servative Party members toward the role of MPs in politics. The aim is 
to examine the extent to which party members are "localist" in their 
perceptions of the role of an MP. Clearly, if there is widespread support 
for the view that MPs are there primarily to serve their localities, as 
opposed to supporting the national party leadership, this creates the 
potential space for MPs to defy the leadership on a variety of political 
questions, providing they are serving these local needs. 
Local parties in Britain, are thought to have, unlike those in the 
United States, a strong national political orientation, which would serve 
to undermine localism. However, this conventional wisdom is not based 
upon any systematic research of local party members. Accordingly, this 
question will be examined using data from the first national survey of 
Conservative Party members in Britain (see Whiteley, Seyd, and Rich­
ardson 1994). This survey makes it possible to address this important 
question for the first time with a representative sample of party 
members. 
In the following section we review the literature on the role of MPs 
in the British political system, including work that discusses the rela­
tionship between local parties and MPs. This is followed by a model 
of the determinants of attitudes toward the work of MPs among party 
members in British politics. In a third section we examine some esti­
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mates of a model of the political orientation of local party members. 
Finally, we look at the implications of these findings for party cohesion 
in the House of Commons. 
Members of Parliament and Local Parties 
In both Conservative and Labour Parties, the powers to choose parlia­
mentary candidates are decentralized. Although both party leaderships 
nowadays possess some powers to influence choice either by influencing 
the pool of eligibles (in the Conservative Party) or by vetoing the final 
choice (in the Labour Party), constituencies possess the crucial power 
of selection (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). When MPs have rebelled 
against their party leaderships' voting instructions, local party activists 
have often reinforced the powers of the party leaderships by disciplining 
the rebels. So, for example, the Labour Party dealt with its left-wing 
parliamentary rebels in the late 1940s by expelling them; although the 
MPs' constituency parties made some attempts to challenge these expul­
sions, they eventually acquiesced with the party leadership's decisions, 
and the parliamentary careers of these rebels were terminated (Ranney 
1965, 155-59). 
In the Conservative Party the position has been slightly more com­
plicated because the party leadership has possessed less centralized 
powers. So when the whip has been removed from parliamentary rebels, 
there have been no attempts to expel them from the Conservative Party. 
Instead, the party leadership has relied on the constituency associations 
as "the true guardians of the orthodoxy of Conservative MPs" (Ranney 
1965, 89). Their response to rebellion has varied. Seven Conservative 
MPs rebelled over the Conservative government's occupation of the 
Suez Canal Zone in 1956, and four of them were not readopted by their 
local associations as Conservative candidates at the following general 
election. By contrast, eight Conservative MPs rebelled against the Con­
servative government's abandonment of its embargo on the use of the 
Suez Canal, and none were refused readoption by their constituency 
associations. 
The more formal structure and more centralized nature of the La­
bour Party have made it easier for its parliamentary leadership to curb 
rebellions than has been the case for the Conservative leadership. Never­
theless, after a thorough study of the selection processes between 1945 
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and 1960, Ranney concluded that "national leaders do not need to con­
trol local candidate selection in order to maintain party cohesion in 
Parliament; the local activists do the job for them" (1965, 281). 
However, Norton (1980) has noted the growth of intraparty dissent 
within the Conservative and Labour parliamentary parties over recent 
decades. He suggests various reasons for this rising trend. He argues 
that Edward Heath's style of leadership played a significant part in the 
growth of parliamentary rebellions in the Conservative Party during the 
1970-74 parliament. The measures that Heath introduced, the way in 
which he introduced them, and the way in which they were pushed 
through the House of Commons, along with Heath's failure to commu­
nicate with his party backbenchers and his failure to use his powers of 
patronage more effectively, contributed to party dissent. 
Norton also suggests that there are other reasons for this growth in 
intraparty dissent that are specifically associated with changes in Parlia­
ment as an institution. Improved sources of information for backbench­
ers have made them less reliant upon government sources and therefore 
more prone to rebellion. Furthermore, the dispelling of the myth that a 
government defeat in a parliamentary vote leads automatically to its 
resignation has also contributed to greater rebelliousness. 
Norton refers to one other factor that he considers to be of impor­
tance. He suggests that "local parties are not quite as ready and able to 
disown dissenting Members as was popularly believed" (Norton 1980, 
466). So, for example, he notes that none of the Conservative Party's 20 
rebels on the second reading of the European Communities Bill in 1972 
were denied renomination by their constituency associations. Similarly, 
all the Labour rebels on the same bill were renominated, with the excep­
tion of Dick Taverne in Lincoln. In addition, the Labour MPs who op­
posed devolution for Scotland and Wales in the 1974-79 parliament first 
forced the abandonment of the Labour government's original policy, 
then imposed a requirement that 40% of the electorate should support 
devolution in a referendum on the issue in Scotland and Wales. The 
devolution issue eventually contributed to the Labour government's 
downfall in 1979, yet these MPs were all renominated by their local 
parties. Norton (1980, 467) concludes that "although constituency par­
ties can and do act as constraints, strong ones, upon members consider­
ing entering the lobby against their own side, especially on an issue of 
importance, they are not quite as strong as was previously assumed." 
Additional factors specific to the Labour Party may have contrib­
Discipline in the British Conservative Party • 57 
uted to this rising trend of dissension. In the mid-1970s, discipline in 
the party was eased once the extraparliamentary party was no longer 
tightly controlled by the right-wing parliamentary leadership of the 
1950s (Shaw 1994). Furthermore, important changes have occurred in 
the selection and reselection procedures for Labour MPs. Increasingly, 
all individual members have been given the right to participate in the 
selection process. These changes in selection procedures are too recent 
to have produced any measured impact so far. It would seem likely, how­
ever, that the party leadership will find it more difficult to impose its 
views upon a reluctant MP if he or she has the support of the entire 
local membership. Thus, primary ballots may strengthen localist tend­
encies in the Labour Party. 
It is within the Conservative Party, however, that parliamentary re­
bellion has been most prominent recently, particularly over the issue of 
European integration (Baker et al. 1994; see also chap. 4 of this volume). 
This issue eventually led to eight backbenchers losing the whip and a 
further one resigning the whip in early 1995. The party leadership's ini­
tial expectations were that these rebels would be forced back into line 
by the threat of the loss of their seats. It was assumed either that the 
local associations would willingly select an alternative Conservative 
candidate or that they might be coerced into selecting another candidate 
on pain of disaffiliation. There has been little sign of the former, how­
ever. Only one association has informed its MP publicly that it expects 
him to return to the Conservative whip as speedily as possible. Another 
two associations have been reported as wanting their MPs to retake the 
party whip (The Guardian, March 1, 1995). In general, however, the 
other associations seem happy to sustain their parliamentary rebels, in 
the belief that their Euro-skepticism is in line with the sentiments of 
Conservative members and voters. Thus, the fact that most Conserva­
tive Party members are Euro-skeptics has sustained the parliamentary 
rebels (Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994, 57-58). 
The question of whether the National Union has the powers to dis­
affiliate a local association if it refuses to select a new candidate in place 
of the rebel is contentious. The correspondence columns of the Daily 
Telegraph have reflected this debate.1 The party's Model Rules ensure 
that candidates on a constituency association's selection short list have 
to have been approved by a central office vetting procedure and that any 
association selecting an unapproved candidate will be disaffiliated. But 
the rules do not cover the case of the reselection of an MP who lacks 
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the party whip. Furthermore, notwithstanding the legal position, there 
are clear electoral problems associated with any attempts to disaffiliate 
a local Conservative association in which the majority of members sup­
port the rebel MR 
In light of this discussion, in the next section we develop a model 
for explaining party members' perceptions of the role of an MR The 
interesting question is whether they think that an MP should be primar­
ily concerned with serving constituency or national political interests. 
Local Party Members and Members of Parliament 
The attitudes of local party members toward the role of MPs can be 
conceptualized in two ways. One possible interpretation of this role is 
to see it as a trade-off between national and local political orientations: 
thus, if local party members are inclined to think that the main role of 
their MP is to support the party leadership and to be a loyal back­
bencher, they are likely to attach little importance to the role of the MP 
in looking after constituents and keeping in regular contact with the 
local party. Similarly, party members who see the MP as primarily a 
constituency worker are likely to be indifferent to parliamentary party 
cohesion. If this is true, then party members who attach great impor­
tance to constituency service will be willing to support a perennially 
dissident MP, providing that he or she pays close attention to the needs 
of constituents and the local party. Thus, constituency service can be 
used to create political capital that can be "spent" rebelling against the 
party line in Parliament. 
If party members in general are oriented toward national political 
issues, or "centralist" in their political orientations, then rebellious MPs 
are very likely to face reselection problems if they continuously dissent 
against the party leadership. By the same token, if most party members 
are oriented toward local political issues, or "localist" in their political 
orientations, then dissidence in Parliament is likely to be tolerated. 
An alternative model is one in which perceptions of the role orienta­
tions of MPs are largely independent of each other. Thus, an MP might 
get into reselection difficulties for two quite different reasons: because 
he or she repeatedly rebelled against the party leadership in Parliament 
and thus ran into difficulties at the local level or because he or she failed 
to perform local constituency services that are expected to be part of 
the job of an MP. In this interpretation, performance in one area would 
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not necessarily trade off against performance in another. An effective 
MP should perform well in both areas, and a member might get into 
difficulties if he or she ignored either aspect of the role of an MP. We 
examine evidence relating to these alternative models below. 
Turning next to the determinants of the political orientations of the 
party members, we hypothesize that these will be influenced by two 
classes of factors: their political experiences and political attitudes. 
These will be examined in turn. In the case of political experiences, 
party members who are most involved in local party activities will be 
most likely to expect that MPs should focus on local representation 
rather than national politics. This is because the activists have more time 
and energy invested at the local level in comparison with inactive party 
members and consequently should see their MP as an ally in main­
taining the local party organization. A corollary of this is that local 
party members who are officeholders within the local party organization 
should have the same views and should value the work of an MP at the 
local level. However, the same may not be true of local councilors, since 
they have extensive links with national government and are subject to 
nationally laid-down policies in much of their work. Accordingly, they 
are likely to attach considerable importance to the role of the MP in 
policy making. 
It may also be the case that long-established members are more lo­
calist in their assessments of the role of MPs in comparison with recent 
recruits; the former have more invested in party membership than the 
latter, which may orient them more toward local politics. 
One other type of political experience that should influence the atti­
tudes of local party members toward the role of their MP is the party 
affiliation of that MP. Conservatives are likely to feel differently about 
the role of the local MP in supporting local party activities if he or she 
is a member of the Conservative Party. If the local MP is a member of 
the Labour Party or the Liberal Democrats, they are less likely to be 
interested in his or her role in supporting the local party organization. 
With regard to political attitudes, members have views about the im­
portance of local politics and the local party organization in influencing 
local politics. Clearly, party members who attach particular importance 
to local government or the autonomy of local parties are likely to be 
more "localist" than members who attach little importance to these 
matters. We develop a localist attitudes scale below and use this to 
model the relationships between such attitudes and views concerning 
the role of MPs. 
60 - Whiteley and Seyd 
In earlier work that focused on explaining party activism, we hypoth­
esized that activism was promoted by various incentives for participa­
tion (Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, Richardson, 
and Bissell 1994). These included three types of "selective incentives" 
(see Olson 1965) for activism: process, outcome, and ideological incen­
tives. These are incentives for political participation that accrue only to 
those individuals who actively participate. 
It has long been noted that political leaders or "entrepreneurs" can 
be exempt from the paradox of participation, the proposition that ratio­
nal actors will not participate in collective action (see Olson 1965), 
because they have such incentives as interesting, well-paid jobs and elec­
tive office (Salisbury 1969). One of the features of party activism in Brit­
ain that distinguishes it from protest behavior or participation in an 
interest group is that politicians have to serve an "apprenticeship" 
within their party organization before being chosen for elective office 
(Ranney 1965). From this perspective, activism can be regarded as an 
investment in a possible future career in politics. Thus, outcome in­
centives measure the private returns from participation associated with 
developing a political career. It is likely that local party members inter­
ested in building a political career within the party will be more "lo­
calist" in their political orientation than members who do not have such 
ambitions, since succeeding in politics primarily involves succeeding at 
the local level. 
Process incentives and ideological incentives for participation are 
rooted, not in the outcomes of collective action, but rather in the process 
of participation itself. Different writers have referred to a number of 
motives that might be counted as process incentives: Tullock (1971) has 
written about the "entertainment" value of being involved in revolution; 
Opp (1990) has discussed the "catharsis" value of being involved in po­
litical protest. Process incentives refer to the extent to which party mem­
bers enjoy participation, since it provides an opportunity to meet like-
minded people and learn about the political process firsthand. We hy­
pothesize that individuals who are strongly motivated to participate by 
process incentives are likely to be more localist than members in gen­
eral, since their motivation to participate is driven by a desire for social 
interaction with local people and not by national policy concerns. 
The ideological incentives variable is interpreted as another type of 
process motivation for participation. The so-called "law of curvilinear 
disparity" of political parties is the proposition that middle-level elites 
or rank-and-file activists in a political party are likely to be more radical 
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than the party leadership or the voters (May 1973; Kitschelt 1989). In 
the case of the Conservative Party, it would imply that the activists 
are to the right of both the party leadership and Conservative voters 
(see also McKenzie 1963). This idea has been discussed mainly in rela­
tion to the question of defining party strategies; it implies, for example, 
that parties need to control their activists in order to pursue vote-
maximizing strategies. 
However, it also provides an interesting theoretical explanation of 
activism. Ideological radicalism should motivate party members to be­
come more involved than the voters or inactive members if the reward 
for their involvement is the ability to give expression to deeply held be­
liefs along with other like-minded individuals. Their motives are similar 
to those of the regular churchgoer—church attendance allows them to 
give expression to religious convictions. In this case, however, ideologi­
cal concerns are defined in relation to the national party organization, 
not just in relation to the local party. Accordingly, we would expect the 
national party to be the focus of ideological motives for involvement, 
making right-wing members more "centralist" in their political orienta­
tions than other members. 
Finally, members vary in their strength of attachments to the Conser­
vative Party or in terms of their expressive evaluations of the party. Such 
evaluations are rooted in the members' emotional attachments to the 
party and have long been discussed in the literature on party identifica­
tion and voting behavior, since the early theorists saw partisanship as 
an affective orientation toward a significant social or political group 
(see Campbell et al. 1960). Again, as in the case of ideology, members 
identify with the party as a whole and not merely the party at the local 
level. Accordingly, we hypothesize that members who are strongly 
attached to the Conservative Party are likely to be less "localist" and 
more "centralist" in their attitudes toward the role of MPs in compari­
son with members who are relatively weakly attached to the party. 
In the next section we consider some estimates relating to these 
models. 
Modeling Attitudes toward the Role of MPs 
The second wave of the panel survey of Conservative Party members 
contained a battery of questions that asked party members the question, 
"How important are the following parts of an MP's job?" They were 
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Table 3.1 
The Attitudes of Conservative Party Members to the Role of an MP (N = 1,604) 
Not at 
Very Fairly Not Very All 
Perceptions of the Role of an MP Important Important Important Important 
Speaking in Parliament 34.7 47.3 16.8 1.2 
Holding regular constituency 
surgeries 73.6 24.8 1.4 0.1 
Attending local party meetings 53.1 41.5 5.1 0.3 
Helping with individual problems 56.4 38.4 4.7 0.5 
Supporting the party leader 59.9 32.9 5.8 1.5 
Speaking to the national press 
and TV 23.1 44.1 27.6 5.2 
Defending party policy 56.0 36.7 6.0 1.2 
asked to comment upon seven different aspects of the work of a member 
of Parliament, and the responses to this battery of questions appear in 
table 3.1.2 
It can be seen that three of these aspects are unequivocally related 
to the role of an MP as a local constituency worker: "holding regular 
constituency surgeries," "attending local party meetings," and "helping 
with individual problems." Similarly, three of these role perceptions re­
late unambiguously to the role of an MP as a national actor, in support 
of the national party organization: "speaking in Parliament," "support­
ing the party leader," and "speaking to the national press and TV." The 
final indicator, "defending party policy," can be interpreted in either 
way. 
In view of the importance of the member's role in supporting the 
national party, it is interesting that the most important perception of 
the role of an MP was "holding constituency surgeries," which is very 
much a local matter. It is also noteworthy that majorities of party mem­
bers regard the other two indicators of localism, "attending party meet­
ings," and "helping with individual problems," as very important. 
In contrast, party members were less likely to attach importance to 
the indicators of national orientation, with the exception of "supporting 
the party leader"; some 60% of members thought this was a very impor­
tant function. Clearly, party members attach importance both to "lo­
calist" and to "centralist" political functions, but the former appear to 
be marginally more important than the latter. It is possible to investigate 
whether there is a single underlying "centralism-localism" scale in the 
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Table 3.2 
Factors Underlying Attitudes to the Role of an MP 
Centralism Localism 
Perceptions of the Role of an MP Factor Factor 
Speaking in Parliament 0.53 — 
Supporting the party leader 0.79 
— 
Speaking to the national press and TV 0.69 
— 
Defending party policy 0.80 
— 
Holding regular constituency surgeries — 0.79 
Attending local party meetings — 0.78 
Helping with individual problems 
— 0.75 
% variance explained 34.5 21 
responses or more than one such scale by means of a factor analysis of 
these indicators. This appears in table 3.2. 
The factor loadings in table 3.2 indicate that there are two distinct 
independent scales underlying the data.3 The first scale, which is de­
scribed as a "Centralism factor" loads on the nationally oriented indica­
tors, which include the ambiguous measure "defending party policy." 
The second scale, described as a "Localism factor," loads highly on the 
three localism indicators. It is clear that supporting the national party 
and constituency service are two separate dimensions of the role percep­
tions of MPs and that they do not directly trade off against each other 
in the minds of party members. Given this, it is interesting to examine 
the relationship between these variables and the indicators of political 
experience and political attitudes discussed above. Measures of these 
different aspects of the determinants of attitudes toward the role of an 
MP are discussed in the appendix to this chapter. 
Table 3.3 contains regression models of the Centralism and Localism 
factors, where the dependent variables are factor scores from the analy­
sis in table 3.2. On the Centralism scale, a high score factor score de­
notes a belief that the role of an MP in national politics is unimportant, 
and a low score the reverse; similarly, a high score on the Localism scale 
means that respondents attach little importance to the local role of the 
MP, with a low score denoting the opposite. There are two models for 
each scale, the second model containing only statistically significant 
predictors from the first model 
The Activism scale in table 3.3 encompasses a number of high-cost 
activities such as canvassing, attending party meetings, and running for 
office within the party organization (see the appendix to this chapter). 
64 - Whiteley and Seyd 
Table 3.3 
Models of the Centralism and Localism Factors 
Centralism Centralism Localism Localism 
Predictor Variables Scale Scale Scale Scale 
Activism scale 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.00 — 
Year respondent joined the party 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.0 3 — 
Respondent local councillor -0.08** -0.07*** 0.01 — 
Respondent officeholder in party 0.01 — -0.0 5 — 
Constituency held by Conservatives 0.01 — -0.0 1 — 
Local government scale 0.04 — 0.06* 0.06* 
Local party scale -0.0 5 — 0.12*** 0.13*** 
Outcome incentives for activism -0.11** * -0.11** * 0.11*** 0.11*** 
Process incentives for activism 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
Left-right ideology scale for party -0.09** -0.09** 0.04 — 
Strength of identification with party 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
% variance explained 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.06 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***/? < 0.01. 
The relationship between the Activism and Centralism scales implies 
that the highly active members are less likely to attach importance to 
the national role of the MP than inactive members. The same point can 
be made about recent recruits to the party and party members moti­
vated by outcome incentives: both types of members attach considerable 
importance to the local role of the MR In contrast, right-wing members, 
strongly attached members, local councillors, and members who are 
motivated by process incentives all attach great importance to the na­
tionally oriented role of their MP. 
These findings all accord with expectations, except for the findings 
that members motivated by process incentives and those who have been 
long-standing members are more likely to support a centralist role for 
their MR Process incentives for participation appear to behave like 
ideological incentives, and individuals motivated by such concerns are 
oriented toward the national rather than the local level. Similarly, since 
most of the long-standing members have little contact with the local 
party organization, this fact clearly orients them toward the national 
party leadership. Also, Conservative incumbency at the local level does 
not appear to influence attitudes toward the national role of the MP, 
nor do the various attitudes that make up the local government and 
local party scales. 
Turning next to the Localism scale, in this case a high score on the 
factor implies that a respondent discounts the importance of the local 
role of the MP, and a low score has the opposite interpretation. Thus, 
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members with a low score on this factor will attach considerable impor­
tance to the constituency work of the local MR In this case, activism 
appears to have very little influence on attitudes, and the same is true 
for office holding, Conservative incumbency, and ideology. However, 
scores on this scale are significantly predicted by the two localist atti­
tude scales that relate to attitudes toward the local provision of services 
and toward the autonomy of the local party organization and the locally 
elected council. Not surprisingly, party members who oppose the con­
tracting out of local services to the private sector and the opting out 
of local schools from local authority control tend to attach particular 
importance to the constituency service role of an MR The same point 
can be made about party members who attach importance to the auton­
omy of the local party organization and local government: they value 
constituency work by an MR 
In common with the Centralism scale, it is also the case that party 
members who are motivated by outcome incentives tend to favor a lo­
calist orientation to constituency service by MPs. However, the same is 
not true of members motivated by process incentives. It may be recalled 
that they tended to be procentralist on the Centralism scale, but in this 
case they tend to be prolocalist. Thus, the original hypothesis that mem­
bers motivated by process incentives would be oriented to the local level 
is partially confirmed: this is true when they are evaluating constituency 
service but not true when they are evaluating the role of the MP in 
supporting the parliamentary party line. A similar point can be made 
about strongly attached party members: they are procentralist on the 
Centralism scale and prolocalist on the Localism scale. For both vari­
ables, a belief in the importance of constituency service does not rule 
out a belief in the importance of loyalty in supporting the government. 
These differences in the two models of attitudes toward the role of 
MPs create the possibility for strategic decision making by MPs with 
regard to their relationships with local party members. If they choose 
to persistently rebel against the party whip in Parliament, this will upset 
strongly attached and process-oriented party members. But with these 
groups, they can "buy off" that discontent by being assiduous constitu­
ency workers who hold regular surgeries and look after the interests of 
their local party. 
On the other hand, if an MP is a stalwart party loyalist in the House 
of Commons, this will not offset the unpopularity engendered by his or 
her neglect of constituency matters for those party members who attach 
considerable importance to local government and local party autonomy. 
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Their beliefs about the desirability of local autonomy influence their 
attitudes toward the constituency work of MPs but do not influence 
their attitudes toward the MP's role in the House of Commons. From 
the MP's point of view, good behavior in the House does not buy credit 
at the local level from this particular group of members. 
In relation to the future of party cohesion in the House of Commons, 
the finding that activists are more prolocalist than other members on 
the Centralism scale is particularly important. It seems clear that activ­
ists, who are particularly influential in the recruitment of MPs, are less 
concerned about party loyalty in the House than the conventional wis­
dom suggests. In addition, they do not appear to be more concerned 
about constituency work than other less active members. This suggests 
that an MP can be a dissident without having to be an assiduous local 
constituency worker, at least as far as the activists are concerned. Given 
that for the average MP, the most important issue in their relationship 
with local parties is to keep the activists happy, this gives them consider­
able scope for dissension in the House. 
Conclusions 
In evaluating the future of party discipline in the House of Commons, 
researchers need to focus on the relationship between the "selector-
ate"—the local party activists—and MPs. An examination of party 
members' attitudes toward the role of MPs produces some predictable 
findings, such as that strongly attached party members value party loy­
alty in the House and that party members who value local autonomy 
attach particular importance to constituency service by their MP. How­
ever, the analysis also produces some surprising findings, particularly 
the fact that activists are not that concerned about their MP's willing­
ness to toe the party line in Parliament. Moreover, a dissident MP does 
not have to be overly preoccupied with constituency service in order to 
keep them happy with his or her performance. It seems clear that the 
modern Conservative Party is different from the party discussed by Ran-
ney (1965), in which the local activists were the enforcers of parliamen­
tary discipline. 
Some current trends in British politics are likely to promote a more 
"candidate-centered" type of politics in which the grip of the parliamen­
tary whips is likely to weaken over time. One such development is the 
growth of the personal vote at the constituency level. Traditionally, the 
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personal vote in Britain has been seen as rather small, but recent evi­
dence suggests that it is rather larger than the conventional wisdom be­
lieves (Wood and Norton 1992). Given this fact, it seems plausible that 
MPs will increasingly seek to emphasize constituency work as a means 
of overcoming a national deficit in their party's popularity. This trend 
will reinforce the localist tendencies within constituency parties. 
A second development is the weakening of local government, a trend 
that has been taking place over the last 15 to 20 years. As central gov­
ernment has reduced the power and influence of locally elected authori­
ties, the incentives to participate have been weakened for those party 
members who want to build a career in politics. This builds resentment 
toward the center—both Parliament and, more particularly, the na­
tional party organization. The latter is no longer seen as being support­
ive of local parties, but rather as the agent of a national institution that 
has systematically devalued local party activity. This could, in part, 
explain why the members' strength of identification with the national 
party has declined significantly over time (Whiteley and Seyd 1995). It 
could also explain why some 51% of party members think that the leader 
should be elected by a system of one party member, one vote (Whiteley, 
Seyd, and Richardson 1994, 266). Again, this will tend to reinforce lo­
calism and make party activists less likely to support national impera­
tives such as sustaining backbench discipline in the House of Commons 
and donating money to the national party funds. 
In light of this discussion, it appears that appeals to the grassroots 
by the parliamentary leadership for help in disciplining rebellious back­
benchers are increasingly quite likely to fall on deaf ears. Of course, 
dissident MPs need to pay attention to localist attitudes among their 
party activists and also to the incentives that encourage members to 
participate at the local level. But at least in the case of the Conservative 
Party, an MP who gratifies local sensibilities and who does a reasonable 
amount of constituency service can persistently rebel in the House of 
Commons without being unduly concerned that this will lead to his or 
her deselection. 
APPENDIX 
The scales used in table 3.3 were constructed from various attitude indi­
cators in the survey of Conservative Party members. 
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The Activist Scale 
Members were told, "We would like to ask you about political 
activities you may have taken part in during the last five years:" The 
activities were "Displaying an election poster in a window," "signing a 
petition supported by the party," "donating money to Conservative 
Party funds," "delivering party leaflets during an election," "attending a 
party meeting " "helping at a Conservative Party function," "canvassing 
voters on the doorstep on behalf of the party," "canvassing voters on 
the telephone on behalf of the party," "standing for office in the party 
organization," and "standing for elected office in a local government or 
national parliamentary election " Possible responses were 1 = not at all, 
2 = rarely, 3 = occasionally, and 4 = frequently. A principal-components 
analysis with a varimax rotation revealed two factors underlying the 
responses to these items. The first factor, which loads highly on all items, 
from delivering leaflets to standing for office in local government, is 
used in the present analysis. 
Local Government and Local Party Scales 
These scales were derived from a factor analysis of a set of atti­
tude measures relating to the autonomy of local government and the 
local Conservative Party. Members were asked to respond to the follow­
ing Likert-scaled items (1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree 
nor disagree, 4 = disagree, and 5 = strongly disagree): 
• "Contracting out local government services to private firms has 
not improved the quality of local services." 
• "Elected local government should be protected from central gov­
ernment interference." 
• "Schools should not be encouraged to opt out of local education 
authority control" 
• "Conservative Central Office should have a more influential role in 
the selection of parliamentary candidates." 
• "Party policies should be determined by party members." 
The local government factor loaded highly on the first, third, and fourth 
of these items, and the local party factor loaded highly on the second, 
fourth, and fifth items. 
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Outcome Incentives for Participation 
This scale was derived from two Likert-scaled statements: 
"A person like me could do a good job of being a Conservative 
Councillor." 
"The Conservative Party would be more successful if more people 
like me were elected to Parliament." 
Both items loaded highly on a single factor. 
Process Incentives for Participation 
This scale was derived from three Likert-scaled statements: 
• "Being an active party member is a good way to meet interesting 
people." 
• "The only way to be really educated about politics is to be a 
party activist" 
• "Getting involved in party activities during an election can be fun." 
All three items loaded highly on a single factor. 
Left-Right Ideology Scale 
This was measured by a 9-point left-right scale, introduced with 
the following preamble: 
In Conservative Party politics, people often talk about the "left" and 
the "right." Compared with other Conservative Party members, 
where would you place your views on the scale below? 
Strength of Identification with the Party 
Members were asked, "Would you call yourself a very strong 
Conservative, fairly strong, not very strong, or not at all strong?" (coded 
from 1 to 4 respectively). 
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NOTES 
1. See November 30, December 2, December 5, and December 8, 1994. 
2. Membership data in the Conservative Party are held at the constituency 
level, so our survey of party members involved a two-stage stratified random-
sample panel design. A 5% sample of constituency associations in Great Brit­
ain was selected and stratified by region, and a random sample of party mem­
bers were surveyed in those constituencies in early 1992, just before the 
general election. The survey response rate was 63%, giving 2,467 individual 
respondents after weighting for gender and strength of partisanship. The sec-
ond-wave panel was conducted in the spring of 1994 and had a response rate 
of 64.9%. Interlocking weights for strength of partisanship and gender were 
applied to ensure that this wave was representative of members in general. 
Further methodological details of the surveys can be found in Whiteley, Seyd, 
and Richardson (1994, appendix 1). 
3. Table 3.2 contains the varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal-
components analysis of the seven indicators. 
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Backbenchers with Attitude: 
A Seismic Study of the 
Conservative Party and 
Dissent on Europe 
DAVI D BAKER, ANDRE W GAMBLE , 
STEVE LUDLAM , AND 
DAVI D SEAWRIGHT 
In contrast to the U.S. system of government, British political parties place enormous weight on unity; parliamentary dissi­
dence, especially in the Conservative Party, tends to be single-issue and 
short-lived in character. The conventional wisdom is that not only the 
electoral system but the very procedures of Parliament institutionalize 
strong single-party government. Consequently, in spite of deep and en­
during internal disagreements, the Conservative Party has suffered only 
two major splits in the last 149 years.1 Unlike the Liberals and Labour, 
the Conservatives have never split on domestic issues. There have, how­
ever, been numerous Conservative divisions over imperial and foreign 
policy: 80 Conservative MPs voted against the Government of India 
Bill in 1935, 74 against the Washington Loan in 1946, 50 against the 
Rhodesian sanctions in 1965, and—with the biggest postwar Tory rebel­
lion in a whipped vote—116 on the same issue in 1978. In spite of these 
divisions, few splits have occurred. However, major strategic policy 
choices occasionally make it hard to sustain this facade of unity, and 
the two occasions when the party has split (1846 and 1906) emerged 
72 
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over just such strategic choices, namely Britain's future role in the world 
political economy. Such choices cannot easily be subsumed by the need 
to win elections or to placate declining sections of the economy. In 1846 
it was the abolition of the Corn Laws and in 1906 disagreement over 
the necessity for Tariff Reform that split the party (Baker, Gamble, and 
Ludlam, 1993a; see Gamble 1974 for a fuller discussion of these two 
splits).2 
Today, European integration has become exactly this sort of issue 
for the Conservative Party, since the decision to go on or to hang back 
(perhaps even to withdraw) has serious implications for the long-term 
future of the British economy and the sovereignty of national political 
institutions. As a result, the European issue has been responsible for a 
series of humiliating parliamentary defeats and U-turns. It has also 
played a major part in the loss of several members of recent Conserva­
tive governments, including two chancellors and Prime Minister Marga­
ret Thatcher. It led to the withdrawal of the whip from eight MPs—the 
first time such action had been taken by a Conservative government 
since 1928.3 So serious are the differences that arise over this issue that 
there has been inevitable speculation as to whether the party could be 
on the verge of another historic split like those over Tariff Reform and 
the Corn Laws (Baker et al. 1993a). 
Yet in spite of the known severity of the divisions within the Parlia­
mentary Conservative Party (PCP), this has not been reflected in the 
voting patterns of Conservative MPs. British parliamentary procedures 
and the strong single-party government system make the process of de­
tecting the attitudes of MPs and ministers through their behavior pat­
terns in Parliament all but impossible. The system gives no alternative 
home for most rebellious MPs, who must face the prospect of an elec­
tion and replacement by the opposition if they place their beliefs above 
their party in crucial votes. The "iron law of backbench rebellions," at­
tributed to former Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, states that 
the maximum number of rebels in any Commons vote of confidence is 
one less than the number needed to wipe out the government's majority 
(Economist, October 31, 1992). This was an "iron law" that the extraor­
dinary circumstances surrounding the Maastricht Bill might have 
proved capable of breaking (Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, 1994b).4 
In addition, considerations of career and threats and/or inducements 
from the party whips make open dissent a dangerous game, particularly 
for members of the governing party. The whipping system (a formal 
party discipline mechanism based on the whips' office) is a very effective 
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machine under most circumstances (Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, 
1993b). The rules of the parliamentary game as played by most MPs are 
loyal support for the government no matter what the private beliefs of 
the individual MPs, an attitude summed up in a phrase by Clemenceau: 
"A speech may often change my mind; my vote never." Few MPs habitu­
ally rebel. Enoch Powell's record of voting against the whips on 113 
occasions between 1970 and 1974 was an enormous exception to this 
rule. Most MPs manage to be rather more loyal than that. Not surpris­
ingly, Powell described the whips as "a prerequisite for civilization like 
a sewer." The whips are unnecessary as party conduits where ministers 
are concerned, since ministers are bound by cabinet collective responsi­
bility to toe the government line, at least in Parliament, or to resign. 
Since Heath used his position as a whip as a springboard to high office, 
service as a whip has been recognized as a point of entry into higher 
ministerial ranks—William Whitelaw and John Major are also notable 
former whips. 
The whips' offices are well-oiled political machines, with huge pow­
ers of patronage over career advancement, government jobs, member­
ship of select committees, foreign trips, and so forth. Most of the 
warfare is purely psychological, as one whip remarked: "Eighty percent 
of all confessions to the Spanish Inquisition came when they explained 
what was going to happen to their victims and showed them the imple­
ments." Nor does pressure end with the vote: ministers and "loyalists" 
often demand that examples be made of those who defy the government 
line, usually in the form of removal of the whip, deselection, or demo­
tion. The fact that a free-vote has to be called to allow MPs and minis­
ters to vote according to their conscience is a sign of the strength of 
party discipline in the Commons. 
Consequently, voting behavior is often a very limited way of telling 
what the real attitudes of most MPs of the governing party are, for what 
may appear as minor tremors detected through open parliamentary dis­
sent can in fact be "seismic" traces of what is a potential major earth­
quake of dissent underneath. The problem is how we find out what is 
going on when observable behavior in Parliament may represent only a 
hint of the real levels of dissent existing underneath. 
Logically, dissent should be most evident when a pressure-point issue 
emerges that divides the party deeply (Baker et al. 1993a). Postwar con­
flict over European integration used to be seen by political scientists as 
most damaging to Labour, but the Conservative Party also has a long 
history of division over Europe. Skillful party management in the 1960s 
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and Labour rebels in the 1970s enabled successive Conservative leaders 
to conduct negotiations to join the European Economic Community 
(EEC) while marginalizing their own dissidents in Parliament. As a re­
sult, the issue received relatively little detailed academic attention apart 
from Ashford's study of the 1945-to-1975 period, which, significantly, 
concluded that the European issue required the party to be viewed more 
as a "managed coalition" than as a stable hierarchy (Ashford 1980,123— 
24). The tensions beneath the surface of the party increased as the pro­
cess of European integration deepened during the 1980s, but it was the 
lethal combination of the Maastricht Treaty, Britain's membership in 
and ignominious exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM),5 a 
government reliant on a small majority in the Commons, and Labour's 
new-found pro-European unity that undermined this party manage­
ment strategy, revealing a growing ambivalence within the Conservative 
leadership about closer European integration (Lawson 1992, 71-76). 
The Maastricht Minefield 
The first Danish Referendum in June 19926 provoked the appearance of 
open dissent in the party, since it gave hope to the rebels that their case 
was shared elsewhere and that a Danish "no" vote would lead to the fall 
of the treaty. The Parliamentary Euro-Rebellion was launched by the 
anti-Maastricht "Fresh Start" Early Day Motion (EDM)7 on June 3, 
1992. The rebels' resolve was further reinforced by Britain's forced with­
drawal from the ERM in September 1992. From now on, certain names 
would reappear in the opposition lobbies with monotonous regularity 
on Maastricht, most notably Bill Cash, Sir Teddy Taylor, and Anne and 
Nicholas Winterton. We have compiled a "league table" of the 50 Con­
servative MPs who voted against the government in one or more of 62 
divisions on the European Communities (Amendment) Bill between 
May 1992 and May 1993 (table 4.1). 
Three leading rebels voted against the government no less than 50 
times, or 81% of all divisions. The top 22 names, all of whom rebelled 
between 25 and 50 times in the divisions, read like a "Who's Who" of 
the Maastricht rebellion. No fewer than 43 of the 50 dissenters signed 
both of Michael Spicer's "Fresh Start" EDMs in June and September 
1992. From then on, the passage of the Maastricht Bill was dogged by 
"ducked" votes, humiliating U-turns, particularly on the Social Chap­
ter8 Amendment, and outright defeat on the composition of Britain's 
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Table 4.1 
League Table of Conservative Dissent in Parliament on the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill, 1992-1993 
%of %of 
No. of Dissenting No. of Dissenting 
Dissenting Votes in All Dissenting Votes in All 
Name Votes Divisions Name Votes Divisions 
Cash, W. 50 81 Hawksley, W. 18 29 
Taylor, Sir T. 50 81 Porter, D 17 27 
Winterton, N. 50 81 Legg, B. 16 26 
Winterton, Mrs. A. 48 77 Pawsey, J. 15 24 
Gill, C. 46 74 Allason, R. 14 23 
Knapman, R. 45 73 Carttiss, M.* 14 23 
Jessel, T. 44 71 Boyson, Sir R. 12 19 
Skeet, Sir T. 44 71 Duncan-Smith, I. 10 16 
Gorman, Mrs. T. 42 68 Townend, J. 9 14 
Walker, B. 41 66 Fry, P. 6 10 
Marlow, T. 40 65 Hunter, A. 6 10 
Budgen, N. 39 63 Moate, Sir R. 4 6 
Shepherd, R. 39 63 Bonsor, Sir N. 3 5 
Lawrence, Sir I. 38 61 Greenway, H. 3 5 
Lord, M. 37 60 Bendall, V. 2 3 
Spicer, M. 37 60 Clark, Dr. M. 2 3 
Cran, 1 36 58 Devar, N. 2 3 
Wilkinson, J. 34 55 Jenkin, B. 2 3 
Body, Sir R. 32 52 Whittingdale, J. 2 3 
Biffen, 1 * 30 48 Dunn, B. 1 2 
Tapsell, Sir R* 28 45 Johnson Smith, Sir G.* 1 2 
Gardiner, Sir G. 25 40 Luff, P.* 1 2 
Butcher, X 23 37 Robatham, A. 1 2 
Carlisle, I 22 35 Rowe, A. 1 2 
Sweeney, W* 21 34 Vaughan, Sir G. 1 2 
Source: Information supplied to the authors by the Public Information Office, House of Com­
mons, 1 Derby Gate, Westminster, London SW1A 2DG. 
"Indicates that this individual failed to sign both of the "Fresh Start" Early Day Motions of June and 
September 1992. 
delegation to the Committee of the Regions. What also marks this out 
as a serious disagreement within the PCP was the appearance, in Sep­
tember 1993, of the "Fresh Start Alliance"—a right-wing group within 
the party that campaigned on a range of European issues. They repre­
sented a well-organized alliance of anti-Maastricht rebels who sup­
ported both "Fresh Start" EDMs of June 3 and September 24, 1992, 
and were prepared to use any procedural device or alliance with the 
opposition to defeat the treaty. Lady Thatcher and Lord Tebbit sup­
ported this alliance from within the Lords. Significantly, the last such 
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group appearing within the Conservative Party that threatened the over­
all majority was also anti-European—the so-called "1970 Group" of 
Common Market entry dissenters (Norton 1978, chap. 3). Indeed, for­
mer Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath suffered a defection of 
no less than 20 of his party on a vote of confidence on Europe in 1972 
(see table 4.2, 1972i). 
The rebellion strengthened during the Maastricht Bill's second read-
ing—so much so that the combined efforts of the 1992 committee of 
backbench MPs to "ambush" its rebel members, strident ministerial de­
nunciations, and appeals to constituencies to discipline rebels, on top 
of the efforts of the whips, all failed, as revealed by the government's 
defeat by 22 votes on a Committee of the Regions Amendment (in which 
26 Conservative MPs rebelled and 18 abstained). Having forced damag­
ing U-turns on Social Chapter Amendments, 41 Conservative rebels 
then voted against the third reading of the Maastricht Bill, along with 
five abstainers. 
Had Major's majority been higher, more "Fresh Starters" might well 
have joined the rebels. Three tactics were employed by the rebels to de­
feat the bill. First, they sought to delay the bill in the hope of changes 
in the wider political environment—in particular, by submitting a huge 
volume of amendments (in all, there were 210 hours of debate and over 
600 amendments by the third-reading vote). Second, they tried to force 
the government to hold a national referendum on Maastricht (particu­
larly when the Danish Referendum raised hopes of a Maastricht defeat). 
After the Committee of the Regions Amendment defeat, the rebels re­
peatedly offered a truce on the grounds of the holding of such a referen­
dum. As Teddy Taylor put it, "A referendum and the rebellion ends 
tomorrow." (But since Labour's frontbench were opposed to a referen­
dum, there was no real prospect of defeating the government on this 
issue). Third, the rebels sought to pass an amendment or amendments 
that would wreck the whole treaty. 
During the third reading, the government was forced into embar­
rassing tactical retreats, avoiding procedural votes and acquiescing in a 
set of amendments that it did not dare put to the vote, culminating in a 
humiliating Commons U-turn by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, who 
suddenly climbed down on a number of hostile amendments. Maastricht 
ended in high drama. In the votes on the Social Chapter on July 22, 
1993, the government was defeated by eight votes on the substantive 
motion. Since a positive vote was needed for ratification of the treaty, 
the government was forced to use its bluntest weapon—threatening to 
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Table 4.2 
Key Conservative Parliamentary Rebellions against European Integration, 1961-1995 
Rebels 
as%of 
Back-
Cross- Total bench 
Year Vote Voters Abstainers Rebels MPs Notes 
1961 Conservative government 1 24 25 9 Passed with Labour 
motion supporting EC opposition support 
entry application 
1967 Labour government 26 0 26 10 Passed with 
motion supporting EC Conservative 
entry application opposition support 
1971 Conservative government 39 2 41 16 Labour opposed 
motion supporting EC (Conservative free 
entry application vote) 
19721 Conservative government 15 5 20 8 Labour opposed, 
European Communities government majority 8 
Bill second reading, 
Heath's vote of 
confidence 
1972ii Conservative rebel 22 9 31 12 Only passed with 
proreferendum Labour support 
amendment 
1972m Conservative government 16 4 20 8 Labour opposed 
European Communities 
Bill third reading 
1975 Labour government 8 18 26 9 Conservative support 
motion accepting (Labour free vote) 
"renegotiated" entry 
terms 
1978 European Assemblies 9 0 9 3 Conservatives support 
Elections Bill third Labour government 
reading 
1986 European Communities 7 0 7 2 
Amendment (Single 
European Act) Bill third 
reading 
1992i European Communities 22 4 26 10 
Amendment 
("Maastricht") Bill 
second reading 
1992H European Communities 26 6 32 13 Government majority 
Amendment 3, with Liberal-
("Maastricht") Bill Democrat support 
paving motion 
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Table 4.2 
Key Conservative Parliamentary Rebellions against European Integration, 1961-1995 
continued 
Rebels 
as%of 
Back-
Cross- Total bench 
Year Vote Voters Abstainers Rebels MPs Notes 
19931 European Communities 26 18 44 17 Government defeated 
Amendment by 22 votes 
("Maastricht") Bill 
Committee of the 
Regions amendment 
1993ii European Communities 38 13 51 20 Government win by 
Amendment 239 votes 
("Maastricht") Bill 
referendum amendment 
1993iii European Communities 41 5 46 18 Government majority 
Amendment of 180 
("Maastricht") Bill third 
reading 
1993iv Postponed Social 23 1 24 9 Government defeated 
Chapter vote, July 22 by 8 votes 
1993v Major's confidence vote, 0 1 1 0 Government Majority 
July 23, on Social 40, whip removed 
Chapter from abstainer 
19941 Major's confidence vote, 0 8 8 3 Labour abstain, 
November 28, European Government majority 
Communities (Finance) 241, whip removed 
Bill second reading from 8 rebels, a ninth 
resigns 
199411 Vote on Labour 7 10 17 6 Government defeat by 
amendment to Finance 8 votes; all but one of 
Bill to abandon stage 2 "unwhjpped" Euro-
of imposition of VAT on rebels rebel 
fuel 
Source: Adapted from Ludlam (1996). 
hold a "vote of confidence" in itself the following day, that, if lost, 
threatened defeat for the Conservatives in a subsequent general election. 
This threat brought all the Euro-rebels except one (Rupert Allison, who 
was otherwise engaged in Bermuda and who lost the whip for his pains) 
back into the government lobby. This graphically underlines the limits 
of dissidence in the PCR As ever, party mattered more than principle 
on this occasion. One should remember, however, that the government 
was assisted by the fact that the opposition was more pro-European 
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than it was, offering to incorporate the Social Chapter and raising an 
even "worse" specter of prointegrationist federalism if elected. 
As it was, the bill only survived because the government postponed 
any vote on the Social Chapter until after it was enacted, leaving ratifi­
cation of the treaty dependent on the separate votes that produced such 
drama on July 22 to 23, 1993 (in spite of an overwhelming Commons 
majority for the treaty). 
Old Wine in New Bottles? 
The reasons behind this outbreak of open civil war in the Conservative 
Party include the change in Labour's position on Europe. This has al­
tered considerably since Edward Heath piloted Britain into Europe in 
1972. In 1972 Labour was seriously divided over Europe, and "anti-
Marketeer" Conservatives were under pressure to preserve party unity 
in order to maximize the Conservative Party's electoral advantage. In 
recent years Labour appears as a united pro-European party, and calls 
to unite behind a pro-European policy in order to defeat Labour on 
Europe are more easily resisted by today's Euro-rebels (Baker and Sea-
wright 1997). Also, when electoral considerations and whip's pressure 
failed to discipline his rebels, Edward Heath could rely on dissenting 
Labour votes to ensure a majority; consequently, he never lost a vote on 
Europe. In contrast, John Major had to face a disciplined pro-European 
Labour opposition. 
It is also noticeable that in both 1972 and 1993, Conservative govern­
ments had relatively small majorities, making threats to withdraw the 
whip from rebels largely empty. Events proved this, when eight Conser­
vatives lost the whip and one voluntarily relinquished it without any 
major effect on their dissent, and they were subsequently accepted back 
into the fold without any of the usual disciplinary measures against 
them because of the drastic situation of a government majority down 
to one. Many hard-core rebels also occupied relatively safe seats. Of 
those rebelling on the Maastricht Paving Motion or the Committee of 
the Regions Amendment, three quarters enjoyed majorities of over 10%, 
more than half of over 20% (see also Norton 1978, 188-89, and chap. 3 
of this volume). 
Major's chief strategy during Maastricht was to hold the Conserva­
tive Party together and prevent it from splitting, both by fudging the 
issues wherever possible and by threatening to resign and take the party 
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out of office with him where this failed (tactics reminiscent of Heath's 
in the early 1970s). The triumphant "opt-outs" from the Social Chapter 
and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) negotiated at Maastricht 
were chiefly designed to hold the party together. Nevertheless, the Euro-
skeptics were alarmed by this, since it highlighted the dangers of the 
process that had necessitated the opt-outs in the first place. Major's 
strategy and the problems he encountered in the process were best 
summed up in off-the-cuff remarks that he made to a television journal­
ist, which were inadvertently recorded for posterity and later less than 
inadvertently leaked: 
The real problem is one of a tiny majority. Don't overlook that I 
could have all these clever decisive things which people wanted me 
to do—but I would have split the Conservative party into smither­
eens. And you would have said I acted like a ham-fisted leader. Just 
think it through from my perspective. You are the prime minister 
with a majority of 18, a party that is harking back to a golden age 
that never was, and is now invented. You have three right-wing mem­
bers of the cabinet who actually resign. What happens in the parlia­
mentary party? . .  . I could bring in other people. But where do you 
think most of this poison is coming from? From the dispossessed and 
the never-possessed. You can think of ex-ministers who are going 
round causing all sorts of trouble. We don't want another three more 
of the bastards out there. (July 27, 1993) 
If anyone has any doubts of the discrepancy between the private 
views of members of the Commons and their public utterances, they 
should contrast this with Major's answer to a Labour MP's question 
delivered during the Danish Referendum debate, on June 3, 1992: "On 
the Hon. Gentleman's 1975 illustration, as I recall the Conservative 
Party voted against a referendum in 1975. It was introduced only to 
cover up divisions in the [Labour] Cabinet of the day. No such divisions 
exist in my Cabinet" (Hansard, 6th sen, 208, col. 839). 
Seismic Detection: How to Reveal 
the True Depth of Dissent? 
In the British context, the figures of parliamentary dissent over Europe 
in both the 1971-72 and 1992-93 sessions are unprecedented under a 
Conservative government in this century. But given the huge pressures 
on Conservative MPs to conform, they may serve as only a "seismic" 
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indicator of deeper tremors beneath the surface. Crucially, it is the per­
sistence of the rebellion in Parliament, rather than its scale, that gives 
away the depth of division within the party 
When Norton emphasized the level of persistent dissent over the Eu­
ropean issue in the 1970-74 Conservative government, he used Finer et 
al.'s quote in support of the idea that the "European issue" was more 
the exception than the rule: "The Conservative party is not divided into 
wings, with each wing espousing a line or tendency of policy affecting 
all departments of national life. This alone goes far to explain the resil­
ience and unity of the Conservative party. By their very nature, the inter­
nal quarrels of the party are temporary. They subside as the issues which 
gave birth are resolved" (Finer, cited in Norton 1978, 244). But as we 
have discussed above, more than 20 years after Mr. Heath fought to take 
Britain into Europe, the issue has still not subsided within the Conserva­
tive Party Norton himself continually emphasized that the incidence of 
dissent over the European issue, particularly in the session 1971-72, was 
without precedent in postwar British parliamentary history, both in 
terms of the number of divisions with dissenting votes and in terms of 
the persistent public dissent expressed on the floor of the House (Nor­
ton 1978, 61). The persistent dissension found by Norton in the parlia­
mentary session 1971-72 is stronger for the parliamentary session 
1991-92 (see table 4.3). The former session included 38 members rebel­
ling on one occasion and 36 members rebelling on between two and 
nine occasions; but during the Maastricht Bill, no fewer than 53 MPs 
rebelled once and 117 MPs between 2 and 10 times. 
Norton's findings also show that no more than nine Tory MPs were 
willing to oppose their government in the 1971-72 session on more than 
59 occasions. Yet on 59 occasions during the European Communities 
Amendment Bill, between May 21, 1992, and May 20, 1993, an average 
of 19 Conservative members opposed their government on this issue 
alone. Also, in 10 of those incidents, we find only one or two MPs op­
posing the Maastricht Bill, mostly Bill Cash or Sir Teddy Taylor. If these 
incidents are not considered, the average Conservative "dissent" on just 
this bill rises to 22 members in each division for the 1991-92 session, 
compared to Norton's 10 MPs. Moreover, Norton (1978, 66) highlights 
the fact that 44 Conservatives registered their disapproval against entry 
to Europe in an EDM on July 23, 1970. However, on June 3, 1992, no 
less than 84 Tory MPs signed the "Fresh Start" EDM calling for the 
government to grasp the opportunity afforded it by the Danish Referen-
dum—which effectively suspended Maastricht—to renegotiate Britain's 
position vis-a-vis Europe (see Appendix for full text). 
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Table 4.3 
Conservative Dissent, 1971/72 and 1992/93 
No. of Dissenting No. of 
Session Votes Cast Members 
1971/72 1 only 38 
2-9 36 
10-19 4 
20-29 0 
30-39 4 
40-49 1 
50-59 2 
60-69 5 
70-79 0 
80 or more 2 
Total 92 
1992/93 1 only 53 
2-10 117 
11-20 7 
21-30 8 
31-40 7 
41-50 10 
51 or more 4 
Total 206 
Sources: Norton (1978, 63); Campaign Information Ltd. (1994). 
If such dissent does persist, as it would appear to have done, it jeop­
ardizes the very nature of British party government. Thus, Rose (1975, 
129) states that "the government of Britain depends upon party organi­
sation. The disciplined support of a parliamentary majority is a sine qua 
non of cabinet government as we know it." The British media have made 
great play over Mr. Major's lack of this indispensable asset. However, it 
is clear that the party in the legislature is still one of tendencies and not 
one of factions, as defined by Rose (1975). Recently a debate has arisen 
about Rose's definition of factions and tendencies (Brand 1989; Barnes 
1994, 342-45). For instance, groups such as the No Turning Back 
Group and Conservative Way Forward are organized and active on a 
range of issues from a particular right-wing perspective. "The once con­
ventional view of a Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) free of in­
ternal tendencies, factions and ginger groups has long been challenged, 
and from the perspective of 1995 it is hard to imagine how such a view 
was ever credible" (Ludlam 1996, 98-99). 
The so-called "Fresh Start" alliance does not easily fit Rose's (1975, 
313) definition of "consciously organised political activity on a broad 
range of policies" because it operates only on the European issue. How­
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ever, there certainly is a faction in Rose's other use of the term—that is, 
an element of opinion within the party that has "persisted through 
time": "Because they persist through time, factions can be distinguished 
from the ad hoc combinations of politicians in agreement upon one par­
ticular issue or at one moment in time" (Rose 1975, 313). 
But the only realistic method of revealing the true depth of division 
(factional or otherwise) is to discover in some way the actual beliefs of 
the PCP on the European issue in this period and to compare the figures 
of dissent on specific European issues with known attitudes in the par­
liamentary party. This is what this chapter is ultimately intended to 
achieve. But before we turn to our core analysis, it is salutary to review 
other approaches to the measurement of dissent. 
British Parliamentary Behavior Studies 
Studies of how MPs behave in Parliament have yielded a rich crop of 
qualitative insights but have often been hampered by the small number 
of quantitative measures available. The most fruitful examples of the 
latter have been records of voting, attendance, and speaking; member­
ship of committees; and the signing of EDMs. 
Because voting in the House is widely considered unreliable as an 
indicator of beliefs, an alternative method of studying MPs behavior is 
the analysis of EDMs, a methodology employed by Finer, Berrington, 
and Bartholemew (1961) and Berrington (1973). Berrington (1973, 3) 
quotes Feinburgh's definition of EDMs as "a recognized parliamentary 
gambit.. . a device whereby members advertise their views, and no one, 
neither whips nor frontbench, can prevent a member from using this 
channel" adding that "EDMs remain . . . one of the least controlled 
mechanisms for expressing opinions " But the problem here is that serv­
ing ministers do not sign such motions and that ambitious backbenchers 
are wary of revealing their attitudes even through this forum. Others 
may use it simply to align themselves with powerful elements in the 
party. One political commentator has remarked that EDMs "are a 
method not so much of influencing the government as of buying cheap 
and risk-free popularity from one's colleagues" (quoted in Berrington 
1973, 16). 
An alternative approach is to study ideological indicators of private 
belief through the analysis of MPs' membership in party and nonparty 
groups, speeches, memoirs, biographies, books, articles, and journalism. 
Backbenchers with Attitude • 85 
The problem here is that these are all to some extent unreliable as indica­
tors of Conservative MPs' real beliefs. For instance, membership of a 
group does not necessarily mean allegiance to all of its principles. Also, 
written or spoken expressions of belief by politicians may be simply 
for public consumption, to protect friends and colleagues, to blacken 
enemies, or to cover up past mistakes, and there is no easy way to filter 
out such bias. 
Patterns of dissidence in the Commons, measured by votes against 
the party whip, were studied by Jackson (1968) and then comprehen­
sively by Norton (1978, 1980). Norton used MPs' voting records and 
participant observation in his attempt to establish and assess these levels 
of dissent in the Conservative Party, concluding (as we saw above) that 
Europe was the divisive issue in the Conservative Party as early as 1970 
to 1974 (Norton 1978). But Norton's study of the levels of dissent in the 
1970-74 parliaments also encounters the problem that it measures only 
dissenting attitudes that are observable in Parliament. In fact, given our 
own evidence below on the discrepancy between current levels of private 
dissent and those willing to sign EDMs and/or to vote against the gov­
ernment on Maastricht, there could have been much wider disagreement 
within the party at that time than was measured by his model. 
We have new evidence, in the form of a survey of Conservative par­
liamentarians on Europe, that shows that levels of dissent within the 
PCP in the post-1992-93 period far exceed the dissent registered in par­
liamentary rebellions. The methodology we have adopted here is to 
compare known dissent—percentages of the PCP voting against the 
government on Europe and signatories to anti-Maastricht EDMs— 
with the results of our own survey of MPs' private views, carried out in 
1994, shortly after the Maastricht rebellion (Baker et al. 1995, 1996). 
PCP Survey Evidence Compared with 
Known Parliamentary Behavior 
Our survey of the private views of Conservative MPs, members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs), and candidates in the 1994 European 
Parliament election was compiled in the summer of 1994. The survey 
questionnaire contained 65 questions on European integration, de­
signed to reflect a wide variety of standpoints. The questionnaire was 
sent to all Conservative MPs, MEPs, and EP candidates. In all, 38% of 
backbench MPs responded and 19% of ministers, an overall response 
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Table 4.4 
Levels of Parliamentary Conservative Party Dissent with Official Party Line, 
as Manifested in Survey, Parliament, and Early Day Motions (%) 
Survey of Divisions in 
Issue Backbenchers Parliament EDMs 
"Ultraskepticisrn" 32 
EMU 61 
Central bank 64 
9
9
9 
26 
Single currency 68 33 
ERM 52 19 
VAT 76 8 
QMV 54 5 
Training 70 10 
Sources: Survey of Parliamentarians; Campaign Information Ltd. (1994). 
Note: Percentagefigures rounded for responses to survey questions and divisions of dissent 
in the House. See chapter appendix for survey questions and amendments. 
rate of 33% for MPs. The questionnaire was anonymous, but three-
quarters of respondents also returned a separate identity-coded post­
card, enabling us to test the representativeness of our sample against 
Norton's ideological typology of Conservative MPs.9 The results of our 
test leave us confident that there is a very close match between our 
respondents and the proportions of the party classified by Norton 
as "Thatcherites," "Loyalists," and "Damps/Wets" (Baker et al. 1995, 
1996). 
We also analyzed respondents in terms of their cohort: that is, which 
general election first brought them into Parliament or followed their 
entry in a by-election. Finally, we tested our known respondents by 
two measures of backbench parliamentary behavior over Europe. In 
rounded figures, our known respondents include 31% of all Tory back­
benchers, 30% of the Maastricht Bill third-reading rebels, and 33% of 
the wider group of signers of the two 1992 "Fresh Start" EDMs10 (Baker 
etal. 1996). 
Table 4.4 offers an overview of eight key issues in which some of the 
results of our survey are compared with voting records and the signing 
of EDMs during the Maastricht and post-Maastricht period. We had 
great difficulty in matching the wording of our survey questions to those 
of the EDMs and amendments, although on these eight issues we have 
endeavored to match their spirit. The wording of an amendment is often 
obscure, to say the least, and in many cases a number of amendments 
are bundled together for the division vote. In addition, we had great 
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difficulty in obtaining the actual wording of these amendments, since 
Hansard does not keep a record of them and since the Commons Infor­
mation Service could not provide the wording either.11 Consequently, 
this comparison does not represent a comprehensive set of data. How­
ever, on every issue, our figures show that backbench dissent was far 
greater than that measured by the other indicators, and on all of them 
the discrepancies are significant. 
One of the most significant discrepancies is on the "ultraskeptical" 
issue. The survey question showed that 32% of respondents thought that 
any benefits of Britain's membership of the European Union (EU) were 
outweighed by the disadvantages. Yet only 9% of backbenchers were 
prepared to vote for an equally strong anti-integrationist amendment. 
On this issue the EDM was a much better indicator of backbench opin­
ion, with 26% signing a motion calling for a halt to political union.12 
However, on the vital economic indicators of pro and anti-Euro-
peanism, there is a wide discrepancy between our survey findings and 
both voting and EDM indicators. On EMU and a Central Bank, only 
9% of backbenchers were willing to defy the party leadership in the 
lobbies, but when asked for their private beliefs, 61% and 64% respec­
tively were against such developments. Equally, while 33% and 19% 
respectively signed skeptical EDMs on the single currency and ERM, 
no less than 68% were hostile to the former and 52% to the latter in 
private. 
On VAT we found that 76% of respondents were against its harmoni­
zation within the EU, but only 8% were willing to support an opposition 
Labour amendment that called for the deletion of the treaty provisions 
for the harmonization of indirect taxation. Similarly, on qualified ma­
jority voting, while a tiny 5% of Conservative MPs were willing to 
openly defy the government, over half those polled (54%) were for re­
storing the blocking minority in the Council of Ministers to preen­
largement levels. On the final issue, that of an EU training strategy, only 
10% were willmg to register dissent on this issue in Parliament, while 
70% registered their disapproval in our survey. 
Conclusion 
The above data, limited though they are, confirm for the first time by 
this method that backbench PCP attitudes cannot easily be inferred 
from behavior in Parliament, particularly under a Conservative govern­
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ment faced with the European issue. Other methods have to be used to 
tease out what is actually happening, and if these are used carefully, the 
true depth of dissent is revealed to be much greater than parliamentary 
dissidence would indicate. 
Not only is the opposition to Europe within the PCP persistent, but 
the compliance of MPs with government opinion in contradistinction 
to their own privately held views on Europe is just as persistent. For 
example, we can see from table 4.1 that the 22 most rebellious MPs who 
dissented on between 25 and 50 occasions over Maastricht make up 
only 7% of the 329 elected Conservative MPs in Parliament on March 
21, 1995.13 But by viewing our survey and comparing it with similar 
EDM/division dissent, we see that many more Conservative MPs hold 
skeptical views. 
The rebels believe that their positions on Maastricht and sovereignty 
have majority support in the Conservative Party, in the country, in Par­
liament, and in the electorate. The cabinets' pro-European majority and 
its supporters in the parliamentary party appear to believe the opposite. 
The 1994 European election punished the Conservatives, returning the 
smallest number of Conservative MEPs ever returned, but this does not 
indicate a general unhappiness with their Euro-policies, since the elec­
tion was treated by many voters (encouraged by Labour's campaign) as 
a referendum on domestic handling of the economy rather than a Euro­
pean election as such. No one can be sure what would happen if the 
party was confronted with an unambiguous choice over Europe in the 
next few years. If an inner core of European states decided to push 
ahead with European integration and drive toward EMU (as now seems 
possible), this would present a Rubicon that a significant part of the 
Conservative Party is determined never to cross and could provoke an 
outright split in the party if it were in government at the time. Yet ironi­
cally, it could be said that the arch-Europhiles like Heath, Bottomley, 
Knox, and Currie, currently on the defensive within the party, are the 
ones most likely to split away from the party if it adopts an open and 
aggressive anti-European stance in the future. 
APPENDIX 
Ultmskepticism 
Survey: Percentage disagreeing with the statement: "The disadvantages 
of EC membership have been outweighed by the benefits " 
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Division: Mr. Cash's amendment to the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill: Deletion of Provisions for Amending the Treaty 
of Rome. (January 14, 1993) 
EDM: That this House urges Her Majesty's Government to use the 
decision to postpone the passage of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill as an opportunity to make a fresh start with the 
future development of the EEC and in particular to concentrate its 
efforts on the chosen agenda of the British presidency which is to 
extend the borders of the EEC and to create a competitive common 
market. (June 3, 1992) 
EMU 
Survey: Percentage agreeing with the statement: "EMU is not desirable." 
Division: Mr. Cash's Amendment to Clause 1 of the European Commu­
nities (Amendment) Bill: Deletion of Treaty provisions re. the third 
stage of EMU. (April 19, 1993) 
Central Bank 
Survey: Percentage agreeing with the statement: "Britain should never 
permit its monetary policy to be determined by an independent Eu­
ropean Central Bank." 
Division: Mr. Cash's Amendment to Clause 1 of the European Commu­
nities (Amendment) Bill: Deletion of Treaty provisions re: Central 
Banks. (April 19, 1993) 
Single Currency 
Survey: Percentage disagreeing with the statement: "Britain should join 
a single currency if it is created because of the economic conse­
quences of remaining outside." 
EDM: That this House congratulates the Prime Minister for making it 
clear on 8th January that it is not in the United Kingdom's interest 
to join a single currency in 1997 and for his confirmation that there 
are no proposals for legislation necessary for the purpose nor for the 
United Kingdom to accept any changes at the Inter-Governmental 
Conference which will impact on the constitution of the United 
Kingdom; and notes his rejections of the support for the principle 
for a single currency by the Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition and 
M. Jacques Santer. (February 8, 1995) 
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ERM 
Survey: Percentage agreeing with the statement: "Britain should never 
rejoin the ERM." 
EDM: That this House welcomes the Government's decision to leave 
the ERM; and urges a fresh start to economic policy, in particular 
the abandonment of fixed exchange rates and a commitment to 
sound finance, stable money and the right climate for steady growth. 
(September 24, 1992) 
VAT 
Survey: Percentage disagreeing with the statement: "VAT should be har­
monised within the EU." 
Division: Opposition Amendment to Clause 1 of the European Commu­
nities (Amendment) Bill: Deletion of Treaty provisions for the har­
monization of indirect taxation. (January 29, 1993) 
QMV 
Survey: Percentage agreeing with the statement: "At the 1996 IGC, the 
QMV blocking minority should be restored to 23 " 
Division: Mr. Shore's Motion to grant a Second Reading to a new clause 
2 to the European Communities (Amendment) Bill: Act of Parlia­
ment required to approve changes in voting procedure at Council of 
Ministers. (May 5, 1993) 
Training 
Survey: Percentage disagreeing with the statement: "In principle there 
should be a Union strategy on training." 
Division: Opposition Amendment to Clause 1 of the European Commu­
nities (Amendment) Bill: European Community competence re. Vo­
cational Training. (January 20, 1993) 
NOTES 
1. Splits need to be distinguished from divisions. Only occasionally will 
division of opinion in a party become a split, in which there is a formal break­
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away by a substantial group, followed by the establishment of a new party or 
an alliance with an existing one (Baker et al. 1993a). 
2. In 1846 the Corn Laws were supported by the old aristocratic and 
landed wing of the party and opposed by the manufacturing interests in order 
to lower the cost of production through lower food costs and wages. In 1906 
Tariff Reform was an unsuccessful attempt by the populist Joseph Chamber­
lain and his supporters to protect national industry against those in the party 
who still advocated a free trade orthodoxy. 
3. In 1978 Norton went so far as to state that "the power to withdraw 
the whip .  . . has fallen into disuse in the Conservative Party" (129-30). Sir W. 
Wayland lost the whip after supporting an independent candidate in a 1931 
by-election (Richards 1959, 151). In May 1957 eight Conservative MPs be­
longing to the "Suez Group" resigned the Conservative whip, and in 1942 one 
Conservative had the whip removed by the coalition government (see Norton 
1978, 166). 
4. The 1992-93 European Communities (Amendment) Bill, commonly 
called the Maastricht Bill, was the necessary parliamentary approval for the 
deeper European integration process, sparked by the agreement between all 
the heads of government at the Maastricht European Council in the Nether­
lands in December 1991. 
5. The ERM, within which exchange rates could be adjusted to allow 
development toward a common currency and also a European Currency Unit 
(ECU), which some expected would become a single currency, the Euro. On 
so-called "Black Wednesday" (September 16, 1992), international speculation 
against the pound sterling forced Britain's withdrawal from the ERM, much 
to the delight of the Euro-skeptics in the Conservative Party. 
6. A referendum was held over ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on 
June 2, 1992, and returned a narrow defeat of Maastricht by 50.7% to 49.3%. 
A subsequent referendum vote narrowly reversed this decision, however. 
7. For a full discussion of the nature and importance of EDMs, see the 
section below on methodology. The actual wording of these EDMs can be 
found in the appendix. 
8. The Social Chapter is the section of the Maastricht Treaty that governs 
workers' rights to representation on company boards and guarantees certain 
levels of social provision and working conditions across the EU. John Major 
negotiated an "opt-out" on this on the grounds that Britain preferred to oper­
ate with a free market in labor markets and believed that productivity and 
inward investment would suffer. 
9. For our discussion of Norton's typology of Conservative MPs, see 
Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam (1994a). The typology can be found in Norton 
(1990). 
10. The survey was funded as part of an Economic and Social Research 
Council Award Number R000231298 and was carried out by the Parliament 
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Project in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield in collabo­
ration with Nottingham Trent University. 
11. We eventually obtained the material from Campaign Information Ltd. 
12. See the appendix for the exact wording of the Amendments and 
EDMs. 
13. Courtesy of the Public Information Office, House of Commons. The 
reason for the wording of this is that nine MPs elected as Conservatives have 
lost the whip; eight have had it withdrawn (Budgen, Carttiss, Gill, T. Gorman, 
Marlow, R. Shepherd, Sir T. Taylor, Wilkinson), and one (Sir Richard Body) 
resigned the whip. It is interesting to note from table 4.1 that while all of these 
individuals are in the top 22 Maastricht rebels, several of the most rebellious 
remained inside the party and declined to "fall on their swords." As already 
stated, the eight MPs who lost the whip were allowed to return shortly after­
wards without the usual thumbscrews being applied on their return because 
of the wafer-thin majority of the government. 
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PART III

Established Continental 
European Systems 

In Part II we saw two examples of a growing body of work that shows 
the United Kingdom as less monolithic than has tended to be as­
sumed. In this part we move further afield. While debates on party 
cohesion can swiftly become locked into U.S.-U.K. comparisons, rela­
tively little is known about parliaments elsewhere. Moreover, as the 
U.K. chapters suggested, the electoral system and rules on candidate 
nomination at the local level can have important effects in terms of aid­
ing and abetting backbench indiscipline. To the extent that the elec­
toral system does matter, the comparison between the United States 
and the United Kingdom—both of which share the single-member 
simple-plurality system—may well hide this. The chapters in this part 
address this point, assessing the experience of party cohesion in other 
(continental European) parliamentary systems and examining the im­
pact of different electoral systems. 
The three chapters provide a good mix of cases, ranging from the 
highly cohesive Norwegian system, archetypical of the Scandinavian 
model that John Fitzmaurice has described as one of "iron party disci­
pline in parliament" (cited in chap. 6), to the far less cohesive Swiss 
system, which, as described by Lanfranchi and Lixthi, bears many simi­
larities to the U.S. separated system, where there is "no institutional 
incentive for [MPs] to vote cohesively" Roll call analysis, reported in 
chapters 5 and 6, confirms these respective trends, and in the Norwe­
gian case, despite the rise of volatility at the electoral level in recent 
years, parliamentary voting discipline remains high and rising. 
Between the two extremes we have the Spanish case, as a relatively 
recent entrant to the family of West European democracies, where 
great effort has been made to enforce strong party discipline in Parlia­
ment. In chapter 7, Sanchez de Dios stresses such features as the impo­
sition of rules to attempt (not entirely successfully) to dampen down 
faction hopping; the requirement for individual MPs to have permis­
sion before they can put down amendments to bills; and the imposi­
tion of fines for absenteeism. A particularly interesting feature of the 
Spanish case is the role of the portavoz (whip): unlike the Westminster 
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model, this is an elected office, which, rather than seeking to turn out 
individual MPs to vote, actually votes, on a weighted basis, for the par­
liamentary group as a whole. 
All three cases share the list system of proportional representation, 
and the authors stress the important role played by this electoral sys­
tem in encouraging parliamentarians to conform with the wishes of 
their party leadership. A feature of the Swiss case relates to the dif­
ferences between the two chambers: the National Council, which is 
elected by proportional representation, and the Council of States, 
which for the most part is elected by majoritarian systems in each 
of the cantons. 
Cohesion of Party Groups and 
Interparty Conflict in the Swiss 
Parliament: Roll Call Voting in 
the National Council 
PRISCA LANFRANCHI AND RUTH LUTHI 
The Swiss Political System 
This chapter deals with the voting behavior of members of the Swiss 
parliament (National Council). Our central question is: Do members of 
the same party vote cohesively? Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sulli­
van (1987, 3) tell us that "different institutions lead to different patterns 
of individual behavior." Thus, if we are interested in the voting behavior 
of MPs, we need to know the institutional context in which they oper­
ate. We therefore first must gain insight into the political system of 
Switzerland. 
Students of Swiss politics like to point out that it is "special," even 
a "deviant case" of democracy. As a matter of fact, some interesting, 
unique qualities characterize the Swiss political system. But even if Swit­
zerland cannot easily be designated as either a parliamentary or a presi­
dential system (see Riklin 1977), there exist some similarities with the 
political systems of other countries. Winfried Steffani (1983, 394), for 
example, in contrast to most Swiss scholars, classifies the Swiss political 
system clearly as a presidential system. Using the terminology of Terry 
Moe and Michael Caldwell (1994), we suggest below that the Swiss case 
can be described as a separation-of-powers system. A number of institu­
tional features appear to affect Swiss legislative behavior.1 
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First, Swiss federalism consists of three levels: the federation, the 26 
cantons, and the more than 3,000 communes. Communes and cantons 
are given a large degree of autonomy and play an important role in 
Swiss political life. The cantons not only enjoy great autonomy but also 
participate in an intensive way in the decision-making process of the 
federation, which allows them to prevent any uncontrolled growth in its 
powers. The most important federalist element in the decision-making 
process of the Swiss Federation is the bicameral legislature: the National 
Council and the Council of States. The two councils are absolute equals 
in all matters of legislation. Every proposition or bill destined to become 
a federal law has to be approved by a relative majority in both chambers. 
There are, however, different electoral systems for the two chambers that 
reflect different ideas of representation. 
The National Council consists of 200 members representing the 
Swiss people. Each canton constitutes an electoral constituency, where 
seats are allotted in proportion to the resident population. Constituency 
size varies markedly: Zurich elects 35 MPs, while in the five smallest 
cantons, the citizens elect just 1. With the exception of thosefive constit­
uencies, the National Council is elected by a system of proportional 
representation (PR) and has been since 1919. 
The Council of States has 46 members representing the Swiss can­
tons. Each canton elects two members, and each half-canton elects one, 
regardless of their size. Election procedure is determined by cantonal 
law and varies from canton to canton. Only one canton uses PR; the 
others use a majority system. 
The different electoral systems lead to different compositions in the 
two chambers. The PR elections to the National Council result in the 
greater representation of small parties (see table 5.1). On the other hand, 
in the Council of States, 34 of the 46 seats are shared between just two 
parties, and the Social Democrats, who hold 42 of the 200 seats in the 
National Council, have only 3 seats in the Council of the States. 
A second institutional feature affecting legislative behavior is direct 
democracy. Not only do Swiss citizens elect their representatives to Par­
liament; they are also the ultimate decision makers on many important 
issues. Swiss direct democracy consists of three instruments: the obliga­
tory referendum, in which all proposals for constitutional amendment 
and important international treaties are subject to a vote of the people; 
the optional referendum, in which 50,000 citizens may, within 90 days, 
demand the holding of a popular vote on laws passed by Parliament; 
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Table 5.1 
Distribution of Seats in the National Council and the Council of States, 
1991-1995 
Council 
Votes National Council of States 
(%) Seats Seats 
Governmental Parties 69.5 147 41 
Radicals 20.9 44 18 
Social Democrats 19.0 42 3 
Christian Democrats 17.8 35 16 
People's Party 11.8 25 4 
Nongovernmental Parties 30.5 53 5 
Green Party 6.4 14 — 
Automobile Party 5.1 8 — 
Alternative Left 4.0 3 — 
Liberals 3.0 10 3 
Swiss Democrats 2.8 5 1 
Independents 2.7 5 1 
Protestant Party 1.9 3 — 
Others 4.6 5 1 
Total 100 200 46 
Source: Linder (1994, 45). 
and the popular initiative, in which 100,000 citizens may request a total 
or partial revision of the Constitution. Our main interest here is in the 
impact of direct democracy on the political system, especially its impact 
on Parliament and party groups (for more general discussion and an 
extensive bibliography, see Linder 1994). One of the most important 
results of direct democracy is another institutional feature of the Swiss 
political system, namely power sharing. 
As described so far, Swiss politics is similar in many ways to the U.S. 
system, where federalism also plays an important role in the decision-
making process and where, in several states, there are elements of direct 
democracy. But there is one fundamental difference, and this relates to 
the third institutional feature that we need to mention. The United 
States has a two-party system with winner-take-all elections, whereas 
Switzerland has a power-sharing system (see Steiner 1990). Direct de­
mocracy has had impacts on the composition of Swiss federal govern­
ment. A large political group that is in opposition to the government is 
able to block the political decision-making process by using the referen­
dum as a weapon. Because of this, the major parties have been forced 
to cooperate. Since 1959, the four major parties have together formed 
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the executive. According to the so-called magic formula, the executive 
consists of two members each of the Radical Party, the Christian Demo­
crats, and the Social Democrats and one member of the People's Party. 
Central to our concerns is the fact that there is no powerful oppo­
sition in the Swiss parliament comparable to what exists in Westmin­
ster systems (see chaps. 3 and 4 of this volume). The Social Democrats 
as the major left party are "integrated" into the government of the three 
"bourgeois" parties (Radicals, Christian Democrats, and People's 
Party). However, the government parties are not bound by a coalition 
contract containing a set political program. 
In the Swiss system, unlike most parliamentary systems, the legisla­
ture cannot stage a vote of no confidence, and the executive does not 
resign when outvoted in Parliament. The executive, on the other hand, 
cannot dissolve the parliament or veto its bills. Therefore, Switzerland 
may be described as a separation-of-powers system, having many simi­
larities to the U.S. system. However, there are some differences, the most 
important of which is that the executive in Switzerland is elected for a 
four-year-term by Parliament and not by the people. 
Previous Research on the Voting Behavior of MPs 
Before reviewing Swiss research on the voting behavior of MPs, and to 
place this chapter in its international context, it is worthwhile to take a 
look at the comparative literature, especially the literature on the U.S. 
case. 
As Melissa Collie points out in her survey (1984, 5), the bulk of anal­
yses have concerned the U.S. Congress: "While the American context 
has traditionally generated studies of this type, analysts of non-
American legislatures have not devoted nearly as much attention to the 
topic, largely because consistently high levels of party cohesion and 
conflict in these legislatures have made such investigations appear su­
perfluous." She distinguishes two schools of research on legislative vo­
ting behavior: one focusing on collective behavior, with particular 
attention to cleavage and alignment patterns, and the other focusing on 
individual behavior, with studies of individual decision-making pat­
terns. In the early 1980s, Collie (1984, 33) notes that "in the American 
setting, the primary object and unit of analysis has shifted gradually 
and erratically from the study of collective behavior to the study of indi­
vidual behavior." 
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Recent studies stress the importance of institutional factors affecting 
legislative behavior (e.g., Rieselbach 1990; Searing 1991; McCubbins 
and Sullivan 1987). The member of Congress is no longer described as 
an individual free rider but is said to be constrained by a set of institu­
tional arrangements (such as committee membership). In this chapter, 
we suggest that institutional factors are interesting for analyzing collec­
tive as well as individual legislative behavior. 
In Switzerland, parliamentary research is a relatively youngfield. Po­
litical scientists were not, however, the first ones to be interested in vo­
ting behavior. Early research on Swiss legislative voting behavior in the 
1950s by a student of law, Marco Vasella (1956), was mainly focused on 
the normative question of whether strict party discipline is a good thing. 
The first research by a social scientist on the voting behavior of Swiss 
members of Parliament was carried out by Hans-Peter Hertig (1980). 
His study belongs to the tradition of individual voting behavior re­
search. He was interested in whether the party, the electors, or the inter­
est groups were the primary factors in determining the voting behavior 
of members of the National Council, and his research was based mainly 
on interviews with MPs. 
The study by Adrian Vatter (1994) also falls into the category of 
individual voting behavior research. However, his main interest was not 
the influence of party or interest groups but the question of district rep­
resentation. He tried to explain the behavior of MPs on the cantonal 
level, exploring the extent to which the MPs' votes were influenced by 
constituency concerns. His findings show that the district-voting ap­
proach seems to be important in explaining individual voting behavior, 
at least for members of cantonal parliaments and on issues concerning 
infrastructural projects. 
Most recently, the Institute of Political Science at the University of 
Berne established a data bank in 1989 where roll call votes could be 
collected. This now contains all roll call votes held in the National 
Council since December 1983. In 1991 Ruth Liithi, Luzius Meyer, and 
Hans Hirter published the results of their research based on these data. 
Their primary interest was to document and to explain intraparty cohe­
sion and interparty conflict. Additionally, they measured voting cohe­
sion of MPs belonging to the same interest groups. 
This chapter is in the tradition of collective behavior research: that is, 
we are interested in cleavage and alignment patterns. In this sense, the 
study is a continuation of the research of Liithi et al. (1991). Inspired 
by the discussion in recent U.S. studies about the importance of institu­
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tional factors, we also explore the assertion that voting behavior is in­
fluenced by committee membership. 
Empirical Evidence of Intraparty Cohesion and 
Interparty Conflict in the Swiss National Council 
This section will give some impression of the importance of party 
groups in structuring floor voting in the Swiss National Council, as 
shown by the levels of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. This 
measure is generally used to test the strength of parties in the U.S. Con­
gress (e.g., Ward 1993), though the strict U.S. definition of party 
strength—high party influence when cohesion within the parties and 
conflict between the parties are both high—must be adjusted in our 
case for several reasons. First, fundamental characteristics of the Swiss 
political system (outlined above), such as multiparty government, must 
be taken into account. Second, as this section will show, roll call votes 
are the exception in Swiss parliamentary life, being used by party groups 
in the National Council as a specific "political weapon." They do not 
reflect the whole range of party behavior in the Swiss federal parliament. 
Therefore, instead of measuring and depicting party importance in the 
strict American sense, we give first impressions, which will have to be 
deepened in future research. 
Roll Call Votes in the National Council 
Unlike "Congress watchers," Swiss parliamentary researchers 
cannot rely on an extensive database for analyzing voting behavior. Un­
til the beginning of 1994, when an electronic voting system was installed 
in the National Council (see below), voting in both chambers of Parlia­
ment was in most cases carried out by the MPs standing up from their 
seats. Although voting behavior was thus not secret, it was not wholly 
transparent either, at least not for ordinary people or political scientists 
without the time or possibility to sit in Parliament day after day re­
cording the voting behavior of the MPs. However, there was, and still is, 
an exception to this standard way of voting, the so-called votes by call­
ing the names (roll call votes). 
In the National Council, this way of voting has been known since 
the first statute of the chamber in 1850 and has been modified several 
times over the last hundred years (Ltithi et al. 1991). According to the 
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present rule, 30 members of the National Council may request in written 
form that a vote on a bill, or on particular sections of it, be carried out 
by calling the names of the MPs. In those cases, the voting of each MP 
is recorded and published in the official Bulletin of the Federal Assembly. 
In the Council of States, where 10 members may ask for the same 
procedure, this possibility of recorded voting has so far hardly ever been 
used (Luthi et al. 1991). This may be explained in part by the fact that 
party membership and its constraints on behavior are linked to propor­
tional representation (Loewenberg and Mans 1988, 170). Unlike mem­
bers of the National Council, members of the Council of States are 
elected by a majority system and are thus more independent of the par­
ties to which they belong. In addition, the majority electoral system 
produces a rather homogeneous composition of this chamber (domina­
tion by the "bourgeois" parties and underrepresentation of the Social 
Democrats), and members of the dominant parties are obviously not 
interested in making their votes public by asking for a roll call vote. 
Thus, the empirical basis of this chapter consists of roll call votes 
carried out in the National Council. Although an electronic voting sys­
tem was introduced at the beginning of 1994, the National Council de­
cided in 1995 to restrict use of this instrument, thereby shattering the 
hopes of political scientists for easy availability of voting records. First, 
it was decided that individual voting decisions are only to be published 
in specified cases.2 Second, the recorded data on roll call votes—al-
though published in the official bulletin—are not handed over to politi­
cal scientists on disks. Therefore, researchers interested in these votes 
still have to collect the relevant information in a database by themselves 
to be able to analyze the voting behavior of Swiss MPs. 
The Political Significance of Demanding a Roll Call Vote 
As Liithi et al. (1991) point out, there is a deep feeling of dis­
trust among most MPs concerning roll call votes. It is widely feared that 
they are then "classified" and somewhat hindered from expressing their 
individual choice of vote. This feeling of distrust is rooted in the liberal 
idea of representation by "free mandate" as explicitly embodied in the 
Swiss Constitution.3 In the classical liberal view, MPs are assumed to 
represent the overall interests of society, being independent of all kinds 
of special interests like regions, organizations, groups, or even parties.4 
However, this normative view of totally independent MPs does not 
stand up to parliamentary practice. As a matter of fact, party groups in 
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the National Council have an important instrument at their disposal to 
influence individual voting behavior. To ask for a roll call vote is actually 
to use a "political weapon" to enforce voting discipline in their own 
ranks or to reveal voting behavior of the MPs of other party groups 
(Vasella 1956; Luthi et al. 1991). 
The specific political significance of requesting a roll call vote has 
effects on our empirical findings, in the sense that our database predeter­
mines in some ways the results that we obtain. Because we do not have 
data on all floor votes in the National Council, and because roll call 
voting is usually demanded in cases of important and contested issues, 
our findings are biased. We would get lower indices of party cohesion 
as well as less evidence of interparty conflict if we had data on all the 
votes at our disposal because the bulk of the unpublished votes concern 
minor issues or issues on which the parties do not oppose one another. 
We use the standard Rice Index of Party Cohesion for measuring 
intraparty cohesion in the Swiss National Council (Rice 1928). This in­
dex is calculated by computing the difference between the proportion of 
the majority of group; and the proportion of the minority of the same 
group^ If the Rice Index is zero, then groupj was completely divided: 
i.e., 50% voted "yes" and 50% voted "no." As the Rice Index increases, 
grou^ votes more and more cohesively. 
Various methodological problems are attached to this way of mea­
suring party cohesion. First, the Rice Index fails to take into account 
the size of the units, or party groups. Deviant voting by MPs belonging 
to a smaller party has a larger impact on the index of cohesion of this 
group than deviant voting in a larger parliamentary party. Second, using 
the standard Rice Index means neglecting the MPs who abstain. How­
ever, abstaining seems to play a minor role in the National Council (see 
Liithi 1989).5 Third, our measuring method also neglects the MPs who 
decide not to participate in the voting. It may be argued that nonpartici­
pation is a means of evading a vote so as not to offend the party (Miiller 
1994). But since there are other plausible "nonpolitical" interpretations 
of nonparticipation in a vote, and because it is not possible to detect 
the real reasons with our database, we will stick to the standard Rice 
Index of party cohesion, thereby neglecting nonparticipating MPs. 
Party Cohesion in the National Council: 
Longitudinal Trends (1920-1994) 
Figure 5.1 shows the number of roll call votes in the National 
Council since 1920. There is a marked increase of requested roll call 
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Figure 5.1 Roll Call Votes in the National Council, 1920-1994 
votes in the last 12 years. This trend has been explained by Vatter (1997) 
as a reflection of the growing interparty conflict between the different 
political groups—between the conservative/liberal ("bourgeois") major­
ity and the Social Democrat/Green minority—on important decisions 
over such policy fields as finance, environment, and energy.6 To be more 
precise, the failure to elect an official candidate of the Social Democrats 
to the federal government by the so-called bourgeois majority in Parlia­
ment marked an important turning point. The party group of the Social 
Democrats announced shortly after this "insult" in 1983 that they in­
tended to ask for more roll call votes in the future to make parliamen­
tary decisions and voting behavior of MPs more transparent to the 
public (Forschungszentrum fur schweizerische Politik 1985). But the So­
cial Democrats were not alone in rediscovering the use of roll call votes 
as a political weapon. The "bourgeois" MPs in recent years have also 
increasingly used this instrument to show, for example, the "antiarmy" 
spirit of the Social Democrats (Luthi et al. 1991). 
The marked increase in roll call votes has not been caused only 
by the polarization in the National Council. Figure 5.1 shows an 
almost "explosive" increase in roll call votes in the most recent legisla­
tive period (1991-95). We suggest that this may be partly explained by 
the fact that, due to the technical innovation of an electronic voting 
system in 1994, MPs are able to ask for a roll call vote without caus­
ing a major waste of the precious and restricted time of the plenary 
sessions.7 
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Intraparty cohesion in the national council Winfried Steffani (1991) 
distinguishes between two types of political systems, the presidential 
and the parliamentary. The separation of powers in the U.S. presidential 
system is based on independence between the executive and the legisla­
tive branch: that is, there are no votes of no confidence, and the parlia­
ment may not be dissolved by the president. In parliamentary systems, 
on the other hand, where the possibility of a no-confidence vote and 
dissolution of the parliament exists, there is a soft of "separation of 
powers" between the party in government and the party in opposition. 
In presidential systems the legislature can check the power of the execu­
tive; in parliamentary systems the opposition checks the party in gov­
ernment. Here, if the majority party is to stay in government, it is 
necessary that its members vote cohesively on crucial issues, whereas 
the U.S. president does not depend on the votes of his or her party to 
stay in office (see also Epstein 1980, 340-42). 
As pointed out above, Switzerland may be classified as a separation-
of-powers system (absence of a vote of no confidence and absence of 
the possibility of dissolution of Parliament). Thus, there exists no in­
stitutional incentive for members of the Swiss National Council to 
vote cohesively. For every bill, each party group designates a speaker 
to report the opinion of the party concerning that bill to the floor, 
but the members of the party groups are not forced to vote accord­
ingly. Therefore, we assume that—as in the U.S. case—there is no 
evidence of strict party discipline on roll call votes in the National 
Council 
To test this assumption empirically, we computed the Rice Index of 
Party Cohesion in the National Council, based on a total of 426 roll 
call votes from 1920 to 1994. The results are shown in table 5.2; four 
trends are worth stressing. First, the Rice Index is in most cases higher 
for nongovernmental party groups than for the three "bourgeois" gov­
ernmental parties (Radicals, Christian Democrats, People's Party). Sec­
ond, among the governmental parties, the Social Democrats vote most 
cohesively in all periods of time (Rice Index around 90). To what extent 
this finding may be explained by the minority status of the Social Demo­
crats in Parliament and in government and/or by the prevailing under­
standing of representation in this party must be the subject of further 
research. Third, the lowest Rice Index of party cohesion among the gov­
ernmental parties since 1971 is found for the Christian Democrats. The 
most convincing ad hoc explanation for this is given by the rather het­
erogeneous composition of this party group. On some issues (e.g., social 
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Table 5.2 
Rice Index of Party Cohesion in the National Council, 1920-1994 
1920-53 1971-83 1983-87 1987-91 1991-94 
Governmental Parties 
Radicals 68.9 74.7 73 A 70.5 192 
Social Democrats 95.4 91.3 89.1 92.9 96.3 
Christian Democrats 75.5 63.0 60.1 70.4 68.3 
People's Party 80.5 84.4 74.0 77.8 80.7 
Nongovernmental Parties 
Green Party 92.1 94.9 
Liberals 78.2 97.9 96.2 90.4 
Independents/Protestant Party* 79.0 79.5 83.1 85.5 
Swiss Democrats 69.0 85.5 
Automobile Party 98.2 
N 108 22 56 77 163 
Sources: Ltithi et al. (1991); Institute for Political Science of the University of Berne. 
Note: No data available for 1953-67. 
T h  e Rice Index for 1971-83 and 1987-94 is limited to the Independents and does not include the 
Protestant Party. 
policy), it is likely that MPs on the "right" of the party hold different 
views than MPs on the "left.55 Therefore, it would be fruitful to take 
into account policy content in future research on roll call votes (see be­
low). Finally, there seems to be no overall trend toward increased party 
cohesion over time, as was asserted by Vatter (1997) on the basis 
of former data. While some party groups (nongovernmental parties, 
Radicals) in 1991-94 do have increased scores compared to earlier 
periods, the results for other party groups fluctuate or are more or 
less stable over time (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, People's 
Party). 
Without seeking to oversimplify, we find some similarities with the 
U.S. case. For instance, as in the U.S. Congress (see Ornstein, Mann, 
and Malbin 1990), party cohesion in the National Council differs over 
time and on the whole (i.e., not taking account of differences between 
the parties) is relatively low, probably lower than in most parliamentary 
systems of western Europe (see Epstein 1980, 315-17, who, however, 
does not deliver empirical evidence for his assertions). 
Interparty conflict in the national council. According to Lijphart's 
(1984) distinction between types of democracies, Switzerland can be la­
beled as consensual Among the different elements that characterize de­
mocracies of this type, Lijphart cites the principle of executive power 
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Table 5.3 
Voting Alliances among the Government Parties 
Left-Green-
Bourgeois Left-Green Christian Other 
Large Alliance Alliance Alliance Alliance Alliances 
At least two At least one of the Social Democrats, Social Democrats, Nongovernmental 
"bourgeois" two "core Green Party Green Party, party/ies 
party groups bourgeois" party Christian 
(Radicals, groups (Radicals, Democrats 
Christian People's Party) One of the "core 
Democrats, bourgeois" party 
People's Party) groups and the 
and the Social Social Democrat 
Democrats 
(Optional, (Optional: (Optional: other (Optional: other 
nongovernmental Christian nongovernmental nongovernmental 
parties) Democrats, parties) parties) 
nongovernmental 
parties) 
sharing, or grand coalitions. As we saw above, executive power in Swit­
zerland has been shared since 1959 between the four largest parties. In 
view of this principle of executive power sharing, it might be assumed 
that the coalition of the four largest parties also structures floor voting 
in Parliament. To test this assumption, we have analyzed the compo­
sition of voting alliances on 162 roll call votes in the most recent leg­
islature (1991-94), defining a voting alliance as occurring when the 
majorities of two or more party groups vote in the same direction. Table 
5.3 distinguishes five different forms of voting alliance with regard to 
the government parties: large, bourgeois, left-Green, left-Green-Chris-
tian, and other.8 
We might expect that, in view of the composition of the Federal 
Council (executive), the "large alliance" would be the most frequent 
voting alliance type to be found in the National Council. But as figure 
5.2 reveals, of the total of all counted alliances (324), only 27 or 8.3% 
were "large alliances," formed by the majorities of at least two "bour­
geois" party groups and the Social Democrats. By far the most frequent 
alliances on roll call votes were formed by at least one of the "core bour­
geois" party groups (People's Party or Radicals), without the Social 
Democrats, 
So far we have not distinguished between winning and losing alii­
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Figure 5.2 Frequency of Different Alliances on Roll Call Votes in the National 
Council, 1991-1994 
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ances, a distinction that would seem to be of major interest, especially 
since observers of the National Council have asserted that the last 15 
years have been marked by growing polarization on important de­
cisions: the traditional model of consensus democracy is shifting to a 
politics of majorities with rigid "bourgeois" majorities and Social Dem-
ocrat/Green minorities (Linder 1988, Vatter 1997). Figure 5.3 shows 
whether this assertion of a rigid constellation of losers and winners 
holds true for roll call votes in 1991-94. 
As might be expected in view of the composition of the National 
Council, "large" alliances have the highest success rate. All of the 27 
voting alliances belonging to this category have been on the winning 
side. In view of the assumption of a rigid politics of majorities men­
tioned above, the results for the types of alliance labeled "bourgeois" 
and "left-Green" are of special interest. Whereas alliances of the former 
type won in two-thirds of the 144 cases in which they voted together, 
the "left-Green" alliances, formed by majorities made up of Social 
Democrats, the Green Party, and other nongovernmental party groups, 
won in only 6 out of 88 relevant cases (6.8%). Although the large differ­
ence in the success rates of these two voting alliances seems to support 
the thesis of a polarized situation for our period, the next point puts 
this conclusion into context. 
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Figure 5.3 Winning and Losing Alliances on 162 Roll Call Votes in the Na­
tional Council, 1991-1994 
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The third most frequent alliance type is formed by the Social 
Democrats, the Green Party, and the Christian Democrats (and op­
tionally, other nongovernmental party groups). This type of voting alli­
ance has been as successful as the "bourgeois alliance," winning 66.7% 
of its roll call votes in 1991-94. Among the "bourgeois" governmen­
tal parties, then, the Christian Democrats not only have the smallest 
index of party cohesion but also vote to a considerable extent with the 
Social Democrat/Green minority, thus enabling the "eternal losers" 
to gain a majority in two-thirds of the 45 roll call votes where they 
are voting in an alliance. For future research, it will be fruitful to link 
these findings to the policy dimensions of the bills in order to sort out 
the topics on which these three party groups form voting alliances (see 
below). 
A Further Research Question: Committees as 
Competitors to Party Groups? 
Parliamentarians are not only members of party groups but also mem­
bers of legislative committees. From an institutional point of view, 
one could question, therefore, if committee membership is also im­
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portant for voting behavior. To date, there has been no research on this 
question in Switzerland, although it can be found in U.S. studies (see 
below). 
The U.S. Research: Party Government 
versus Committee Government 
The alleged weakness of parties in Congress is a dominant 
theme in U.S. research (see Cox and McCubbins 1991). The assumption 
of decline and weakness of congressional parties has gone hand in hand 
with studies of the rising power of committees. Some scholars speak of 
committees as autonomous units, which operate quite independently of 
such external influences as legislative party leaders, chamber majorities, 
and the president (e.g., Fenno 1973). Gary Cox and Mathew McCub­
bins (1993) have analyzed the relations between parties and committees, 
arguing that parties are more important than was maintained in previ­
ous studies. They underpin this with considerable empirical tests—for 
example, on the influence of parties over the appointments to commit­
tees or on the representativeness of a party's committee contingents. Of 
interest to us are their findings about the difference between the voting 
behavior of a party's committee contingent and the voting behavior of 
the rest of the party on committee-specific roll calls. They use a method 
that would seem interesting for future Swiss research. By considering 
the example of the Agriculture Committee, they explain their procedure 
as follows: "As it turns out, a total of twenty-three roll-calls pertinent 
to bills were reported out by the Agriculture Committee in the Ninety-
eighth Congress. . . . First, for each of the twenty-three roll-calls we 
compute the difference between the proportion of the contingent voting 
yes and the proportion of the rest of the party voting yes. Second we 
take the absolute value of each of these twenty-three differences and 
average them. This approach yields a straightforward statistic, the mean 
absolute difference (MAD). . .  . If MAD is zero, then the contingent 
and the rest of the party never differed . . . ; as MAD grows larger, the 
contingent appears more and more distinctive in its behavior vis-a-vis 
the rest of the party" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 220). 
The authors computed MAD scores for the Democrats' committee 
contingents to be between 2.3% and 17.9%, with most of the committee 
contingents clustering in the range of 7 to 13% (Cox and McCubbins 
1993, 222-23). They use the difference between the contingent's voting 
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behavior and the voting behavior of the respective party as a test for the 
representativeness of committees. At the same time, they point out some 
problems in using MAD this way, since members of Congress may also 
vote not according to their preferences, but strategically: "To what ex­
tent do differences between how committee contingents and their party 
colleagues vote reflect logrolling within committees rather than distinct 
preferences?" (223). 
This methodological problem is not relevant in our case, since our 
primary concern is not the representativeness of committees but the po­
tential impact of committee membership on floor voting behavior. Our 
question is: Are there any differences in the voting behavior between 
members of the committee who prepared the bill and their party col­
leagues? For this purpose, MAD seems to be a useful measure. If MAD 
is zero, committee membership is assumed to be of no importance for 
floor voting; as MAD grows larger, committee membership may be ex­
pected to be another explanatory variable for voting behavior. 
Contingent versus Party Behavior in the Swiss 
National Council: First Empirical Results 
At the beginning of 1992, a system of 12 standing committees 
was introduced in both chambers of the Swiss parliament. Each com­
mittee is responsible for a specific policy field. Before the 1992 reform, 
most of the important bills were treated by ad hoc committees, which 
were then dissolved when the bill had been passed in both chambers. 
Since the system of standing committees of the Swiss parliament is only 
two years old, one may describe it as being less institutionalized than 
the U.S. House of Representatives, which has been described as "the 
most institutionalized in the world" (Shaw 1990, 258). According to 
Shaw, the level of institutionalization of a committee system is a signifi­
cant factor among others in the importance of the committees in a legis­
lature. Furthermore, the more important committees there are, the more 
committee membership may compete with party membership: that is, 
the more committee members are assumed to vote differently from their 
party colleagues. Following this, it may be expected that even if mem­
bers of committees in the National Council vote differently from their 
party colleagues on committee-specific roll calls, these differences will 
be lower than in the U.S. case. 
In an exploratory test, we calculated MAD—as Cox and McCubbins 
have done for the Democratic Party and its committee contingents in 
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Table 5.4 
Mean Absolute Difference (MAD) in Percentage Voting "Yes" between 
Committee and Noncommittee Members, 1992-1994 
Roll Calls 
Committee MAD (%) (N) 
Christian Democrats 
SGK (social security and welfare) 15.9 17 
WAK (economy and tax) 12.9 23 
RK (legal issues) 8.5 24 
SPK (political institutions) 9.6 15 
APK (foreign affairs) 1.6 7 
UREK (environment and energy) 10.6 7 
Radicals 
SGK (social security and welfare) 4.9 17 
WAK (economy and tax) 9.1 23 
RK (legal issues) 8.7 24 
SIK (military security) 11.4 9 
Social Democrats 
SPK (political institutions) 2.6 15 
FK (finance committee) 3.7 34 
Congress—for the three major parties and some of their committee con­
tingents in the Swiss National Council in the period 1992-94. Some 
caveats are in order. First, the committee contingents—even the ones 
from the three largest parties—are much smaller than their respective 
parties. Four to six members form a committee contingent. So the per­
centage voting "yes" may change considerably if only one member of 
the contingent deviates. Second, the number of roll call votes pertaining 
to bills reported out by the committees in the three years considered is 
also rather small; the committees we analyzed reported out 7 to 34 bills 
during this period. Furthermore, we have taken into account only the 
contingents whose composition did not change in the course of the three 
years considered. 
As table 5.4 indicates, our results do not differ significantly from 
those obtained by Cox and McCubbins. Thus, although the committee 
system of the Swiss National Council is not as institutionalized as that 
of the U.S. Congress, members of the committees considered do vote 
differently from their party colleagues. In particular, in a few cases we 
found rather high differences between committee members' voting 
behavior and the behavior of the other members of the party group. 
However, table 5.4 does reveal differences between the party groups 
considered. It is not surprising that the Christian Democrats, who have 
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relatively low indexes of party cohesion, have a higher MAD score than 
the Social Democrats, who vote more cohesively (see table 5.2). Thus, 
we suggest that among the three governmental party groups considered, 
committees most likely constitute a competing factor for the Christian 
Democrat Party. 
For the Social Democrats, we find that in most cases the committee 
contingent did not differ from the rest of the party. However, there were 
a few interesting cases in which a big difference actually did occur. It 
obviously happens sometimes that the committee contingent defends a 
solution achieved in committee even if the party group is against this 
solution. For example, on a vote over whether the prohibition of gam­
bling should be abolished, the majority of Social Democrats voted 
against this for social reasons (people losing their money at gambling 
tables): only 14.3% of the noncommittee members voted for the aboli­
tion. On the other hand, 80% of the Social Democrat members of the 
Finance Committee, which had prepared the bill, voted in favor of this 
abolition (presumably because the owners of gambling tables would 
have to pay taxes according to the new bill, thereby increasing the state's 
revenue). This resulted in a MAD score of 65.7 for this roll call. 
There are interesting cases found for other party groups too. Take, 
for example, a roll call vote on the purchase of army airplanes. The 
question was whether the state should make advance payments before 
the popular vote on the airplane purchase was held. The Radical mem­
bers of the Committee of Military Security were all in favor of these 
advance payments because they wanted a quick purchase of the air­
planes. More than half of the other members of the Radical Party, how­
ever, voted against these advance payments, with a resulting MAD score 
of 56 in this case. 
Prospects for Further Research on Voting Behavior 
in the Swiss Parliament 
This chapter has isolated three main findings. First, party cohesion on 
roll call votes in the Swiss National Council differs across the party 
groups, with the Social Democrats achieving higher scores than the 
three other government parties. Although there exist assumptions in the 
Swiss literature about an increase of party cohesion over time, we have 
found no empirical evidence of an overall trend toward increased party 
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cohesion. Second, we have found that many different alliances occur on 
roll call votes in the National Council. In spite of what one may expect 
in view of the Swiss power-sharing system, voting alliances involving all 
government parties appeared only rarely in the period that we analyzed. 
The two most frequent alliances on roll call votes were "bourgeois alli­
ances" (with the highest success rate) and "left-Green alliances" (with 
the lowest success rate). The third most frequent voting alliance was 
formed by the Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Christian 
Democrats. These alliances were as successful as the "bourgeois alli­
ance"; thus, the Christian Democrats may be described as "majority 
makers" in the National Council. Third, we have presented initial re­
sults on the assumed difference between the voting behavior of commit­
tee members and noncommittee members, showing that in some cases 
such differences do exist, as in the U.S. Congress, although the commit­
tee system of the Swiss parliament is not as institutionalized as that of 
the U.S. Congress. 
In closing this chapter, we suggest two areas for future research: col­
lective behavior and individual decision-making patterns. 
With regard to collective behavior, first, it would be interesting to 
put the Swiss case into comparative perspective in order to test the theo­
retical assumption of intraparty cohesion being determined by the po­
litical system (parliamentary versus presidential system). Second, we 
suggest analyzing the course of interparty conflict from a longitudinal 
view: Is the thesis of a growing polarization in the Swiss National Coun­
cil and the shifting of the traditional model of consensus democracy 
to politics of majorities (with rigid "bourgeois" majorities and Social 
Democrat/Green minorities) really supported by empirical evidence? 
Third, we propose taking into account the dimensional aspect, a focus 
on the policy areas affected: On which issues and under what circum­
stances do members of a party group vote cohesively, and when do they 
differ? Which alliances between the different party groups are formed, 
and for which issues? A fourth research question is the relation between 
parties and committees. On the one hand, it would be useful to collect 
more data in the coming years in order to have a better base for quanti­
tative analysis; on the other hand, single case studies could lead to inter­
esting results as well. 
With regard to individual decision-making patterns, different factors 
that presumably affect the voting behavior of individual MPs will 
have to be empirically tested: party and committee membership, the 
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constituency factor, membership in interest groups, gender, and—espe-
cially interesting in the Swiss context—regional and language factors. 
Do French- or Italian-speaking members of the Swiss National Council 
vote differently from German-speaking members? We suggest analyzing 
the relative influence of these different institutional and noninstitutional 
factors on legislative voting with multivariate regression in order to test 
different theories of individual voting behavior. 
NOTES 
We would like to thank Hans Hirter for putting the data he collected at our 
disposal and for helping us on various research problems. 
1. For further insight into the workings of Swiss democracy, see Linder 
(1994). 
2. Since the beginning of 1994, in addition to requested roll call votes, the 
following votes are also being recorded and published: voting on the whole of 
a bill (Gesamtabstimmung), final voting after both chambers have decided on 
a bill (Schlussabstimmung), and voting on bills to be treated as urgent. Conse­
quently, the bulk of voting on particular parts of a bill, which is especially 
interesting in terms of analyzing the way in which voting alliances are formed 
(i.e., logrolling), is still not made wholly transparent. 
3. The Constitution, article 91, states that the MPs vote without 
instructions. 
4. This way of perceiving the parliamentary mandate is reflected in the 
results of a comparative study by Loewenberg and Mans (1988). On the basis 
of interviews held with MPs from 1975 to 1976, the authors find that Swiss 
MPs consider partisan loyalty as constraining their behavior. 
5. On the basis of data from 1983 to 1988, Luthi (1989) showed that the 
abstention rate was generally low (about 2%) and that the same party group 
that voted most cohesively also had the highest abstention rate. 
6. Liithi et al. (1991, 64) point out that the increased number of roll call 
votes may be an expression of a politically polarized situation; at the same 
time they emphasize that a lack of those votes in former periods does not 
automatically mean that there were not any conflicts between the parties at 
that time. They stress, however, the fact of the changed political meaning of 
roll call votes. 
7. In 1994, 75 roll call votes were held in the National Council on request 
by at least 30 MPs, compared to 39 in 1993. 
8. This reduction proved to be necessary, since parliamentary life is in fact 
marked by a wide variety of different alliances if one treats governmental and 
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nongovernmental parties equally. For the period in question (1991-94), 60 
different voting alliances were counted. 
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Electoral Systems, 
Parliamentary Committees, 
and Party Discipline: The 
Norwegian Storting in a 
Comparative Perspective 
BJ0RN ERIK RASCH 
o;
^ ver the last two or three decades, a certain unrest has been
"observed at the voter level in several West European coun­
tries. This includes Norway (and the other Nordic countries), where the 
party loyalty of voters has become weaker, party identification has de­
creased, and volatility has increased (Lane et al. 1993). The reduced 
loyalties of voters do not seem to be mirrored at the level of legislative 
representatives (in the Storting). Parliamentary party groups in Scandi­
navia are known to act as highly cohesive and disciplined units of legis­
lators. Fitzmaurice (1986, 274) even speaks of the "iron party discipline 
in parliament" in these countries. With respect to Norway, Laver and 
Schofield (1990, 237) state that political parties "function more as uni­
tary actors than do those in most of the other West European systems," 
This chapter comments on the Norwegian case and relates it to some 
more general hypotheses concerning party discipline. There is no reason 
to believe that unrest among voters should have a negative effect on 
party discipline in the legislative assembly; instead, I indicate other 
types of mechanisms—primarily centrifugal forces—of relevance in the 
parliamentary context. One of these is associated with the electoral sys­
tem, potentially making the district, or constituency, highly significant 
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to legislators' actions. The internal organization of the parliament and 
organizational features of the parliamentary parties are other sources 
of accounting for disciplined behavior. For instance, if parliamentary 
committees are prestigious and powerful, they may threaten the unity 
of the party groups or their ability to command the loyalty of their 
legislators. 
It is relevant to consider several different mechanisms when trying 
to explain the degree of discipline of parliamentary party groups. Such 
mechanisms may not necessarily work in the same direction: some 
might be expected to weaken party discipline, others to strengthen it. 
To my knowledge no broad theory (or lawlike explanation) has yet been 
developed in this field to show how the various mechanisms are related 
and when they are, so to speak, switched on and off. 
It seems reasonable to make a distinction, building on other authors, 
between party cohesion and party discipline (e.g., Ozbudun 1970; chap. 
1 of this volume). Cohesion is regularly associated with a certain con­
sensus in values and attitudes, or a clear "affinity" of preferences. Party 
discipline, of course, is related to cohesion but refers primarily to legisla­
tive behavior. Typically, a party is regarded as disciplined to the extent 
that its representatives vote in similar ways in the assembly. The reasons 
for uniformity in voting may be diverse: one possibility is that party 
members have similar preferences and values; another is that they abide 
by party decisions (the majority binds the minority) or follow the will 
of the party leadership. 
The chapter starts, in the next section, with a rudimentary sketch of 
a rationale for parties, referring to the general effects of electoral sys­
tems and parliamentary organization on party discipline. The second 
section is devoted to the measurement of party discipline in Norway; 
roll call data still demonstrate a remarkable cohesiveness in legislative 
behavior (despite the electorate's becoming more and more fluid). In 
the third section I mention one type of strategic party voting found in 
legislatures that potentially reduces the pressure generated by the cen­
trifugal mechanisms discussed earlier. 
Mechanisms Affecting Party Discipline 
A Rationale for Parties 
In all modern parliaments the overwhelming majority of legisla­
tors belong to organized party groups. In most parliaments, the parties 
The Norwegian Storting in a Comparative Perspective • 123 
play an important role in selecting presiding officers, in allocating legis­
lators to committees and to leadership positions within committees, and 
in shaping the agenda for consideration of bills and other measures.1 
Why are such organizations—which create hierarchical relations among 
formally equal representatives—established and maintained? A very 
general answer has been developed recently by rational choice theorists 
(see Cox and McCubbins 1993, 83-135, 1994; Kiewiet and McCubbins 
1991, 22-38; Aldrich 1995; see also chap. 2 of this volume). The basic 
idea is that "parties are invented, structured, and restructured in order 
to solve a variety of collective dilemmas that legislators face" (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 83). There are three basic types of collective di-
lemma—free-rider problems, difficulties in achieving coordination, and 
the arbitrariness of social choice instability—and these dilemmas would 
prevail, easily leading to suboptimal outcomes, in a hypothetical, com­
pletely unorganized legislative setting.2 The main task of legislators, of 
course, is to act as representatives of those who have elected them and 
to engage in processes of passing legislation by majority rule or some 
stronger requirement. The legislative task is collective in nature, and 
collective dilemmas will readily emerge. The same can be said with re­
spect to the task of getting reelected in mass electorates; collective di­
lemmas are inherent in such situations and need to be solved in some 
way so as to avoid suboptimal outcomes. 
In general, central authority—attained by the formation of attractive 
elective leadership positions—represents a solution to collective dilem-
mas.3 Party groups are organized—that is, networks of principal-agent 
relationships are established, and authority is delegated from individual 
legislators to a central agent—in order to realize benefits of collective 
action as seen from the perspective of self-interested, individual legis­
lators. The central agent will monitor compliance and try to prevent 
defection from group-regarding action. According to the theory of po­
litical entrepreneurship, central agents (in this context, the party leader­
ship) have to possess three essential features to facilitate collective 
action: "(1) They bear the direct costs of monitoring the community 
faced with the collective dilemma; (2) they possess selective incentives 
(individually targetable punishments and rewards) with which to reward 
those whom they find cooperating or punish those whom they find 'de­
fecting'; (3) they are paid, in various ways, for the valuable service they 
provide" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 91). 
Selective incentives in the parliamentary arena include such things as 
staff support, attractive committee (and rapporteur) assignments, and 
access to mass media as the spokesperson of the party on certain types 
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of issues. The ideas that Cox and McCubbins use are also known from 
other institutional contexts, such as the Hobbesian view of the state 
as a means to overcome the "war of all against all" and the theory of 
the firm. 
Most parliamentary parties in western Europe are institutional-
ized—for instance, in the sense that they have formal statutes. Typically, 
the parties favor majority rule on internal matters, although actual vo­
ting seldom takes place.4 With respect to Norway, all parties but one— 
the right-wing Progress Party (FRP)—vote only on issues where inter­
nal disagreement has been strong. The Progress Party is the only one 
requiring a qualified majority (two-thirds of the votes) to bind the group 
members to a party line; all other parties may in principle tie up their 
legislators by simple majority. 
Parliamentarism 
Before turning to centrifugal forces, an important centripetal 
force often mentioned in scholarly debate should be outlined. Clearly, 
the constitutional system of a country may significantly affect legislative 
party discipline.5 In particular, the relationship between the legislature 
and the executive—presidentialism versus parliamentarism—is a factor 
often discussed. In presidential systems the chief executive is elected 
directly by the people for a fixed term of office. The president typically 
commands a more or less circumscribed veto to guard against legislative 
trespass and is empowered to initiate legislation and to issue decrees 
(Shugart and Carey 1992). In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, 
the head of government and the ministers operate on the basis of confi­
dence from the legislative branch. The majority of the legislative assem­
bly has the power to form and, at any time, remove the government. 
The instrument of censure in the hands of parliamentary majorities is 
normally balanced by the government's right to dissolve parliament and 
arrange early elections.6 
In parliamentary systems, two dimensions are relevant for each legis­
lator on the occasions when votes are taken (except for motions of no 
confidence, which only involve one dimension): legislators vote to sup­
port or oppose some policy or bill (usually proposed by the government) 
and, at the same time, to support or oppose the present government 
(Huber 1992). At least on bills regarded as sufficiently important by the 
group controlling government offices, a vote against the governmental 
policy position would be equivalent to a vote against the government; 
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such action can contribute to replacing the government. The possibility 
that roll calls are easily transformed into a question of confidence in the 
government provides incentives for disciplined party voting. MPs of the 
governing party or coalition may contribute to the fall of their own gov­
ernment by voting contrary to the party line on a bill, thereby losing 
their share in the various benefits of executive power. They also risk 
being punished later, since reelection fortunes and parliamentary com­
mittee assignments may be at least partly controlled by party groups. 
Opposition parties may also have incentives to act unitarily in their 
struggle to try to win governmental office. 
Sartori sums this up as follows: "Putting all in a nutshell, parliament-
dependent government implies party-supported government; a support 
that in turn requires voting discipline along party lines" (Sartori 1994, 
193). Undeniably, however, there is some variation within the parliamen­
tary context: for instance, Japan and Italy have until recently been men­
tioned as countries with relatively fragmented dominant-party systems. 
Preferences, Institutions, and Voting Behavior 
Party discipline, as stated above, refers to congruence in voting 
behavior. Parliamentary voting behavior, furthermore, is always guided 
by formal rules and norms defining majority requirements, the right to 
table amendments, the order of voting, and so forth. A simple example 
shows that institutional details of agendas and voting in parliaments may 
also be relevant to an understanding of party discipline. Disciplined (and 
undisciplined) behavior may have subtle institutional sources and does 
not have to reflect underlying partisan preferences (the degree of cohe­
sion) very directly. In this example, let us assume a one-dimensional 
policy space, as shown in figure 6.1. The legislators have Euclidean (or 
"Downsian") preferences, meaning that alternatives become less attrac­
tive as they move away from a legislator's ideal point and that a legisla­
tor is indifferent between proposals of equal distance from the ideal 
point. All MPs of party A have ideal points in the shaded area of the 
figure. Now, assume that a vote is taken between the bill Bx and SQ 
(status quo, or no bill at all). Clearly, all legislators of party A will prefer 
Bj to SQ and will vote as a unitary bloc in favor of this piece of legisla­
tion. The party is coherent, and voting is disciplined without any system 
of sanctions or any crack of a party whip. If we instead, for whatever 
7reason,  assume that the MPs face a choice between B2 and SQ, the 
behavioral implications are less straightforward. In one sense, party A 
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of Ideal Points in One Dimension 
has to be no less cohesive this time, since preferences are unchanged. The 
altered location of the bill along the relevant policy dimension will, 
however, cause a division. Some of the MPs of party A will prefer B2 to 
SQ, while some others will have the reverse preference. Unity in voting 
this time has to rest on some kind of enforcing mechanism (or long-
term self-interest). 
Centrifugal Forces: Electoral System and Committees 
Electoral systems can be classified in various ways (e.g., Blais 
1988; Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 19-37; Bowler and Farrell 1993). A 
major distinction is between systems based on single-member districts, 
systems based on multimember districts, and various combinations of 
both, as in Germany. Huge variations can be observed with respect to 
districts electing more than one legislator. Some countries operate with 
the entire nation as one district (Israel, Netherlands), while other coun­
tries are divided into relatively small districts electing only a handful of 
legislators in each. This variation can be shown by calculating the dis­
trict magnitude of a system (i.e., the [average] number of seats in a dis-
trict).8 If district magnitude is (very) low (equal to 1 if all districts elect 
one MP each), we should expect party discipline in the parliament to 
be affected negatively. As district magnitude decreases, a real home dis-
trict—and a distinct segment of district voters—becomes more and 
more clearly defined to the representative. A need to cultivate the district 
emerges, potentially leading the representative into conflicts with the 
party line. 
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A second, related, distinction concerns ballot structure, in particular 
whether the elector votes for candidates or for party lists. Typically, 
single-member districts use the former type of ballot, while both vari­
ants may be found in the multimember context. The existence of party 
lists means that someone has to arrange them. If the placement on party 
lists is centrally controlled or is controlled by the party branch of large 
regions, the representatives have an incentive to cultivate the party lead­
ership. This may introduce an additional impediment to voting contrary 
to the party in Parliament and thus may affect party coherence posi­
tively. As such, it is not the list systems that generate this type of effect 
(e.g., if the local party is exclusively in charge of nominations in small 
constituencies); the essential question is who controls list access. 
A third element separating electoral systems is their decision rule(s), 
or electoral formulas. As the literature shows, there is a vast range of 
formulas in single-member districts (e.g., plurality, alternative vote, sec­
ond ballot) and multimember districts (e.g., quota methods, divisor 
methods, single transferable vote, single nontransferable vote). For my 
purpose, an important distinction is between "d'Hondt-like" (and more 
disproportional) rules applied regionally (i.e., not with the nation as a 
single district) and other, more proportional rules.9 It is well known that 
the plurality formulas in single-member districts imply a system with 
two dominant parties.10 D'Hondt-like approaches also may encourage 
the formation of alliances—or at least there are no incentives to party 
splits (a party would get fewer seats if it split into two parties). With 
respect to party discipline, we should expect parties operating under 
the more disproportional electoral formulas to be broader, more fac­
tionalized alliances (than parties operating under conditions of perfect 
proportionality and low thresholds of representation). Thus, the par­
liamentary parties—all else being equal—should be less disciplined 
entities. 
Let us move to internal organization and suggest some possible link­
ages to party discipline. First, staff resources may be linked to individual 
legislators, to the parliamentary institution, or to each of the parties. If 
the staff are organized and controlled primarily by the parliamentary 
party groups, the level of party coherence will most likely be higher than 
in situations where these resources are affiliated to individuals or to the 
parliament. Second, committee members may serve on short-term con­
tracts (ad hoc committees) or long-term contracts (standing commit­
tees). Stability in committee contracts and membership encourages the 
development of expertise. Over time, legislators learn to know certain 
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policy fields quite well, and the information advantage may generate 
differences in opinion between the party representatives. Such differ­
ences of opinion also potentially affect party discipline. Third, legisla­
tors are allocated to committees in different ways. Three approaches are 
followed, often in combination: legislator "self-selection," allocation by 
the plenary of the parliament, or allocation by the parliamentary party 
groups themselves (at least on the decision of who should serve on what 
committee). The more central the role of the party in committee assign­
ments, the stronger we should expect party discipline to be. 
In this section we have looked at some general mechanisms likely to 
affect the behavior of parliamentary parties. Clearly, parliamentarism 
strengthens party discipline, compared to presidential forms of govern­
ment. However, characteristics of the electoral system as well as the in­
ternal organization of the assembly might contribute to a weakening of 
party discipline. 
Party Discipline in Norwegian Roll Call Voting 
The Norwegian party system has exhibited some signs of turbulence in 
the last few decades. Two elections—in 1973 and 1993—have signifi­
cantly reshaped the political landscape. As we can see from figure 6.2, 
the relative strength (in seats) of the various parliamentary parties has 
changed during the post-World War II period. Labor has lost seats, and 
the Liberals (Venstre) have been completely erased. In the 1970s new 
parties emerged on both the left and right. The Conservatives (H0yre) 
are no longer the clearly dominating force of the nonsocialist camp. 
It is difficult to bypass the parties. Only once during the entire period 
since 1945 has an independent representative been elected to the parlia­
ment, in 1989. Fraction hopping has also been very rare. Two MPs 
moved from Labor to the Socialist Left (and one of them was reelected 
from the list of the new party). Some MPs have left the right-wing Prog­
ress Party to act as independents (one before the 1993 election and four 
after). Only one major party split has occurred: the Common Market 
issue caused the Liberal Party to split into two party groups (with eight 
and five representatives) in 1972. 
Let us now move to the question of party discipline. There has been 
little analysis of party voting in the Storting. This is not surprising, first, 
because everyone (correctly) believes party discipline to be very high 
and, second, because until recently there have been no comprehensive 
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sets of roll call data. At the outset it should be added that there is no 
obvious way to measure (intra)party cohesion or party discipline; sev­
eral approaches have been suggested in the literature (e.g., Collie 1985; 
Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979). Here I present a range of different 
measures, but, as we shall see, they all lead to the same conclusion: 
highly disciplined parties. 
One approach is to rely on an index, such as Stuart Rice's (1928) 
Index of Party Cohesion. For a given vote by a party i, the index is 
simply calculated as follows: 
Ii = (%YES - %NO> 
The measure ranges from 0 (in the case of a party divided into two 
fractions of equal size) to 100 (in the case of complete party unity). The 
index is simple, and the results are fairly easy to interpret. Table 6.1 
shows the Rice Index for all the main parties in the Storting and the 
Odelsting from 1979 to 1994 (a total of 11,393 roll calls).11 The data 
include all ballots carried out electronically, which means that only 
unanimous or nearly unanimous votes are excluded from the data set. 
The actual index values range from 93.3 to 99.2 (both extremes are 
found in the agrarian Center Party, SP). There is no consistent pattern 
indicating more (or less) cohesive parties as a new election approaches. 
However, during the period covered, there has been a marked increase 
in the number of roll calls. This is due to the fact that opposition par­
ties formulate amendments to government proposals more and more 
frequently. 
On the basis of a relatively large number of roll calls in the Storting 
and the Odelsting, Bjurulf and Glans (1976) analyzed voting behavior 
in the period from 1969 to 1974. During these years there were govern­
ments of different size and party composition; the years cover the Euro­
pean Community referendum (1972) and the "earthquake" election of 
1973. In other words, the political situation was one in which we might 
expect party unity to be put under considerable pressure. The voting 
pattern reported by Bjurulf and Glans was, however, unambiguous: in 
all parties the overwhelming majority of MPs voted the same way on 
most issues. One of the measures that the authors used in their analysis 
was the degree of individual, pairwise agreement in voting. For every 
pair of MPs it was calculated how often they voted the same way (yes­
yes or no-no) before the representatives were grouped into parties and 
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Table 6.1 
Intraparty Agreement in Storting and Odelsting Voting, 1979-1994: Main Parties, 
Election Results (Seats), and Rice's Index of Cohesion 
N 
Session Roll Calls SV SP KRF H FRP 
Election 1977 (2) (76) (12) (22) (41) — 
1979-80 285 98.9 98.2 96.9 93.4 96.8 
1980-81 412 98.8 98.9 95.7 95.3 96.8 
— 
Election 1981 (4) (66) (11) (15) (53) (4) 
1981-82 293 98.7 95.8 93.3 94.6 97.5 96.2 
1982-83 502 97.2 98.1 97.1 97.0 99.0 98.0 
1983-84 375 98.4 97.9 98.1 97.4 99.0 98.2 
1984-85 456 98.3 98.7 96.5 98.0 98.9 97.4 
Election 1985 (6) (71) (12) (16) (50) (2) 
1985-86 449 98.0 98.3 98.9 98.0 98.3 98.2 
1986-87 329 98.6 97.5 96.4 95.8 96.4 97.2 
1987-88 549 98.7 98.3 96.8 94.4 97.3 98.6 
1988-89 784 97.0 98.2 95.8 94.2 96.7 99.6 
Election 1989 (17) (63) (11) (14) (37) (22) 
1989-90 1,315 98.3 98.9 99.2 98.7 98.4 98.6 
1990-91 1,711 98.1 98.8 98.6 98.0 98.1 98.4 
1991-92 1,459 98.0 98.4 97.2 98.1 98.0 98.1 
1992-93 1,296 96.8 95.9 95.9 95.7 95.9 95.2 
Election 1993 (13) (67) (32) (13) (28) (10) 
1993-94 1,178 8.3 99.2 98.1 97.4 8.1 94. la 
Source: Norwegian Social Science Dat a Service (NSD Bergen). 
Note: SV = Socialist Left; A = Labour; SP = Centre Party; KR F = Christian People's Party; H = 
Conservatives (H0yre); FR P = Progress Party. 
including those 4 representatives leaving the Progress Party (FRP) in April and May of 1994 to serve 
as independents (they formed their own parliamentary group). 
averages taken. A summary of the results is shown in table 6.2. For most 
parties the internal agreement reached well above 90% over the entire 
time period. In general, there were no marked differences in party cohe­
sion between the two largest parties, Labor and Conservatives. 
A decade later, Shaffer (1991) found an equally high level of in­
traparty cohesiveness in the Storting. He studied the 1985-86 parlia­
mentary session and found that "on approximately 84 percent of the 
Storting votes (336/402) analyzed in this research every single representa­
tive voted with his or her party. On the remaining measures, usually only 
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Table 6.2 
Intraparty Agreement in Storting and Odelsting Roll Call Voting, 1969-1974 
A V KRF SP H ALP SV 
1969-70 97 97 95 97 97 
(N = 188) 
1970-71 98 97 97 99 99 
(N= 114) 
1971-72 95 93 88 87 94 
(N = 105) 
1972-73 94 80 93 93 94 
(N = 166) 
1973-74 98 81 95 97 98 95 98 
(N = 362) 
Source: Summary of table 2 in Bjurulf and Glans (1976, 239). 
Note: See table 6.1. 
Table 6.3 
Contested Party Votes in the Storting, 1989-1993 
A H FRP KRF SP SV 
Size of party in % of 38.2 22.4 13.3 8.5 6J 10.3 
seats 
% contested party 13.8 10.5 6.6 6.6 4.3 5.8 
votes of all roll 
calls (TV = 4,301) 
Average no. of party 3 3 2 2 2 6 
members in 
minority on 
contested party 
votes 
Source: Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD Bergen). 
Notes: From the last parliamentary year 1992-93 of the election term, data include only the 
fall session (not spring 1993). 
For acronyms, see table 6.1. 
one or two members broke with party ranks. In fact, a minuscule 0.2% 
of all the individual votes cast on the 402 roll call votes broke with party 
position" (65). 
Table 6.3 shows the extent of party unity in roll call voting, using 
data from recent parliamentary sessions. The data include all roll calls 
using the electronic voting device of the Storting (not the Odelsting), 
meaning that most unanimous decisions are excluded as well as some 
of the roll calls in which less than a handful of representatives opposed. 
A large portion of the data concerns budgets and appropriations; the 
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Table 6.4 
Intraparty Agreement in Storting Voting, 1989-1993 
SV A SP KRF H FRP 
1989-93 98.5 99.0 99.1 98.7 98.4 98.8 
(N = 4,301) 
Source: Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD Bergen). 
Notes: From the last parliamentary year 1992-93 of the election term, data include only the 
fall session (not spring 1993). 
For acronyms, see table 6.1. 
Odelsting and Lagting decisions on formal laws are not included. With 
respect to party cohesion, however, we should not expect systematic 
differences between the Storting and the Odelsting. Table 6.3 reveals, 
first, that on most roll calls the parties act as unitary actors. The fraction 
of roll calls where at least one representative breaks with party lines 
ranges from around 4% to almost 14%. The greatest number of divided 
votes is found in the largest party (Labor), whereas the smallest parties 
exhibit the fewest nonunitary votes. Second, the minorities voting con­
trary to party positions are very tiny (in absolute terms) in all parties. 
On average, only some two to six representatives constitute the party 
minority on divided votes, and the "largest" minorities are to be found 
in the Socialist Left Party (but it should be added that the party seldom 
splits—251 divided votes out of a total of 4,301). The overall impression 
is one of tight party discipline; the parties to a remarkable extent still 
act as unitary actors on the floor of the Storting. 
The same message can be read from table 6.4, which uses the mea­
sure employed by Bjurulf and Glans (1976). Party voting is no less domi­
nant today than two decades ago. There are some problems associated 
both with the roll call data and with the measures, however. First, all 
kinds of roll calls are mingled; the data set does not distinguish between 
unimportant or small issues and important or major issues. The really 
interesting question is the degree of party discipline on significant policy 
proposals. Second, if the parliament votes in a situation where three or 
more alternatives are formulated, voting proceeds in stages. Proposals 
are voted one by one in some predetermined order, and normally n — 1 
ballots are needed if n alternatives exist (the successive voting proce­
dure). In the data set, all ballots are treated the same way; it does not 
matter whether the vote concerns one proposal in a larger sequence of 
ballots or whether only one proposal is formulated to be voted up or 
down. Votes taken early in a larger sequence, typically on extreme pro­
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posals that nobody believes has any chance at all of adoption, are less 
interesting (or actually irrelevant) from our perspective. Third, the mea­
sures being used neglect abstention. In Storting voting, participation at 
the voting stage is mandatory in principle. Furthermore, it is not pos­
sible to express indifference by using blank votes (or by being present 
and refraining from voting); each and every MP should form prefer­
ences either for or against any proposal. From time to time, however, 
some legislators from a party may "disappear" just before votes are 
taken to avoid voting contrary to their conscience (e.g., avoiding the 
choice between "pest and cholera"), the party line, or the constituency.12 
Strategic Party Splits 
On what kind of issues is party discipline most likely to be relaxed? Two 
instances have been acknowledged as especially vulnerable to intraparty 
disagreement. First, on issues of regional interest, party-line voting from 
time to time breaks down. Such issues that may generate serious con­
flicts within all parties are the choices of sites for large public institu­
tions and infrastructure, such as airports and roads, or even private 
ones, such as oil exploration bases, which require parliamentary per­
mits. Here it might be accepted that coalitions would form across party 
lines. Second, on issues concerning the moral and ethical beliefs of the 
individual member (e.g., abortion), the individual members are often 
free to vote according to their conscience—particularly if they have al­
ready made their viewpoints known when nominated. In general, free 
votes normally involve matters of regional interest or individual con­
science on issues cross-cutting the party lines and not threatening the 
standing of the government.13 
Janda (1980, 123) mentions one type of factionalism that he calls 
strategic or tactical: "Members of political parties may agree on ideol­
ogy and issues but disagree seriously on the strategy that the party ought 
to use in achieving its goal or perhaps on particular tactics that the 
party ought to follow within a given strategy." Disagreement in this case 
has a particular basis. One example probably is the left-wing activism 
seen in some Labor parties, where activists want to follow other (more 
radical) reform strategies than moderates, thereby reducing coherence 
in party behavior.14 
I will point to a very different kind of strategic party division in 
voting and will use an incident from the Storting for illustrative pur­
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Figure 6.3 Voting on Location of New Airport, the Storting, 1988 
F (28 votes)  ' - (1*> .gainst F) 
H (81 vote.) ' x (76 .gainst H) 
poses (Rasch 1990). In 1988 the Storting had to decide where in the 
Oslo area to locate a new main airport. Three solutions were discussed: 
(1) to build a completely new airport to the south of Oslo (at Hurum), 
(2) to upgrade an existing airport north of Oslo (at Gardermoen), and 
(3) to continue using the existing airports in the Oslo area in combina­
tion (Fornebu and Gardermoen; actually a formal status quo proposal). 
Let us call the proposals H, G and F, respectively. Communities in and 
around the capital of Oslo, of course, had very strong interests in the 
Storting decision and differed sharply with respect to the favored solu-
tion.15 Disagreement among MPs from this area of the country did not 
follow party lines. 
The Labor minority government in power proposed G as their al­
ternative, and the government soon received support from most of the 
Labor MPs. However, the government needed additional votes to get 
its proposal adopted. As the vote approached, it seemed clear that a 
majority would support G—after the elimination of first F and then 
H. To the surprise of most MPs, H was adopted by a tiny majority 
before the assembly got the opportunity of voting on the governmental 
proposal G. 
Figure 6.3 shows the results of voting, indicating that the government 
would have been supported by a majority if 14 of its 71 representatives 
had not voted in favor of proposal H (voted on earlier than G in the 
voting sequence).16 In the case of H being voted down (as almost every­
one expected), these Labor MPs would have voted subsidiarily in favor 
of G (as their second preference). Although the impact of the party 
split was rather dramatic for the government, none of the 14 MPs partly 
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responsible for the governmental defeat seems to have been "punished" 
in any way after the vote. On the contrary, they all strengthened their 
position and reputation in their constituency and local party branch, 
and some of them later advanced to attractive positions in the Storting 
or on the committees.17 Advancement is not possible without support 
from the parliamentary party leadership and majority. 
The airport saga leads us to the following assertion: given the voting 
institution as outlined (the successive procedure), a free-rider strategy 
may be attractive to parliamentary parties if opinions diverge. The party 
may find it in its interest to let some MPs vote in favor of alternative 
proposals—important to their constituency, their local party, or some 
ideological segment—before the main proposal of the party is voted 
upon. The intention, of course, is not to contribute to the adoption of 
the alternative proposal; the party acts on the assumption that the alter­
native proposal has no real chance of getting through. In this way, devi­
ant views are explicitly expressed, and the party line is at the same time 
supported—as either the first or second preference—by each legislator 
of the party. Thus, the party is able to serve both intense minorities in 
some constituencies and the majority views. The problem with this free-
rider strategy is that it occasionally misfires: the alternative proposal, 
voted upon early, gets adopted (as in the airport case). 
If the strategic approach to voting outlined above is used with some 
frequency to ease the pressure on issues where party preferences are 
divided, actual party discipline in Norway is most likely even higher 
than reported in the analysis of all roll calls. 
Conclusion 
Parties in the Norwegian parliament act in a highly disciplined fashion, 
as we have demonstrated by using recent roll call data and various mea­
sures of party coherence (the Rice Index and frequencies of pairwise 
agreement among legislators). Party discipline has increased rather than 
decreased in recent years. This is the reverse of the tendencies observed 
in the electorate: voters have become more fluid and "disloyal," while 
party loyalty among MPs seems to be stronger than ever. 
The fact that parties are extremely disciplined in Norway will come 
as no surprise to any observer. The more difficult—and more interest-
ing—question is to explain why behavior is uniform. In this chapter I 
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have only hinted at some mechanisms assumed to be relevant if we want 
to account for variation in party discipline. Parliamentarism will tend 
to make parties more disciplined, whereas candidate-centered electoral 
systems and strong parliamentary committees work in the opposite di­
rection. The measurement of party discipline is still quite inaccurate, as 
voting rules (e.g., order of voting effects) and voter strategies (e.g., stra­
tegic party splits) are not taken into consideration. 
NOTES 
This chapter is based partially on data provided by the Norwegian Social Sci­
ence Data Service (NSD). 
1. Several of the chapters in Doring (1995) stress the importance of 
parties. 
2. More formally, Cox and McCubbins (1993, 87) define a collective di­
lemma as a situation "that can be modeled by a game possessing Pareto-
inefficient Nash equilibria." 
3. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 90) illustrate the idea of central authority 
by an example of Chinese riverboat pullers. This is the collective dilemma: 
"In prerevolutionary China large gangs of men would tug fair-sized boats up 
Yangtze. The problem was that each man was tempted to slack off a bit. After 
all, if enough others were pulling, the boat would still progress; if too few 
others were pulling, it did not matter how hard one pulled anyway." As a solu­
tion to the free-rider problem, the workers agreed to hire someone to whip 
them. This ensured that everyone pulled. 
4. Based on unpublished information about voting in West European par­
ties, collected as part of a research project led by Professor Herbert Doring at 
the University of Potsdam (see Doring 1995). 
5. See the discussion in Ozbudun (1970), which deals with federalism and 
parliamentarism. The author convincingly argues that federalism is not able 
to explain why some countries have undisciplined parties. 
6. Although such a balance of threats is found in most parliamentary sys­
tems, the actual decision rules involved vary considerably. See Str0m (1994) 
and Str0m and Swindle (1995) on regulations concerning dissolution of par­
liaments and De Winter (1995) and Bergman (1995) on decision rules regulat­
ing government formation and removal. See also Rasch (1995). 
7. For instance, there could be a party with members' ideal points to the 
left of B2. A proposal B7 from this party will do better than any other propos­
als to the left, and such a proposal may also be tabled simply because it may 
generate problems for the legislators belonging to the competing party, A. 
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8. District magnitude is not easily calculated for all countries because the 
electoral system may contain different "levels" of representatives. For in­
stance, in some countries a pool of additional or compensatory seats is allo­
cated nationally (8 out of 165 seats in Norway, 39 out of 349 in Sweden, 40 
out of 179 in Denmark, at least 58 out of 386 in Hungary, 328 out of 656 in 
Germany, etc.). 
9. It is possible to reformulate the d'Hondt divisors in terms of a quota 
(or actually an interval). This quota will always be close to the Droop and 
Hagenbach-Bishoff quotas, implying equivalence between these electoral ap­
proaches. Furthermore, Cox (1991) has shown that, under certain assump­
tions, applying the plurality rule in multimember districts (i.e., the single 
nontransferable vote) gives results similar to the d'Hondt method. I refer to 
regional d'Hondt or stronger formulas because d'Hondt applied nationally 
may function quite proportionally. 
10. See Duverger's law. Behind the consolidation into two broad parties is 
a "mechanical effect" (nonlinear relationship between seats and votes, harm­
ing small parties) and a "psychological factor" (voters do not want to waste 
their vote and therefore vote strategically for one of the two top runners). See 
Riker (1982). 
11. The Storting is elected as a single body but divides into two cham-
bers—the Odelsting (lower chamber with three-fourths of the MPs) and the 
Lagting (upper chamber with one-fourth of the MPs)—when passing (nonfi­
nancial) legislation. Bills need acceptance by both chambers. The party com­
position of the Storting and the Odelsting (and Lagting) has been (almost) 
identical. (The allocation of members to the Lagting is controlled by the Stort­
ing majority; members not appointed to the Lagting belong to the Odelsting.) 
12. Although against the letter of the parliamentary rules of procedure, 
this practice is not normally viewed as illegitimate (as long as the assembly 
is quorate and outcomes are not changed). It has, however, happened that 
government proposals have been defeated because more than one representa­
tive, not aware of each other's preferences and intentions, have left the plenary 
hall through different doors just before voting. 
13. This is not very different from what we find in other parliamentary 
democracies. For the British case, see Mughan and Scully (1995). 
14. See, for example, Tsebelis (1990) on the approach of British Labour 
Party activists. 
15. Some wanted the airport in their district because it would reduce un­
employment and strengthen the economy of the affected municipalities. Oth­
ers opposed an airport in their neighborhood because of noise and pollution. 
16. If at least three Labor MPs had not voted in favor of H, the govern­
ment proposal would not have been defeated. In this sense, the party needed 
3 out of the 14 nonparty votes. As the result of the vote came as a surprise, the 
Labor Party did not know in advance that more votes were required to win. 
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17. One of the 14, Tom Thoresen, was in fact elected as leader of the par­
liamentary party group in the fall of 1996. 
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Parliamentary Party 
Discipline in Spain 
MANUEL SANCHEZ DE DIOS 
Spain provides an example of a new democracy based on well-structured and disciplined parties, where party stability 
is directly related to party discipline and to the control of party leaders. 
Spanish parties are essentially parliamentary parties. This is not only 
because, as elsewhere, the parliamentary group dominates the whole or­
ganization but also because, as in the United States, party membership 
is not significant. Compared to elsewhere in western Europe, Spanish 
parties have exceptionally small memberships (Gallagher, Laver, and 
Mair 1995, 247). 
As a new democracy, the Spanish case fits Attila Agh's thesis of 
"party parliamentarization" (chap. 8 of this volume): the parliamentary 
group has been the basis of party institutionalization. This process was 
stimulated in Spain by an initial "consensus" among the groups that 
provoked the transition to democracy in the 1970s: it has also been facil­
itated by the constitutional structure of the system. In Spain the process 
of party parliamentarization implies that a group of leaders take control 
over the whole party, imposing strong discipline by means of organiza­
tional rules and by deciding on who the party's candidates will be. In 
essence, the parties that have been created in Spain are parties of 
government. 
After 20 years of democratic government, however, we can differen­
tiate two periods in the Spanish party system. The first period, before 
1982 (see table 7.1), is consistent with Laver and Shepsle's notion of 
parties emerging from "the primeval slime" (chap. 2 of this volume). 
Here we see various groups and factions ceding strategic autonomy in 
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Table 7.1 
Spanish Parliamentary Parties, Number of Legislature Seats, 1977-1996 
o / / / / / / IV V VI 
1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 
N 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 
Popular13 16 9 106 73 107 141 156 
Centrista 165 168 12 
CDS 19 14 
Socialista 105 98 202 184 175 159 141 
Soc. de Cat. 13 17 
Soc. Vase. 6 
M. Cat. 11 8 12 18 18 17 16 
Vasco 8 7 8 6 5 5 5 
Comunista/IUc 20 23 17 18 21 
Andalucista 5 
C. Can. 4 4 
Mixed: Agrupaciones 39* 
7 kMixed: Rest 12d 10f l l h 14! 6i 
Sources: Memorias de Legislatures, data from the Archives of the Congreso de los 
Diputados. 
Note: See chapter appendix for key to party acronyms. 
"Constituent assembly. The subsequent legislatures are indicated by roman numerals. 
bAP in 1977, CD in 1979. 
cCommunists from 1977 to 1982; IU from 1986 to 1996. 
dPSP (6), UDC (2), ERC (1), EE (1), P. Arg. (1), I. Cast. (1). 
eUN (1), HB (3), ERC (1), EE (1), PAR (1), UPN (1), UPC (1). 
fCDS (2), PCE (4), HB (2), ERC (1), EE (1). 
O e m  . Crist. (21), P. Liberal (11), IU (7). 
hHB (5), EE (2), PAR (1), AIC (1), CG (1), UV (1). 
!HB (4), P. And. (2), UV (2), EA (2), EE (2), PAR (1), AIC (1). 
M B (2), ERC (1), PAR (1), EA (1), UV (1). 
kHB (2), BNG (2), ERC (1), EA (1), UV (1). 
the expectation of generating a disciplined party of government. An 
example of this is provided by the centrist party, UCD, which was little 
more than a coalition of leaders that finally dissolved. A further ex­
ample is provided by the socialist party, PSOE, which won the 1982 
election by a huge majority Its electoral success was based on the fact 
that a group of leaders had taken control of the party. At this early stage 
in Spanish electoral politics, we also see the formation of a coalition of 
groups under the banner of the Popular Party (PP). 
According to Cotarelo (1992, ix), the next phase in the development 
of the party system was marked by the consolidation of Spanish democ­
racy after 1979. By 1982 the party system was structured around two 
basic dichotomies, right-left and center-periphery. Only when the Popu­
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lar Party was refounded in 1990 and when new leaders took control of 
the party was the dilemma resolved about which center-right group was 
going to direct the conservative forces. The situation was even more 
clear after the 1996 election, which saw the alternation in power between 
the PSOE and the PP. Nowadays Spanish parties are very well differen­
tiated by their programs, by their leadership group, and by their MPs: 
they have clearly left the "primeval slime." 
The Spanish case can be considered also from the viewpoint of par­
liamentary government, which places stress on party discipline as one 
of its basic principles, particularly in Europe. Stable governments are 
those supported by a disciplined majority of a strong party or a coali­
tion, and only a homogeneous and unified opposition can aspire to take 
control of the government. 
Sometimes party discipline is imposed; at other times it is due to 
group cohesion. What is clear in all cases is that the practice of Euro­
pean parliamentary democracy is based on the existence of large and 
disciplined voting blocs. As a matter of fact, when we compare Euro­
pean parties with their U.S. counterparts, we see that their voters tend to 
vote for parties rather than for individual candidates and that individual 
parliamentarians think of themselves first and foremost as members of 
their party's parliamentary group (Gallagher et al. 1995, 52). 
The Spanish case is entirely consistent with the European pattern of 
parliamentary government: the government is responsible to the legis­
lature, and both the government and the parliament are dominated by 
parties. The party in government is supported by its parliamentarians 
on all issues, while the MPs of the different opposition groups support 
their party lines when voting in Parliament. Party discipline is a clear 
feature of Spanish parties. 
Although on first impression Spain appears as a consensual system 
because of its written constitution, multiparty system, proportional rep­
resentation electoral system, bicameralism, and regional autonomy, if 
we pay closer attention to how some of these characteristics operate, it 
is clear that things are not so straightforward. First, there is the "ratio­
nalization" of the system giving the prime minister power over the gov-
ernment.1 Second, there is the weakness of the senate, which has no say 
in electing the prime minister and cannot place a vote of no confidence 
against the executive. Third, as the most important feature, there is the 
electoral system, which, although formally proportional, has some mod­
ifications that make it close to the majoritarian rule: notably, small elec­
toral districts and the d'Hondt rule for dividing seats among parties. In 
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consequence, the electoral system works in favor of having a small num­
ber of big and polarized parties, against multipartyism, and in favor of 
strengthening the power of ruling party leaders and party discipline at 
the highest level. 
This chapter seeks to explain how party discipline works in the Span­
ish parliamentary system. Due to the secondary position of the senate— 
its representative function is quite similar to that of the chamber (Con­
greso de los Diputados)—the focus in on discipline in the parliamentary 
parties of the Congreso. The chapter starts, in the first section, with a 
consideration of constitutional rules, with particular reference to elec­
toral and financial rules. I examine how these strengthen parties and the 
party leaders. Additionally I analyze turnover as an indicator of the 
degree of party discipline. Next, I consider the effects of parliamentary 
standing orders on the parliamentary party system, observing how these 
affect the structure and activity of groups, as well as the mobility of 
MPs between groups. The last section assesses party discipline from the 
point of view of the internal organization of groups, looking at mass 
and parliamentary group statutes and at disciplinary procedures. 
The Constitutional Formula 
Although parliamentary parties are fundamental actors in the system, 
the Spanish 1978 Constitution has only the briefest of references to 
them, in article 78.1, which states that parliamentary groups have to 
send representatives to the Diputacion Permanente, a constitutional or­
gan in charge of the Congreso's powers when it is not in session. But 
if the Constitution does not pay attention to parliamentary groups, it 
does affirm clearly that parties have a powerful role in the system. Ar­
ticle 6 states that parties are "fundamental instruments for political 
participation." 
On the other hand, the Constitution ensures the freedom of MPs 
from being mandated (art. 67.2), and it states that MPs cannot delegate 
their vote to anyone (art. 79.3), since it is personal In theory, at least, 
both these rules enable MPs to break party discipline without losing 
their seats. However, as we shall see, the practice of party discipline 
overrides this freedom, and one can talk of a pseudoimperative mandate 
of parties over MPs. 
In Spain the main source of party power is the electoral system, regu­
lated for the Congreso by the Constitution (art. 68), which establishes 
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proportional representation based on closed party lists.2 Moreover, the 
use of the d'Hondt formula,3 together with small districts, has some 
extremely distorting effects that benefit the two major national parties 
(socialists and centrists or conservatives), as well as the Basque and Ca­
talan minorities, which are the largest parties in their regions. These 
majority elements work against small parties and any splinters from the 
big ones. The electoral rules also enforce the power of party leaders 
because it is the leaders who determine the lists. This is the main source 
of party discipline: MPs wanting to be placed high on the electoral lists 
must accept the instructions and proposals set by the leadership. 
As elsewhere in Europe, there are no American-style primaries, 
though in contrast to many of the older European parties, the leader­
ship group of each Spanish party has a dominant role in candidate selec­
tion. More precisely, in the PP there is a national electoral committee, 
linked to the national executive committee of the party, that must ap­
prove the electoral lists for the Cortes Generales. In the PSOE there is a 
"committee on lists," elected by the party's federal committee, that con­
trols the content of electoral lists. In the left coalition, IU (United Left), 
the federal political council approves the lists proposed by each federa­
tion. The same practice occurs in the Basque nationalist party, PNV, 
where the national executive organ (Euzkadi Buru Batzar) proposes the 
parliamentary list to the national assembly of the party. 
In addition to the electoral rules, party leadership is also strength­
ened by the 1987 law on party finance.4 Much as elsewhere in Europe, 
the bulk of Spanish party revenue comes from the public budget—about 
80%—and goes directly to party headquarters (del Castillo 1990, 86). 
For this reason individual parliamentarians cannot oppose party lead­
ers if they want to be economically protected by the party—for ex­
ample, when financing electoral campaigns. 
Parliamentary Party Turnover 
When we take into account the effects of the electoral system 
on party structure, parliamentary turnover can be seen as a good mea­
sure of party discipline: the stronger the party discipline, the more stable 
the parliamentary representation, and vice versa. In this analysis, a 
"normal" rate of turnover is taken to mean that 70% of MPs (of a given 
group) from the previous parliament remain in office. This is the case 
for the PP in 1996 (68%) and the PSOE in 1993 (72%) and 1989 (74%). 
Whenever a parliamentary group's size grows after an election, the "nor­
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mal" rate can be calculated on the basis of that proportion of MPs who 
were also members of the previous parliament. This is the case for PSOE 
in 1982 (85 of 121), PP in 1993 (74 of 107) and 1996 (107 of 141), and 
CIU (Catalan nationalist party) in 1986 (8 of 12) (see table 7.2).5 
The PSOE and CIU are the most stable during the period (table 7.1). 
Table 7.2 
Parliamentary Turnover in Spanish Parties 
AP-CD-CP-PP* 
(Conservative) 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 
1996 9 11 14 25 59 107 157 
1993 16 18 22 45 74 141 68% (76%) 
1989 17 16 26 57 107 74% (70%) 38% 
1986 16 15 40 105 54% 32% 16% 
1982 13 18 106 38% 25% 16% 9% 
1979 4 9 17% 14% 15% 13% 7% 
1977 16 44% 12% 15% 16% 11% 6% 
Note: The table should be read as follows: Of the 157 MPs in 1996, 107 (or 68%) of them 
were MPs in 1993, 59 (or 38%) in 1989, and so on. The percentage figures in brackets show 
the reverse: i.e., 76% of MPs in 1993 remained in the parliament in 1996. 
*AP in 1977, CD in 1979, CP in 1982 and 1986, PP from 1989. 
UCD-CDS* 
(Liberal) 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 
1989 2 1 4 11 14 
1986 2 4 2 19 79% 
1982 8 10 14 11% 29% 
1979 92 168 71% 21% 7% 
1977 165 55% 57% 11% 14% 
Note: The table should be read as follows: Of the 14 MPs in 1989, 11 (or 79%) of them were 
MPs in 1986, 4 (or 29%) in 1989, and so on. 
*UCD in 1977, 1979, and 1982; CDS in 1982 to 1989. 
PSOE 
(Socialist) 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 
1996 14 22 42 49 59 78 141 
1993 26 40 76 95 114 159 55% 
1989 34 49 102 129 175 72% 42% 
1986 39 62 128 184 74% 60% 35% 
1982 52 85 202 70% 58% 48% 30% 
1979 75 121 42% (70%) 34% 28% 25% 16% 
1977 118 62% (64%) 26% 21% 19% 16% 10% 
Note: The table should be read as follows: Of the 141 MPs in 1996, 78 (or 55%) of them 
were MPs in 1993, 59 (or 42%) in 1989, and so on. The percentage figures in brackets show 
the reverse: i.e., 70% of MPs in 1979 remained in the parliament in 1982. 
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Table 7.2 
Parliamentary Turnover in Spanish Parties continued 
PCE-IU* 
( Communist) 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 
1996 1 2 3 0 6 11 21 
1993 0 0 0 3 9 18 52% 
1989 1 2 1 4 17 50% 26% 
1986 2 3 0 7 24% 17%) 0 
1982 2 4 4 0 6% 0 1% 
1979 17 23 100%. 43% 12% 0 1% 
1977 20 74% (85%) 50% 29% 6% 0 1% 
Note: The table should be read as follows: Of the 21 MPs in 1996, 11 (or 52%) of them were 
MPs in 1993, 6 (or 26%) in 1989, and so on. The percentage figures in brackets show the 
reverse, i.e., 70% of MPs in 1979 remained in the parliament in 1982. 
*PCE from 1977 to 1982; IU from 1986 to 1996. 
CIU 
(Nationalist) 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 
1996 0 2 2 5 5 8 16 
1993 1 3 4 11 11 17 50% 
1989 1 6 7 17 18 65% 3P/o 
1986 2 6 8 18 94% 65% 31% 
1982 2 7 12 44% (67%) 39% 24% 12%o 
1979 5 8 58% 33% 33% 18% 12% 
1977 11 63%) 17% 11% 6% 6% 0 
Note: Th  e table shoul  d b  e rea  d as follows: Of the 16 M P  s in 1996, 8 (or 50%) of the  m were 
M P  s in 1993, 5 (or 31%) in 1989, an  d so on . Th  e percentag e figures in bracket  s show th e 
reverse: i.e., 67  % of M P  s in 1982 remaine  d in the par l iamen t in 1986. 
PNV 
(Nationalist) 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 
1996 0 0 0 2 2 3 5 
1993 0 0 0 2 4 5 60% 
1989 0 0 0 3 5 80% 40% 
1986 0 1 2 6 60%) 40% 40% 
1982 2 2 8 33% 0 0 0 
1979 6 7 25% 17% 0 0 0 
1977 8 86%) 25% 0 0 0 0 
Sources: See table 7.1. 
Notes: The table should be read as follows. Of the 5 MPs in 1996, 3 (or 60%) of them were 
MPs in 1993, 2 (or 40%)) in 1989, and so on. 
See chapter appendix for key to party acronyms. 
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PSOE stability can be explained by the fact that it was a ruling party 
until 1996. Before 1982, when the PSOE was in opposition, the party 
strengthened its centralism (and stability) in order to fulfill its aim of 
being a party of government. Around 1996 the PSOE faced a big crisis 
over problems of corruption and of a "dirty war" against terrorism 
while it was governing. (There was also a crisis of leadership.) The stabil­
ity of CIU—which is a coalition of nationalist parties—is due to the 
fact that it has been a governing party in its home region. 
The nationalist Basque party (PNV) was very stable until the mid­
1980s. In the 1989 election it separated into two different groups, and 
since then it has remained stable. What also explains the stability of the 
PNV is that it has been the ruling party in the Basque region. (On many 
occasions high turnover in the nationalist parties is due to the fact that 
MPs consider it more important to take part in regional institutions 
than in the national parliament.) 
The PCE (Communist party) was stable, reflecting its strong position 
in Parliament through to the early 1980s. But its successor, IU, has been 
in constant difficulty, changing its parliamentary leaders very frequently. 
IU was formed when the PCE was unsuccessful in 1982, the leftist vote 
having gone to the PSOE. After that election, the PCE (which had been 
the best organized opposition to Franco's dictatorship) was in crisis, 
and many of its leaders joined the PSOE ranks. In 1986 the Communists 
set up the coalition IU, and the PCE is still the main group in control 
of it. The regular changing of leadership by IU stopped in 1989 when 
an orthodox group took control of the PCE. Since then, IU's stability 
has consistently increased. 
On the right there have been two groups (national parties) competing 
between each other not only—or even primarily—for votes but also for 
MPs. The UCD is a centrist party based on a coalition of "families" 
(factions) ranging from liberals to social democrats and including Chris­
tian democrats (Esteban and Lopez 1982, 88). UCD won the first and 
second elections with a relative majority. Due to disputes among inter­
nal groups, the party faced a big crisis in 1981 when the resignation of 
the prime minister and party leader, A. Suarez, was followed by the 
departure of some of its parliamentary party members. The party disin­
tegrated after big losses in the 1982 election. Suarez founded a new cen­
trist liberal party, CDS, with the aim of being a possible government 
coalition partner. Despite becoming the third largest national party in 
1986, its plan was unsuccessful, and CDS disappeared after 1993. 
The conservative party, AP (Alianza Popular), was founded by Fran­
coists. It was unsuccessful in the two first legislatures, even though some 
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liberals joined it before the 1979 election. UCD's difficulties helped con­
servative party development, and in 1982 AP set up a new coalition, 
Coalicion Popular (CP), which had a very good electoral result. CP be­
came the main opposition party and a potential governing party. Some 
of UCD's MPs joined this group, though the figure was not really that 
significant, only about 16% (table 7.2). The rate of centrist deputies go­
ing over to the conservative group remained about the same in the sub­
sequent parliaments, as can be seen when we consider how many MPs 
of the conservative group of 1986 had been in Parliament in 1977 and 
1979 (15% and 14% respectively). 
From 1982 onward, CP has had a big turnover. In 1986 only 38% of 
its deputies had been in the 1982 parliament. In 1989 the proportion 
increased to 54%. Before the 1989 election, the party changed leadership 
and name—to the Popular Party (PP)—and began a process of power 
centralization. In 1990 it held a party congress of "refoundation and 
renovation," which resulted in the party becoming firmly under the con­
trol of a new group of young leaders. This explains the stability of the 
party in 1993, when it held onto 70% of its MPs from 1989. In 1996 the 
PP achieved a huge majority and became a governing party. (The rate 
of PP turnover was higher in 1996 than in 1993 because many of its 
MPs had gone to take part in many regional institutions.) 
To sum up, in the Spanish case, being a party of government makes 
for a stable and disciplined party. At the same time a stable party in­
volves the existence of a group of leaders who control candidate selec­
tion. Thus, the leadership is structured under an autocratic regime. 
Finally, a party turnover of about 30% in every election is the normal 
rate for a stable party of government. 
Parliamentary Parties in the Standing 
Orders of the Congreso 
The parliamentary parties are well defined and structured by the stand­
ing orders of the Congreso. That is as a result of the main role that 
parliamentary groups play. 
The Parliamentary Party System from 1977 to 1996 
MPs must be integrated in a parliamentary group from the be­
ginning of the legislature, or from the first time that the MPs arrive in 
Parliament (at the beginning of the session) (art. 23). There is the 
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so-called grupo mixto, formed of MPs who cannot form a group in their 
own right and have to act through this. 
From 1982 onwards, when new standing orders were adopted, it was 
specified that forming a parliamentary group required at least 15 MPs, 
or 5 if the party (or coalition) obtained either 5% of the total vote at the 
national level or 15% in the electoral districts where the party (or coali­
tion) presented candidates. As a result of this rule, not only must MPs 
be part of a group, but they must be part of a strong group.6 Another 
rule is that MPs cannot form an alternative parliamentary group to the 
one that included them in its electoral list. A consequence of this is that 
the Spanish parliament must have one of the smallest and most stable 
number of parliamentary groups. Before 1982, the rules were more lax: 
parties needed just five MPs (with no minimum vote requirements) to 
form a parliamentary group. This was the case with the Andalusian So­
cialist Party (PSA) in 1979. At that time it was also possible to form 
separate parliamentary groups of deputies of the same party, as was the 
case with the Catalan and Basque socialists (table 7.1). 
In 1986, when the number of deputies in the grupo mixto increased 
because of a crisis in Coalicion Democratica, the President of the Con­
greso permitted the formation of agrupaciones (small parliamentary 
groups) in the grupo mixto. Christian democrats and liberals abandoned 
the grupo popular and formed two agrupaciones. The communists, with 
4.7% of the vote at national level, could not form a parliamentary group, 
so they also set up an agrupacion. 
Party Discipline According to the Standing 
Orders of the Congreso 
According to the standing orders, the Spanish parliament is a 
"parliament of groups." Parliamentary parties are the main agents of 
the Congreso: they form the Junta de Portavoces (council of party repre­
sentatives in the chamber), which is in charge of organizing parliamen­
tary work (distribution of time). They also decide on the composition 
of parliamentary committees, which is based on a quota that every 
group has according to size. 
The most important point of the standing orders is that groups are 
considered as unified actors with only one voice, so when a parliamen­
tary group acts through a representative, its vote is worth exactly the 
number of members of the group (voto ponderado). This means that the 
representative of a group (portavoz or whip) votes on behalf of the entire 
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group of deputies (the vote weighted according to the size of the group) 
in every parliamentary commission or in the main organs of the Con­
greso. The power of parliamentary parties is even more impressive when 
we consider how MPs can act in the Congreso. For instance, in the legis­
lative process, individual deputies can present total or partial amend­
ments to legislative bills, but all amendments must be signed by the chief 
whip of the parliamentary party (Portavoz del grupo) (art. 110). Legisla­
tive proposals {proposiciones de ley) can be tabled both by groups or by 
MPs. However, legislative proposals of deputies must be signed by at 
least 15 MPs (art. 126.1). In this case it is clear that only if the group 
supports the proposal will it be debated. 
In the case of checking on executive power, we also find a strong 
hold of the groups over MPs. Because in parliamentary debates the only 
speakers are the representatives of the parliamentary parties, motions 
that end in a debate are controlled by groups, as are interpellations 
(which can be tabled both by groups or members), since they can give 
rise to a debate. In addition, because each parliamentary party has a 
limited number of interpellations in each session, it is a responsibility 
of the group leaders to decide when to table an interpellation. Only 
questions are totally reserved to MPs (art. 185), but even here there is a 
limited number for each group that the leaders administer. 
Clearly, deputies are so controlled by the groups that one can con­
clude, with Lopez Aguilar (1988, 205), that the only scope for MPs to 
speak freely is in the so-called turno por alusiones. This is when in a 
debate an MP refers to another where this reference is not central to the 
debate. In this situation the MP who has been referred to has a right of 
reply without any intervention by the group.7 
Finally, the standing orders establish that financial and personal re­
sources are in the hands of groups, which are in charge of distributing 
them. The resources of each group are proportional to size. The result 
of all this is the weakness of the individual parliamentarian, who has 
little room for autonomous initiative. 
Interparty Mobility 
The standing orders of the Congreso regulate faction hopping 
in a restrictive way. An MP who wants to change his or her group must 
be accepted by the chief whip of the target group, and the MP can ask 
for a change of group only in the first five days of a parliamentary ses­
sion; otherwise the deputy has to remain until the end of the session in 
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the grupo mixto. In spite of the restrictive regulation, interparty move­
ment in the Spanish Congreso has been relatively frequent, as table 7.3 
shows. 
According to Agh (chap. 8 of this volume), "migrations among the 
factions" are characteristic of the new democracies. The Spanish case 
differs from eastern Europe, and particularly from Hungary, in that the 
parties have always been very homogenous internally. This Spanish sin­
gularity is due, first, to the fact that from the outset, the process of 
democratization in Spain entailed the establishment of two main parties 
on the right-left spectrum and, second, to the fact that leadership com­
petition has tended to take place more in the electoral arena than in the 
parliamentarian one. 
At a very early stage, PSOE dominated the center-left. The center-
right, however, was disputed between two groups, and it is here that 
faction hopping tended to predominate (Montero 1989, 505), though in 
fact, in the fourth and fifth legislatures there were no significant moves 
because the PP won the race among right-wing groups. In the constit­
uent legislature (1977-79), there was a big move from the Popular So­
cialist Party (PSP)—which was in the grupo mixto—to PSOE, but this 
could be considered a normal process of integration of socialists into a 
single party. However, abandonment of the centrist group in the first 
legislature was due to a crisis in the party quite similar to that of the 
first Hungarian parliament as described by Agh. 
Moves to the popular group in the third legislature were produced 
by the addition of MPs from the Christian democratic and liberal 
groups that were members of the same electoral coalition in 1986 (CP). 
These changes took place at the end of the legislature, with the aim of 
rebuilding the electoral coalition. In the third legislature there were also 
moves to the centrist party, CDS, which at that time was being predicted 
as a possible pivotal party in the fourth legislature. 
In conclusion, it is evident that the standing orders regulating parlia­
mentary parties fit completely with the constitutional formula favoring 
the existence of a small and powerful group of parties in the Spanish 
democracy. The standing orders strengthen party discipline by further­
ing strong leadership in each group, by constraining the free activity of 
individual backbenchers, and by making faction moves by MPs difficult. 
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Table 7.3 
Intergroup Mobility (Transfugismo) in Spanish Parliamentary Parties, 1977-1996 
Beginning End of 
of Legislature Legislature Change to 
Constituent legislature, 
1977-79 
Group Centrista (GC) 165 157 8 GMx 
Group Socialista (GS) 105 106 
Group Soc. de Cat. (GSC) 13 17 
Group Min. Cat. (GMC) 11 10 1 GMx 
Group mixto (GMx) 12 15 4 GSC, 1 GS 
I legislature, 1979-82 
Group Centrista 168 150 13 GMx, 4 GCD, 1 GA, 
1GMC 
Group Socialista 98 97 1 GMx 
Group Soc. de Cat. 17 16 1GA 
Group Coal. Democ. (GCD) 9 12 1GC 
Group Min. Cat. 8 9 
Group Comunista 23 22 1 GMx 
Group Andalucista (GA) 5 7 
Group mixto 9 24 4 GSC, 1 GS 
II legislature, 1982-86 
Group Centrista 12 11 1GP 
Group Popular 106 104 3 GMx 
Group mixto 10 13 
III legislature, 1986-89 
Group Socialista 184 182 2 GMx 
Group Popular 73 89 2 GCDS, 3 GMX, 
1 GMC 
Group Min. Cat. 18 19 
Group Vasco 6 4 2 GMX 
Group CDS 19 27 1GMX 
Agrupacion Dem. Crist. 21 0 15 GP, 3 GMx, 3 GCDS 
Agrupacion P. Liberal 11 0 6 GP, 3 GCDS, 2 GMx 
Agrupacion IU 7 6 1GCDS 
Group mixto 11 23 
IV legislature, 1989-93 
Group Popular 106 105 1 GMx 
Group CDS 14 12 2 GMx 
Group mixto 15 18 
V legislature, 1993-96 
Group Coal. Canaraia 5 4 lGMx 
Group mixto 5 6 
Sources: See table 7.1. 
Note: See chapter appendix for key to party acronyms. 
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The Internal Organization of Parliamentary Parties 
Party discipline is structured by the internal organization of parties and 
primarily by party rules and statutes. As Katz and Mair (1992, 7) have 
pointed out, party rules offer a fundamental and indispensable guide to 
the character of a given party, "affording an insight into its internal 
conceptions of organizational power, authority and legitimacy." For this 
reason, to explain how Spanish parliamentary parties are organized, we 
have to take into consideration both mass party and parliamentary 
party statutes, as well as practices and ways of proceeding. 
Mass Party Statutes 
Some of the rules governing how parliamentary parties function 
are located in the mass party statutes: they are the basic principles. First, 
these party statutes set up a link between the party and the parliamen­
tary group. For example, in the case of the PP, the president of the party 
is at the same time the president of the group. In the case of hquierda 
Unida (IU), the party statutes state that the president and the portavoz, 
both elected by the parliamentary group, must be ratified by the federal 
council of the coalition (executive committee). This is the same for the 
Basque group. The PSOE statutes simply state that the parliamentary 
group elects its own leaders and that the president of the group is a 
member of the federal executive committee of the party. 
The statutes of the PP, IU, and PNV establish that the parliamentary 
groups can write their own statutes but that these must be finally ap­
proved by the mass party leadership (executive committees). In the 
PSOE statutes there is a rule of unity of action and vote for MPs, who 
can be sanctioned if they do not act in accord with the set position. 
Similarly, the PP states that MPs must act according to instructions by 
the party leadership. 
A clear difference among parties relates to the financial relationship 
between party and MPs. In the PP the parliamentary group is autono­
mous when administering its resources, so that deputies receive their 
salary directly from the Congreso. But for socialists, communists, and 
Basques, it is the mass party—through a special fund in which the depu­
ties' salaries are deposited—that decides the wage of each MP. 
The PSOE statutes state that parliamentarians who abandon the 
party should resign as MPs. This can be understood only as a moral 
requirement because no party can legally force an MP to resign. On the 
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other hand, the PSOE accepts that members of its parliamentary group 
can be independents—though not socialist militants—as has happened 
several times. In such cases discipline has been difficult to demand, espe­
cially in the area of voting. 
The Internal Statutes of the Parliamentary Parties 
The general structure of parliamentary parties is stated in their 
internal statutes (reglamento interno). In each case it is specified that 
there is & portavoz of each group in the chamber who is a member of the 
Junta de Portavoces. This function is also defined in the Constitution 
and in the standing orders of the Congreso. The portavoz usually is the 
"chief whip"—according to the British pattern—and he or she is 
elected. The portavoz plays a very important role: it is the main represen­
tative of the group and the person who organizes and directs the whole 
group (Sole and Aparicio 1984, 138). 
In the PP the president is different from the portavoz. When the PP 
was in opposition, the portavoz was the second leader of the party and 
substituted for the president in the council of direction (executive com­
mittee). When the PSOE was in government, the portavoz was also the 
president of the group. When the PSOE was in opposition, the president 
of the group was the party leader—and the leader of the opposition, as 
in Britain. In this case, the chief whip is a different person and is given 
the title of general secretary of the group. Both can act as the portavoz 
of the group, but usually the portavoz is the general secretary. 
The PP party leaders propose the candidate to be the portavoz; in 
the PSOE, this position is elected by the group. The PSOE was homoge­
nous and unified before the 1993 election, but since then two main fac­
tions have been competing in the parliamentary group (and in the mass 
party): "renovators," who are the majority, and "guerristas" (Guillespie 
1992, 8-10). That is why in 1993, for the first time, PSOE MPs had to 
choose by secret ballot between two candidates for president of the 
group. And in 1994 and 1996, whenever the PSOE had to elect a new 
president or a general secretary, again there was an internal division in 
the group. 
The mass party chooses the portavoz of the Basque group and of the 
Catalan minority. In the IU group there is a president, a vice president, 
and a portavoz elected by the group. Only the portavoz of the IU is in 
charge of having formal relations with other groups. 
The two major parliamentary parties in the Congreso (PSOE and 
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PP) are organized along similar lines. Both meet in a general assembly 
(pleno) of all backbenchers who belong to the party. The PSOE general 
meeting takes place three times a month: that is, before each general 
assembly of the Congreso. The PP meet just once a month. Party leaders 
use these meetings to give information to backbenchers; PSOE also uses 
the occasion to have political debates. When the party is in government, 
ministers participate and inform backbenchers about their proposals. 
Members of IU also meet regularly before each plenum of the Con­
greso to have a political debate. In the assembly of the IU group, differ­
ent proposals or initiatives from MPs are taken into consideration 
before being tabled, and conflicts between MPs and committee coordi­
nators are resolved. 
Both the PSOE and PP are governed by an executive committee 
elected by the MPs. In the PSOE group, candidates to the direction 
committee (comite de direction) can be proposed by the party's federal 
executive committee—which has been the usual practice—or by five 
members of the parliamentary group. The direction committee is re­
sponsible to the general assembly of the group, and in each session a 
vote of confidence in the committee must be held. The committee coor­
dinates the activity of the whole group within the government. 
The PSOE group has a second executive committee called the per­
manent committee (comite permanente). This is larger than the first one, 
with about 30 members, consisting of the entire direction committee 
and all the coordinators of commissions (i.e., the whips who are in 
charge of coordinating socialist MPs in each parliamentary commis­
sion). The permanent committee monitors legislative initiatives as well 
as the parliamentary activities of MPs. 
The PSOE parliamentary group has a third committee that controls 
participation and voting by MPs: this is the committee on discipline. It 
has three members, and its president is a member of the permanent 
committee. The committee on discipline is helped by the whips, who 
give information about failings by MPs. The committee can propose 
sanctions that can be imposed by the direction committee. 
The PP parliamentary group has just one formal executive commit­
tee: the council of direction. It is very large, consisting of leaders of the 
parliamentary party and others from the mass party. However, in its 
weekly meetings, only the main leaders of the parliamentary group meet 
under the presidency of the portavoz. When the PP was in opposition, 
there were meetings between the party president (who at the same time 
was president of all the party's parliamentary groups) and the chief 
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whips of the parliamentary parties of both chambers and the European 
Parliament, held each week to coincide with the plenum of the Con­
greso, to prepare party strategy. A meeting of the council of direction 
of each parliamentary party was held afterwards. There was a second 
meeting at the end of the week to consider proposals or amendments 
that were coming up. 
The council of direction studies different legislative proposals and 
initiatives by PP MPs before they are tabled. It designates members of 
the group for the parliamentary commissions. The council also takes 
decisions about party discipline. The general secretary of the group, 
who is also a member of the council, takes care of the discipline of 
the group and informs the council about absences by MPs. Finally, the 
popular group has a "coordinator of commissions," a member of the 
council who coordinates and monitors the parliamentary activity in 
commissions by popular MPs. The "coordinator" meets regularly with 
the portavoz or representatives of the party in each parliamentary 
commission. 
Discipline Proceedings 
Each parliamentary party has procedures for dealing with MPs 
who do not follow party discipline. In the case of the PSOE and PP, this 
is regulated in their statutes. For the IU group there is only a minor 
reference to this question. Usually it is the executive committee of the 
group who penalizes MPs. The statutes refer to the kind of penalties 
that can be imposed on deputies, depending on what they have done. If, 
for example, there is a very important vote requiring a qualified majority 
and an MP is absent without any justification, the executive committee 
can impose a fine of up to 25,000 pesetas in the PSOE group or 40,000 
pesetas in the PP group. While in the PSOE group the money is easy to 
take because MPs receive their salary through the party, in the case of 
the PP group, deputies have to pay the fine by themselves. 
The executive committee of each group can penalize other kind of 
acts by MPs, such as voting contrary to party instructions. Under party 
statutes it is usually the mass party leaders who are charged with moni­
toring the behavior of MPs and, if necessary, expelling recalcitrants 
from the party. The executive committee of each party acts as a high 
court with competence to judge on the appeals of MPs against such 
decisions. From this viewpoint we can analyze how party discipline 
works in practice, taking into consideration two variables—voting, in 
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which we pay particular attention to levels of dissension, and substitu­
tion of MPs—examining to what degree these are due to poor relations 
between MPs and the party. 
Dissension in voting has not been significant across the whole pe­
riod. Research by Capo (1990, 99) on votes during the first four legisla­
tures shows that there has been a general consensus among parties. In 
the 568 cases in which there has been a final vote on the entire legislative 
act (leyes and decretos-leyes), the average was 223 votes in favor, 28 
against, and 14 abstentions. Moreover, there was more support for the 
proposed law in the case of minority governments than with majority 
ones; this means that UCD governments gained support from part of 
the opposition. It means also that we have to distinguish between UCD 
and PSOE governments. Before 1982, not only did every bill have to be 
negotiated among the different families that made up UCD, but also the 
government had to make deals with other parliamentary groups because 
it did not have an absolute majority (Capo 1990, 108). In the case of 
PSOE governments (the second, third, and fourth legislatures) the so­
cialist parliamentary party provided a "rubber stamp" to government 
proposals (Guillespie 1989, 420). Abstentions are significant because 
prior notice is given of final votes, but it is difficult to link abstentionism 
with dissent because usually it is not made explicit-
Table 7.4 provides data on the numbers of substitutions of MPs— 
when an MP retires from the house midterm and is replaced by a substi­
tute on the party list—showing a global number of 35 to 40 for each 
legislature. The particularly large amount in the first legislature was due 
to the fact that many MPs left to represent their parties in the brand-
new regional parliaments that were being established. On average, three 
to four replacements are due to deaths in each legislature. Of the rest, 
only about 10% of substitutions are actually due to a crisis between the 
MP and the party. 
In sum, from the point of view of the parliamentary party organiza­
tion, we find in each group real integration among its members based 
on a strong direction that coordinates the group with the mass party, 
and, where applicable, with the government. There is also a unified rep­
resentation of the whole group through the portavoces in the Congreso 
and in each parliamentary committee. In addition, in each main parlia­
mentary group, there is a web, structured by the portavoces, that serves 
to transmit instructions to backbenchers as well as monitor them. Fi­
nally, in the Spanish case, party rules and statutes not only protect lead­
ers by ensuring their legitimacy but also help enforce their power. 
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Table 7.4 
Substitutions of MPs in Spanish Parliamentary Parties, 1977-1996 
C I II HI IV V 
Group Centrista 5 9 2 
Group CDS 2 3 
Group Popular 7 9 12 6 
Group Socialista 1 13 26 21 12 12 
Group Soc. de Cat. 1 6 
Group Soc. Vascos 2 
Group Comunista-IU 2 4 1 
Group Min. Cat. 7 2 4 2 2 
Group Vasco 1 3 2 1 3 1 
Group Mixto 1 1 5 1 
Group Andalucista 2 
Source: See table 7.1. 
Note: C = Constituent legislature; I-V = first through fifth legislatures. See chapter appendix for key 
to party acronyms. 
Concluding Remarks 
In Spain, party discipline is very strong, to the point that we can affirm 
how in practice the constitutional principle of free mandate of deputies 
is ineffective. Spanish MPs always act according to party instructions. 
The reason for this is the electoral law, which places in the hands of 
party headquarters the capacity to decide who appears on the electoral 
lists. Moreover, party discipline is helped by the principal role that par­
ties have in the parliamentary system: parliamentary groups are the 
main actors in Parliament. 
Among the parliamentary parties, the PSOE group has the most ex­
tensive set of rules on party discipline, ensuring that it has been more 
cohesive and stable than any other group. There are different explana­
tions for this: first and most important, it has been a government party 
(with a qualified majority) for several parliaments; second, it is a center-
left party that takes party discipline seriously; and finally, it has been 
organized as a mass party with the highest rate of membership affiliation 
in Spain. 
By contrast, the conservative and liberal groups have been less stable, 
as reflected by a high turnover of deputies. These parties are primarily 
electoral parties with weak organizations: a lack of professionalism 
among the MPs is evident. The most important cause of instability in 
the conservative parties was the nonexistence of a unique political or­
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ganization; there have always been two competing parties with MPs 
moving between them. Nevertheless, since 1990 the PP has been moving 
in the right direction. A new leadership has strengthened its organiza­
tion, and by 1996 it had become the only national center-right party 
and the majority party in government. 
APPENDIX 
Abbreviations for Parties 
AIC Agrupaciones Independientes de Cananas 
AP Alianza Popular 
BNG Bloque Nacionalista Galego 
C. Can. Coalicion Canaraia 
CIU Convergencia i Unio 
CD Coalicion Democratica 
CDS Centro Democratico y Social 
CG Coalicion Galega 
Coal. Can. Coalicion Canada 
CP Coalicion Popular 
Dem. Crist. Democracia Cristiana 
EA Eusko Alkartasuna 
EE Euskadiko Eskerra 
ERC Esquerra Republicana de Cataluna 
HB Herri Batasuna 
I. Cast. Independientes de Castellon 
IU Izquierda Unida 
M. Cat. Minoria Catalana 
P. And. Partido Andalucista 
PAR Partido Aragones Regionalista (in 1996 part of Group 
Popular) 
P- Arg. Partido Aragones 
PCE Partido Comunista de Espana 
P. Liberal Partido Liberal 
PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
PP Partido Popular 
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espaiiol 
PSP Partido Socialista Popular 
Soc. de Cat. Socialistas de Cataluna 
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Soc. Vase. Socialistas Vascos 
UCD Union de Centra Democratic*) 
UDC Union Democratica de Cataluna 
UN Union Nacional 
UPC Union del Pueblo Canario 
UPN Union del Pueblo Navarra (from 1992 part of Group 
Popular) 
UV Union Valenciana 
NOTES 
1. According to articles 99 and 113 of the Spanish Constitution, the vote 
of confidence (investiture) and the vote of no confidence (censure motion) of 
the Congreso de los Diputados are given only to the prime minister—as presi­
dent of the government—and not to the entire government. In addition, the 
prime minister is charged with the formation and leadership of the govern­
ment as well as the coordination of its members (art. 98). The prime minister 
has a virtual free hand over the structure of and appointments to cabinet 
(Heywood 1991). 
2. Senate elections are under a majority rule, which usually produces the 
same majorities as in the chamber. 
3. Real Decreto-Ley de 18 de marzo sobre Normas Electorates 1977; Ley 
Organica 5/1985 de 19 de junio, sobre el Regimen Electoral General 1985. 
4. Ley Organica 3/1987, de 2 de julio, sobre Financiacion de los Partidos 
Politicos 1987. 
5. The stability of a group can be also understood if we take into consider­
ation the fact that the total number of MPs of each parliament is about 45% 
of the total of two parliaments before. 
6. Sometimes a party helps another to form a parliamentary group by 
lending an MP just for its formation. This happened in 1993 and in 1996 with 
Partido Aragones Regionalista (PAR) and Coalition Canaraia. Shortly there­
after, there was a faction change between both groups (see table 7.3). 
7. There is another possibility for MPs to act freely from group control. 
This is when the cabinet provides information to the Congreso and MPs ask 
for complementary information. 
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PART I  V

Newly Emerging Systems 

The chapters in Part III examined three non-Anglo parliaments in 
which, among other factors, electoral rules were identified as impor­
tant components of party cohesion. But, as we noted in chapter 1, 
the chamber itself provides a whole series of incentives—carrots and 
sticks—that can aid efforts to impose party discipline. Moreover, the 
legislatures we have examined so far are all well established (with the 
partial exception of Spain), with electoral and institutional arrange­
ments that have been in place for some time. In this part we change 
perspective once again, this time to examine newly forming legislative 
settings, where—to paraphrase Laver and Shepsle (chap. 2)—parties 
and party discipline are emerging from the "primeval slime." In the 
chapters that follow, we see parties moving quickly into center stage, 
and we also see how procedural arrangements inside the chamber con­
cerned make an important contribution to developing party cohesion. 
Europe has seen two recent developments that provide a perfect 
means to observe the emergence of parliamentary party discipline 
from "the primeval slime " The first and most dramatic of these has 
been the process of democratization in eastern and central Europe 
since the late 1980s. The second, more gradual development (and start­
ing far earlier) has been the process of European integration, which 
started with the Treaties of Paris and Rome in the 1950s and has been 
steadily building up steam in recent years. The three chapters in this 
part provide some useful insights into both of these developments. 
Attila Agh explores the process of what he calls party "parlia­
mentarization" (or the institutionalization of parliamentary fraktions) 
in Hungary, and he generalizes from this case about trends in East and 
Central Europe from the late 1980s onwards. What starts, in the first 
Hungarian parliament, as a story of "enforced party discipline," involv­
ing the adoption of rules to attempt (evidently not entirely success­
fully) to limit parliamentary indiscipline, culminates in the Second 
Parliament with what Agh refers to as "the end of the beginning," with 
greatly reduced evidence of faction hopping (down from the 20% "po­
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litical tourism" trends of the First Parliament) and a much more stable 
and cohesive picture overall. 
Chapters 9 and 10 assess the "parliamentarization" process of the 
European Parliament (EP). Raunio (chap. 9) shows how, despite a 
range of institutional factors that work against party cohesion, the 
evidence from examining roll call votes in the EP—which certainly 
produces significantly lower levels of cohesion than in most West Euro­
pean national legislatures—compares favorably with the record of the 
U.S. Congress. Bowler and Farrell (chap. 10) assess cohesion levels in 
the EP from the perspective of theories relating to parliamentary 
norms, finding pretty sparse evidence of their presence. In their ab­
sence (and bearing some similarity to Agh's discussion of early trends 
in Hungary), the parliamentary groups in the EP rely on formal rules 
as a means of maintaining parliamentary discipline. 
8

The Parliamentarization of the 
East Central European Parties: 
Party Discipline in the 
Hungarian Parliament, 
1990-1996 
ATTILA AGH 
Parliaments are model institutions in the democratic institu-tion-building process of East Central Europe (ECE), and 
they have, among other roles, important elite recruitment and political 
learning functions. Parliaments have been the "central sites" and parties 
the "major actors" of the democratization process (Agh 1995a). This 
chapter deals with the formation of party discipline in the framework 
of the Hungarian "parliamentarization" process. This process has basi­
cally been the same in all ECE countries; it has appeared in Hungary in 
a most marked way. In Hungary, after the first free (or founding) elec­
tions, the First Parliamentary cycle lasted four years: the First Parlia­
ment (1990-94) completed its full term, unlike other ECE countries. In 
addition, the Second Parliament (1994-98), already in its first two years 
(at the time of writing), provides a clear contrast to the First Parliament. 
These two very different stages of the party formation process can be 
studied in depth. It needs to be pointed out, however, that this chapter 
deals only with the problems of party discipline in the case of parlia­
mentary faction behavior; it does not extend its field of inquiry beyond 
this. It should be borne in mind that other forms and levels of party 
discipline strongly influence the parliamentary behavior of MPs.1 
267 
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It is generally recognized that in ECE—and even more so in the 
Balkans or in eastern Europe proper—parties are still weak and fragile. 
I think, however, that the (major) ECE parties—when considered as 
elements of a party system—have already reached some kind of early 
consolidation: in other words, they already represent the relevant social 
cleavages with a clear political profile, and they have forged definite con­
nections with their respective European Party Internationals. Their "ex­
ternal" roles are clear and distinct, but their "internal" structures with 
regard to organization and program setting are still somewhat weak and 
fragile. I have argued elsewhere that the ECE parties are already "at 
the end of beginning"; the usual discussions of their general weakness, 
lumping them together with the really very weak East European parties, 
miss the point (Agh 1997). 
Two factors stand out in this paradoxical development of Hungarian 
parliamentary parties. First, the Hungarian party system has proved to 
be the most stable and durable in the region: the same six parties have 
been elected to Parliament twice, in 1990 and 1994, so one can analyze 
the same parties with solid data. Second, as I have mentioned above, 
the First Parliament sat for four years; thus, we have an ample time 
horizon for the relevant analysis. The Second Parliament (elected in 
1994 for four years), as a good contrast to the First Parliament, enables 
us to make conclusive remarks on the changes in party discipline since 
the initial period of democratic transition. 
Party discipline depends on (1) the development stage of the party, 
whether it is still in the formation process or already consolidated; (2) 
the particular type of party, originating inside or outside the parliament 
and varying party families; and (3) the function of the given party in 
the political (power) system. According to Katz and Mair (1995, 10), 
for instance, the mass party combines the first two of these features, 
especially with its organized membership, and they point out that "these 
parties naturally were more amenable to the idea of enforced party 
cohesion and discipline" than the other parties. Regarding the third 
feature, the political or power context, Mair (1994, 10) refers to the 
"parliamentary party complex," which is particularly important for the 
ECE parties, existing almost exclusively in and through the parliament. 
In our conceptual framework, it is also necessary to note the distinction 
between the party of government (as "transition actors," see Pridham 
1994, 33, or umbrella organizations) and the party in government (as 
consolidated parties with a coalition-making capacity). The first term 
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indicates the creation of a party to govern, which is quite common in 
young democracies. Such loose umbrella organizations differ consider­
ably from those stable parties that gain election and form a government, 
going beyond the "polarized pluralism" of the first years to a "moderate 
pluralism" of the relative consolidation. 
Traditionally, political science has distinguished two different forms 
of the manifestation of party identities. In discussing the transformation 
of former ruling parties into modern social democratic parties, Michael 
Waller (1995, 484) picks his words carefully: "A distinction has been 
made between the identity that a political party has acquired through 
its historical experiences on the one hand, and on the other, what it 
stands for in competition for support within a party system at any given 
time. It is a distinction, in Sartori's words, between an 'historically 
derived identity' and 'contemporary political appeals.'" This bears 
a resemblance to the distinction, drawn by the editors of this book 
(chap. 1), between coherence and discipline, such that MPs either work 
together for party goals on their own or are prepared to accept orders 
of their party leaders. I understand by coherence a spontaneous self-
identification with that given party, and by discipline conscious, institu­
tional, rule-abiding behavior. Hence, coherence may only be a result of 
a long party-identity formation process, which was obviously not avail­
able at the very beginning of the new multiparty systems. 
Furthermore, discipline may take two different forms. First, it may 
be mechanically imposed upon party or parliamentary faction members 
through drastic means when coherence is low; second, it can be a means 
of ensuring the efficient working of the institutional mechanism of ma­
ture parties with a high degree of party coherence. Simply put, the ECE 
parties, and above all the Hungarian parties, have progressed a great 
deal in the 1990s according to these criteria. They have now achieved a 
rather high coherence and an effective operation of parliamentary 
mechanisms through efficient party discipline. 
The formation of the multiparty system began much earlier in Hun­
gary than in other ECE countries and also reached relative consolida­
tion sooner. Four of the six Hungarian parliamentary parties emerged 
from social movements in 1987 through 1989, yet as institutionalized 
parties, all of them were largely organized from above by a small group 
of leaders until late 1989. Hence, their party identity was decided at the 
top and brought down to the party activists and members, as was the 
case with coherence and party discipline. First the leaders were "disci­
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plined" and then the followers, in a still unfinished process of mutual 
feedback. Therefore, party discipline in Parliament is of central impor­
tance not only to the normal workings of parliamentary systems but 
also to the party formation process itself This chapter concentrates 
on the first issue, above all on the relationships between the party elite 
and the backbenchers. But the second aspect, the party discipline of 
activists and rank-and-file members, should not be forgotten, since it 
can have an eroding or reinforcing effect on the parliamentarization of 
parties, especially in the case of the loose and heterogeneous "party 
of government." 
In the first stage the obscure nature of party identity undermined to 
a great extent the efforts of the party elites to form coherent parliamen­
tary party factions. The "undisciplined" behavior of members with di­
verging political tendencies contributed to an increasing factionalism 
within parties. In fact, in most ECE countries, the term faction has been 
used to describe the organized unit of the parliamentary parties, except 
for Poland, where such kinds of factions are called "parliamentary 
clubs" of parties. I follow this tradition here: parliamentary faction refers 
to all MPs of a given party organized in one parliamentary unit, the 
rights and duties of which have been regulated in detail by the standing 
orders. In some ways the entire life of the ECE parliaments can be de­
scribed through the activities of the parliamentary party factions as the 
real actors in the parliament. In this chapter party coherence and disci­
pline are analyzed only with regard to these actors. Faction as a term, 
however, has a second meaning. It may also refer to an intraparty organ­
ization, namely a relatively solid and permanent group inside a party 
that has a different political profile within the common political horizon 
and policy universe of the party. In the United States, faction is used to 
describe the subgroups of a party, and the other meaning has been cov­
ered by the term caucus. 
In sum, by factionalism orfactionalization I mean the increasing ten­
dency for intraparty tensions that may produce in an extreme version 
the disintegration of parliamentary party factions. Indeed, factionali­
zation finally led to the disintegration of "parties of government" in 
the late 1970s in Spain and in the early 1990s in Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia (on Spain, see Sanchez de Dios, chap. 7 of this volume; 
on ECE parties, see Lewis 1995; Kopecky 1995; Malova 1994). 
This chapter analyzes Hungarian developments in two parts: first, it 
examines the attendance and voting behavior of parliamentary party 
factions; second, it explores the drastic changes in the party factions 
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during the First Parliament in contrast to the first half-period of the 
Second Parliament. In the closing section, I try to generalize from this 
analysis about trends in the ECE. 
Attendance and Voting Behavior 
in the First Parliament 
Hungary has a unicameral parliament with 386 MPs (176 MPs elected 
from single-member individual districts and 210 MPs from party lists). 
The following six parties were represented in the First Parliament and 
are now present in the Second Parliament: Hungarian Socialist Party 
(HSP), Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), Hungarian Democratic Fo­
rum (HDF), Independent Smallholders Party (ISP), Christian Demo­
cratic Peoples Party (CDPP), and Alliance of Young Democrats (AYD, 
Fidesz). Four parties emerged from social movements and movement 
parties in 1988 (HSP, AFD, HDF, and Fidesz). The two others are his­
torical parties (ISP and CDPP), and they were formed, or reemerged, 
later in 1989. In the first, "founding" elections of 1990, these six "early 
comers" were elected to the parliament, and dozens of others were left 
out. The distance between the "insiders" in Parliament and the "drop­
outs" (including the new parties that appeared in Parliament between 
1990 and 1994) grew in the second elections. In 1990 the smallest parlia­
mentary party received 6.46% of the popular vote, and the largest non-
parliamentary party 3.68%; in 1994 the respective figures were 7.02 and 
3.19%. As a consequence the "dropouts" have been marginalized in the 
overall framework of party life, and it is enough to deal with the six 
stable parliamentary parties. Yet before going any further with the anal­
ysis, it is necessary to say something about the disintegration or erosion 
process that affected the parties in the First Parliament (see tables 8.1 
and 8.2). 
Compared to other ECE parties, Hungarian parliamentary parties 
have shown that they are relatively strong organizations. Nevertheless, 
their political profiles and social constituencies were rather obscure in 
1990 when they entered the parliament. In all ECE countries the first 
free elections were plebiscites against state socialism, and the political 
profiles of the parties were unclear, especially with regard to their pro­
grams and the principal characteristics of their social support. All par­
ties based their identities on their opposition to the former system; they 
emphasized virtually the same goals in their programs, and their social 
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Table 8.1 
The Political Map of the Hungarian Parliament, May 2,1990, and 
April 7,1994 
Votes Seats 
(%) Seats (%) Changes 
HDF 24.73 165 42.75 - 2  9 
AFD 21.39 94 24.35 - 1  1 
ISP(-C) 11.73 44 11.40 - 8 
HSP 10.89 33 8.55 0 
Fidesz 8.95 22 5.70 +4 
CDPP 6.46 21 5.44 +2 
PHJL — 12 3.11 + 12 
ISP-T 9 2.33 +9 
Independents 
— 
7 1.81 +21 
Notes: PHJL (Party of Hungarian Justice and Life—MIEP) was the biggest successor party 
of the HDF and is led by Istvan Csurka. The others were not able to organize their party 
factions, since they had fewer than 10 MPs, so their members sat with the independents. 
This was also the case with the faction of the ISP that left the coalition (ISP-T, indicating 
the name of Jozsef Torgyan, the ISP president). Most of the ISP's MPs (36) remained with 
the coalition (ISP-C) and were able to organize a faction, but the real party, having only 9 
MPs, could not. This breakaway faction of 36 MPs disappeared in the second elections, in 
1994, so the ISP once again is the party of Torgyan. During the first parliament, 29 MPs 
departed (9 died and 20 resigned) and were replaced (5 in by-elections in individual constitu­
encies and 24 from the party lists). Altogether 56 people moved inside the parliament by 
changing factions (6 MPs twice), including 12 MPs who later formed the PHJL faction and 
the 9 MPs of ISP-T who remained outside their party faction after the split in the ISP. This 
table shows the aggregate results of both changes, i.e., inside the parliament, as well as the 
effects of the five by-elections from "outside." 
For party acronyms, see chapter appendix. 
support was rather diffuse. For example, the two strongest parties in 
1990, Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) and Alliance of Free Dem­
ocrats (AFD), were indistinguishable in their social constituencies. 
Moreover, at that time they had the support of the same social strata, 
although the competition between them was fierce politically and cul­
turally. Their original party memberships took on a somewhat "ran­
dom" character, depending upon family and friendly circles and local 
circumstances, including the leading politicians and MPs of the respec­
tive parties. One recurring feature was that some politicians moved sev­
eral times between different parties by "faction hopping," and this 
included shifts between the parliamentary factions of the HDF and 
AFD—despite the fact that these two particular parties were archene­
mies in the First Parliament. This period of 1988 through 1990 can be 
characterized as the "original organizational chaos" in party develop­
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Table 8.2 
The Political Map of the Hungarian Parliament, June 28,1994, and 
July 3,1996 
Votes Seats 
(%) Seats (%) Changes 
HSP 32.99 • 209 54.14 0 
AFD 19.74 71 18.39 o 
HDF 11.74 38 9.84 -19 
ISP 8.82 26 6.73 + 1 
CDPP 7.03 22 5.69 0 
Fidesz 7.02 20 5.18 0 
HDPP 15 3.88 + 15 
Independents 
— 
6 1.55 +6 
Notes: Two MPs, counted here in the AFD faction, were elected as candidates of other 
parties (Agrarian Alliance and Party of Entrepreneurs, respectively), which were in electoral 
alliance with the AFD. The Hungarian Democratic People's Party (HDPP) is a breakaway 
faction of the HDF. 
For party acronyms, see chapter appendix. 
ment. This chaos was significantly reduced in personal and organiza­
tional terms in 1990 by the natural selection of the first elections, 
although it did not disappear. In the abstract sense, this is the starting 
period of missing party coherence involving the mechanistic imposition 
of party discipline for the required parliamentary party behavior. The 
problem is more complex in real life, however, since the ECE parties 
emerged from particular political subcultures—that is, from friendly 
circles of the intelligentsia. Therefore, there was some kind of common 
mentality from the very beginning that created an elementary level of 
party coherence.2 
Yet this common mentality, or set of values, was insufficient for a 
coherent policy-making process in the parliament, where the intellec­
tually minded new politicians had to face concrete decision-making sit­
uations instead of the more nebulous ideological debates that they 
preferred. The uncertainty in the sociopolitical character and the inter­
est representation function of parties was reflected, first, in the relation­
ships that rank-and-file party members in general had with their own 
parties. Second, this was particularly evident and appeared much more 
markedly in the parliament with regard to the MPs of the respective 
party factions. This is illustrated very well in the everyday behavior of 
MPs in connection with their attendance and voting, and even more so 
in those instances when they left and/or changed factions in the First 
Parliament (Szarvas 1995, 207). 
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There was a certain consolidation of Hungarian parties caused by 
the "pressure" of the decision-making process in the First Parliament. 
This partial consolidation (with a higher coherence) was finalized by the 
second elections of 1994. The HDF and (Alliance of Young Democrats) 
Fidesz have changed the most, the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) and 
the Christian Democratic Peoples Party (CDPP) the least, but the Inde­
pendent Smallholders Party (ISP) and AFD have also undergone sig­
nificant changes. The HDF emerged in the late 1980s as a typical 
"transition actor," an umbrella organization and movement party (the 
name "Forum" then became widespread in the region). It evinced some 
characteristic leftist features in the form of a "third way" populist ideol­
ogy. However, as a "party of government" it gradually changed into a 
rightist, national conservative party, and as a result its first president 
and one of the vice presidents (Zoltan Biro and Csaba Gy. Kiss, respec­
tively) left the party. Apart from this, power glued the diverging tenden­
cies of the HDF together. During the First Parliamentary cycle, the 
extreme right initially became organized within the HDF, and after 
some years of tense conflict, at the end of the First Parliament, it split 
off. On June 1, 1993, four MPs were expelled from the HDF faction as 
a final means of a disciplinary action; this triggered, on June 14, the 
formation of the new extreme nationalist party in the parliament (Party 
of Hungarian Justice and Life—PHJL) as a new party faction. Thus, it 
can be said that after this factionalization, the HDF consolidated in its 
final form as a national-conservative center-right party. 
The Fidesz did not change too much as far as the parliamentary 
faction is concerned, but it changed its political profile a great deal. It 
appeared on the political scene in the late 1980s as a left-liberal genera­
tional party (with a membership age limit of 35 years at that time). At 
first it displayed a rather radical-anarchistic political style, but by the 
end of the first parliamentary cycle it had transmogrified into a modern­
ist center-right conservative party. Hence, some of the founders of Fi­
desz left the party in late 1993 and joined the AFD, but this split did 
not reach the level of factionalization. Finally, the relationship in the 
First Parliament between the two "liberal" parties—the AFD and Fi-
desz—became sour, if not inimical. The AFD moved left and was stabi­
lized as a centrist-leftist, social-liberal party. After a short leadership 
crisis in 1992, the party has become rather cohesive and well balanced. 
The ISP took a right-populist turn in early 1992, producing a split in 
the party, and more recently it has occupied the extreme rightist place 
in the Hungarian parliament, with a harsh populist-nationalist style. 
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Table 8.3 
Legislation in the First Parliament, May 1990-April 1994 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1990-94 
New laws 29 55 50 61 24 219 
Amendments 48 38 42 60 25 213 
Resolutions 55 73 92 103 31 354 
Opinions 3 3 2 2 0 10 
All decisions 135 169 186 226 80 796 
The changes in the characters of the parties in this formation process 
led concomitantly to changes in the loyalties of politicians, and it was 
noticeable that institutional-political and personnel changes went in 
parallel. MPs, of course, were not idle and passive during this process 
of self-determination or self-definition by the parties. When the deci­
sions were made, they were faced with two options: to comply or to 
leave the party. It was a feature of all Hungarian parliamentary parties 
that the majority did the first, while the minority chose the second. In 
this atmosphere of "creative chaos," the inexperienced MPs faced a tre­
mendously heavy legislative burden in the First Parliament. The First 
Parliament worked as a "law factory" (table 8.3), passing about 100 laws 
annually (and 100 other decisions). In this respect, the Second Par­
liament has followed suit, producing even more laws than before, in­
creasing even more the legislative burden on the MPs (see below). 
"Extraordinary" sessions were eventually held on a regular basis, and 
these were caused not only by legislative overload but also by disorga­
nized governmental activities in the legislative agenda, as well as by the 
low level of preparatory work for draft bills. The figures show that in 
the First Parliament, MPs met for almost 100 days each year and that 
about 80% of MPs (being committee members) sat an additional day 
every week. One has to approach the problem of attendance at the ple­
nary and committee sessions, and in voting procedures, from this angle: 
it shows that the burden of participation was heavy. In general, the at­
tendance in Parliament was rather high in the first part of the parlia­
mentary cycle, but it declined drastically in the second part. It seemed 
that the First Parliament had almost decided to "dissolve itself" by the 
low attendance in the last months of its life, this being the result of 
physical and political fatigue. 
Attendance and voting participation in the First Parliament were 
much higher in the governing parties than in the opposition.3 As the 
data suggest, there were two contradictory tendencies in the First Parlia­
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ment. As we have seen, two parties (HDF and ISP) experienced splits, 
and the other parties some erosion. Otherwise the process can be de­
scribed as one of a widening of party centers in voting: that is, an in­
creasing party discipline in voting behavior around the "party center." 
The HDF, CDPP, and Fidesz had 95% of members voting with the party 
faction on about 95% of issues. After the split in the ISP, the progovern­
ment ISP faction (ISP-C) also manifested voting discipline. Therefore, 
the "voting machinery" of the three governing parties (HDF, ISP-C, 
and CDPP) worked well. On the other side, it seems that the opposition 
MPs, disappointed by the defeats they had suffered in Parliament, dem­
onstrated their resentment by decreasing even further their attendance 
and voting participation. The governing coalition (HDF, ISP-C, and 
CDPP) had a comfortable majority at the beginning of the cycle 
(59.59%), and although at the end of the cycle its majority had become 
more critical (50.51%), it was never voted down in the First Parliament 
(except for interpellations; see below). 
The relationship between the governing parties in the coalition was 
not always harmonious, but they were fused together by power; the op­
positional parties (AFD, HSP, and Fidesz) lacked the incentive to vote 
together, since they were much more fragmented politically in their par­
liamentary behavior and party discipline. Most of the MPs of the gov­
erning coalition, however, were forced into passivity because rank-and-
file MPs were not given an opportunity to play important roles and to 
take part meaningfully in the decision-making process of their party 
faction. This passivity was not caused simply by the general nature of 
party operations, as found elsewhere; rather, it stemmed from the spe­
cial nature of the party formation process, during which the party lead­
ers concentrated all important decisions in their hands and neglected 
the other faction members. Nevertheless, the MPs of the governing co­
alition took revenge for their situation as a silent and loyal majority 
not involved in decision making but disciplined in and through voting 
procedures. To compensate for the passivity in their voting behavior, 
they were very undisciplined before the final vote and in the plenary 
discussions. Strangely enough, the MPs of the governing coalition initi­
ated many private motions, not in consultation with their own govern­
ment, and raised a huge number of interpellations and parliamentary 
questions against their own government. For example, a progovernment 
MP began his interpellation by making excuses: "As a progovernment 
MP I would have preferred not to be forced to submit this interpella­
tion, b u t . . .  " As a sheer absurdity and showing the tensions within the 
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government, the political state secretaries (deputies of ministers) inter­
pellated each other several times (see Papp 1995, 111). 
Interpellations and parliamentary questions, following the continen­
tal European tradition, are the major means of legislative control over 
executive power in ECE, and especially in Hungary. Interpellations have 
a long tradition in the history of parliaments as a means of ensuring the 
accountability of ministers and through them the entire executive. The 
right of interpellation in the Hungarian parliament is not collective but 
is a right of the individual MPs. The interpellation is, however, always 
of a political nature: that is, although it concerns a particular policy 
issue, it still questions the respective minister's personal performance 
and overall capacity to handle this particular issue. In the Hungarian 
parliament, interpellations are distinguished from simple parliamentary 
questions. They are the most direct and vigorous form of parliamentary 
control because they are followed by the answer of that given minister, 
then by the rejoinder of the interpellator, and finally by a vote in the 
plenary session over the minister's answer. Until the 1990 constitutional 
amendments, Hungarian ministers were individually responsible to the 
parliament, which meant that a minister would have to resign if the 
parliament did not approve his or her answer. Under prime ministerial 
government, this practice has been discontinued, but a negative vote 
of Parliament after an interpellation is still a big defeat for the whole 
government and especially for the relevant minister. Parliamentary 
questions are of less importance politically, since they are not followed 
by a rejoinder and vote. Altogether, the opposition submitted 467 in­
terpellations in the First Parliament and the ruling coalition 95 inter­
pellations (with 423 versus 221 parliamentary questions). The pro-
government interpellators did not accept the minister's answer in 28 
cases, and the parliament concurred in 17 of those cases. Such manifest 
and extremely undisciplined behavior by individual MPs is quite un­
usual in West European parliaments, and where it occurs it is punished 
by expelling the MP from the party faction. This did not happen in the 
first Hungarian parliament to those progovernment MPs who raised an 
interpellation against their own government or who voted negatively 
after the debate, indicating big intraparty tensions on some policy is­
sues, above all on the privatization process. In this particularly undis­
ciplined behavior, there was a clear difference between those MPs 
representing individual districts and those elected on party lists: the for­
mer apparently felt they were more independent from their parties and 
acted accordingly.4 
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We can conclude that the MPs of governing parties in the First Par­
liament were more disciplined in the act of voting itself than in their 
general political behavior: that is, they acted under the pressure of 
different political tensions. As a result of this contradiction, namely the 
enforced party discipline in voting, the governing parties finally "ex­
ploded" in the First Parliament. To put this more accurately, in the First 
Parliament, among the coalition parties, the HDF and ISP were the first 
to change beyond recognition, and then the CDPP became margin­
alized. The ISP experienced a split in February 1991; the rump of the 
party (ISP-T; the T indicates the name of its president, Jozsef Torgyan) 
formally left the coalition with some of its MPs, but the majority of the 
MPs (ISP-C) continued to support the coalition, though without being 
attached to a party. (Incidentally, they established a substitute party in 
1993 under the name of Unified Smallholders Party, but this entity van­
ished in the 1994 elections.) The HDF also went through a series of 
splits in 1993, before the second elections, with the emergence of the 
Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (PHJL). Whereas the HDF was a 
large umbrella organization in the First Parliament, it has become a 
small center-right party in the Second Parliament. Thus, the strong 
party discipline that was imposed upon the governing parties resulted 
in the weakening of the parties themselves because of their lack of or­
ganically developed party coherence; nevertheless, at the same time the 
splits have produced much clearer party profiles and rather mature party 
coherence. The whole process of "redefinition" of parties can be de­
tected in detail through the very intensive movements among the fac­
tions in the First Parliament. 
Faction Movements and Changes 
in the First Parliament 
In the parliamentarization process the newly emerging parties faced a 
paradoxical situation in the First Parliament. First, the parties were 
initially formed from social movements; thus, strong formal party or­
ganization and disciplined political behavior were unfamiliar and un­
comfortable to most party members, including the MPs. Second, the 
dividing lines between the newly emerging parties were neither strictly 
nor precisely formulated in their political programs. This reflects the 
fact that the (parliamentary) parties had emerged from different politi­
cal subcultures; they may have had their own particular political dis­
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courses, but they lacked distinct profiles and programs. Therefore, in 
most cases, parties were internally heterogeneous ("several parties in 
one")- Third, it is worth noting that party discipline was not a result 
of internal discussions but was imposed upon the party members from 
"outside"—that is, from the top, by the new party leaderships, in a 
rather authoritarian way. Fourth, party discipline itself, either as a prin­
ciple or as a practice, was an alien and inimical concept for the members 
of the newly emerging parties. It reminded them of the principles and 
practices of the former ruling party (Democratic Centralism). It took a 
long time for the new parties and their members to understand that 
party discipline—albeit in a radically different form from the form to 
which they were accustomed—was also very important, even crucial, 
for democratic parties. One should not forget that most of the MPs in 
the first ECE parliaments were former members of the ruling party, es­
pecially in Hungary, with its long, smooth, and evolutionary transfor­
mation. As a recent study reveals, "In each of our countries [the party 
members] are also overwhelmingly former members of the communist 
party. In other words, it is largely the same people active in politics now 
as were active in the communist period" (Wyman et al. 1995, 538-39). 
This paradoxical situation produced very intensive, sometimes even 
chaotic, changes in the parliamentary factions of the First Parliament. 
As a cumulative effect of the above-mentioned factors, many MPs left 
their factions and joined another faction or became "independents." 
The independents, as a separate "party faction" in the First Parliament, 
showed all the characteristic weaknesses of the new parties concerning 
party discipline and party identity. The First Parliament started out with 
7 independent MPs, but by its end this figure had increased to 28—this 
despite the fact that in the first weeks of the parliamentary cycle some 
independents joined parties. Eleven MPs were formally elected as inde­
pendents, but only seven MPs remained independent when the First 
Parliament was convened. Later, however, a movement in the other di­
rection became dominant: dozens of MPs left their party factions be­
cause of their deep confrontations with the party line, and they ended 
up joining the independents. In a 386-member parliament there were 56 
changes between factions by 50 MPs (six MPs changed twice; one MP 
even returned to his original faction!). These moves between factions, 
or faction hopping, meant that altogether the party affiliation of MPs 
changed by about 20%: that is, virtually one in every five MPs moved 
between factions in the First Parliament (Szarvas 1995, 208). The "fac­
tion" of independents proved to be very heterogeneous. It collected two 
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kinds of MPs: the real independents, having no party connections and 
affiliations (transitory or permanent), and party members who could 
not form their own party factions because they did not constitute a large 
enough group. The standing orders of the First Parliament prescribed a 
10-member minimum for party factions. For example, when the ISP 
split, the 9 remaining MPs of the original party (ISP-T) could not form 
their own faction, but the breakaway group of 35 (later 36) MPs could. 
Thus, they were able to maintain the former ISP faction, although this 
created a constitutional debate, since there was no party behind them. 
In fact, this manifest lack of party discipline, which led to "mass 
migrations" or "political tourism" among the factions, raised some 
other constitutional issues as well. Toward the end of the First Parlia­
ment, there were representatives of about 20 parties, although there were 
only seven party factions (the original six and the PHJL) and the faction 
of independents in the parliament. These new parties emerged in the 
parliament mainly due to the erosion of the other parliamentary parties, 
starting with the HDF. Yet they were not visible or manifest because 
they did not represent party factions (having fewer than 10 MPs), so 
formally they were independents. This dissolution process threatened 
the workings of parliament and its majority and raised the legal issue of 
whether parties could be formed inside the parliament or whether it 
should be laid down legally that only those parties that received popular 
legitimacy in the elections could be recognized as parliamentary fac­
tions. The "20-party parliament," as it eventually became, still worked 
normally despite the significant reduction of governmental majority 
(from 59.59% to 50.51%) because some of the deserters still supported 
the coalition and because the opposition did not want to vote down the 
government, preferring to wait for the next elections. Altogether, there 
were 61 cases of party faction-related changes in the First Parliament: 
in addition to the 56 cases of "faction hopping," in 5 cases, when the 
MP from the individual district resigned or died, by-elections were 
held, and this caused a party faction-related change on each occasion 
(Szarvas 1995, 208). 
In the end, all these questions were solved by the fortunes of political 
life (i.e., by the 1994 elections) and not by theory or legal principles. 
The newest parties, formed in the First Parliament by the breakaway 
groups, are not present in the Second Parliament. Consequently, the 
theoretical debates on the free mandate (for both those from the single-
member individual districts and those from party lists) have lost their 
practical significance to a great extent. The Second Parliament has 
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brought a fundamental turning point in the party formation process, 
including party discipline. I have described here the parliamentarization 
of the Hungarian parties as an institutionalization process from the 
angle of party discipline. It is obvious that the imposed party discipline 
in the voting procedure, as well as the manifest lack of party discipline 
in interfactional changes, were only the phenomena of birth pangs of 
the party formation process. In other words, in an institutional sense, 
they represent the characteristic contradictions of the reemergence 
of the multiparty system; they are not the "normal" party change famil­
iar to consolidated democracies. At the same time, however, imposed 
party discipline was necessary for governability; it provided the oppor­
tunity for a special political learning process to be experienced by MPs 
and indeed for the whole of Hungarian politics. Party identity on one 
hand and party discipline and party coherence on the other developed 
in a parallel fashion during the First Parliament. The results of this pro­
cess have appeared very markedly in the Second Parliament. 
Party Discipline in the Second Parliament 
In the Second Parliament the same six parties were reelected, but these 
parties now have much clearer political profiles and identities and have 
no "random" or "by chance" members. The incumbency retention rate 
was only 36% after the second elections. This drastic "natural selection," 
eliminating two-thirds of the MPs of the First Parliament from the Sec­
ond Parliament, has had a very strong disciplinary effect on the MPs 
(Agh and Kurtan 1995, 25). All MPs (new and old) now understand 
that democratic parties need strong party discipline. Debates currently 
taking place are only about how to reach democratic decisions effi­
ciently within a framework of strong party discipline. At the very begin­
ning of the Second Parliament, there were no independents. In the 1994 
elections, only two MPs were elected as independents. Their parties 
failed to reach the 5% threshold at the elections, and they were success­
ful in single-member individual districts. One of them joined the AFD 
faction in full accordance with the regulations, and the other indepen­
dent MP, for a while, cooperated with the same party faction. After the 
"disappearance" of these two independent MPs, there have been very 
few interfaction movements in the first two years of the Second Parlia­
ment. Only eight MPs have left their factions—among them, one who 
was expelled from the ISP faction as a disciplinary measure—and two 
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of these have already joined other parties. The only big move was that 
the HDF split once again and a new faction of the Hungarian Demo­
cratic People's Party (HDPP) emerged with 15 MPs. Altogether, there 
have only been 23 changes so far (the new 15-member faction and 8 
individual moves); this proves that the parliamentary parties are rela­
tively "ready-made" and that the newly elected MPs have understood 
that interfaction movement, or faction hopping, would mean commit­
ting political suicide. The party formation process has reached a new 
stage in the Second Parliament, where the problems of party discipline 
can be formulated in a completely different way. Hungarian parties have 
more or less finished the party formation process, and Hungary now 
experiences the "normal" tensions and contradictions of party change 
caused by environmental factors or internal party dynamics. 
Of course, the problems of party factionalization and difficulties with 
party discipline have not entirely disappeared. The HSP, with its land­
slide victory (54% of seats), has emerged as a much more coherent um­
brella organization than the HDF was. But most of the HSP MPs are 
from individual districts, feeling more independence and local engage­
ment than those from party lists (of the 209 HSP MPs, 159 represent 
individual districts). There are competing, rival groups in the HSP, re­
flecting inside the party almost all the contradictions of Hungarian soci­
ety. But they have learned the lesson from the fate of the HDF and fight 
only for influencing party decisions, carefully avoiding any manifest fac­
tionalization. For some time it was an open question whether this large 
party faction could be kept together during the whole period of the 
Second Parliament. The question was first raised over the serious eco­
nomic austerity measures introduced by the HSP and AFD coalition 
government on March 12, 1995. There were some angry reactions to 
these measures by some MPs (those with a trade union background), 
but unlike the HDF before it, the HSP did not "explode" under the 
pressure of economic crisis management. This party has always had the 
greatest party coherence and discipline among the Hungarian par­
ties, with a clear party identity; thus, it has a good survival chance as a 
governing party without splits and factionalization in the Second 
Parliament.5 
In general, the Second Parliament reveals rather mature parties with 
relatively high coherence and discipline. As in the First Parliament, at­
tendance and voting participation have been higher in the government 
factions, ensuring the efficient workings of the parliament. Apart from 
this, the behavior of the progovernment MPs is very different from that 
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Table 8.4 
Legislation in the Second Parliament, July 1994-July 1996 
1994 1995 1996 1994-96 
New laws 19 61 37 123 
Amendments 31 59 29 119 
Resolutions 44 128 68 240 
All decisions 94 254 134 482 
in the First Parliament: higher party coherence means that the MPs 
need less "recompense" through other activities before the final vote. 
The legislative burden has even increased slightly compared to the First 
Parliament (see table 8.4), but with a more democratic decision-making 
process in the factions and with an extended committee system, even 
the backbenchers of the ruling coalitions have not been forced into pas­
sivity. Thus, there has been no interpellation and there have been very 
few parliamentary questions by progovemment MPs; also, there has 
been little erosion of the progovemment parliamentary factions. Only 
the AFD faction of the governing coalition has lost three MPs, one of 
whom was originally an independent, and two MPs left for political 
reasons. There has been no factionalization so far in the ruling coalition. 
The progovemment MPs have been voting in a disciplined way, with 
smaller deviations in the detailed debate on the amendments, but with 
around 95% support for the ruling coalition, with only some absten­
tions, in the final votes. Both coherence and discipline have been lower 
in the four opposition parties because they are small and fragmented, 
but the erosion of attendance and voting participation has been less 
than was the case in the opposition of the former parliament. With these 
mature parties, the party formation process in Hungary has reached a 
threshold. We find here a situation of "party in government" instead of 
"party of government"—that is, a moderate pluralism instead of polar­
ized pluralism—since two former enemies (HSP and AFD) have joined 
to form a coalition government.6 
Common projects with our ECE research partners have led us to a 
conclusion that the process of forming party coherence and discipline 
has been very similar in all ECE countries, and indeed earlier, in the 
1970s, in the South European countries as well (see chap. 7 of this vol­
ume). The special character of the Hungarian developments is that 
the parties emerged earlier and the First Parliamentary cycle was 
longer than elsewhere in the region; this makes the problems of party 
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coherence and discipline more visible and manifest. The other ECE 
countries have not yet reached the "party in government" stage, but 
both party coherence and discipline have been rather high in their par­
liamentary parties. ECE parties already have their own "history" as a 
base for their organic coherence and are not simply united by "contem­
porary political appeals," such as the tasks of governing and opposing. 
Hence, the mechanical party discipline has also evolved into a more 
conscious kind of self-discipline based on the newly gained organic 
party coherence. 
This analysis of Hungarian party formation has demonstrated that 
there have been three specific factors of party coherence in the ECE: 
1. The social movements as preparties created a feeling of cohesion 
and a common mentality that was initially disturbed by the party 
formation process but that has been reinforced since by the com­
mon fight against other parties. 
2. The heterogeneous character of the new parties was the biggest 
obstacle to party cohesion, especially in the case of large umbrella 
organizations like the HDF, but party erosion and splits have 
paved the way for party homogenization. 
3. The political subcultures were the starting points and triggered a 
process of ideology formation and program setting that has inten­
sified party coherence and made it more conscious and organic. 
The change from mechanical to conscious party discipline has had 
other dominant factors: 
1. Different party traditions have mattered a great deal: the leftist 
tradition has embraced more discipline than the rightist one, but 
the formation of the party system, in parallel with that of the 
individual parties, has made some models of political behavior 
mandatory. 
2. The ECE countries have their own traditions of political organi­
zation and institutional behavior that date back to the early post­
war period or even to the interwar period: party loyalty has been 
traditionally the highest in Czechoslovakia and lowest in Poland, 
with Hungary in the middle. 
3. Parliamentary regulations (especially the standing orders) and 
practices have been very instrumental in promoting party disci­
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pline through legal and moral norms; accordingly, these rules and 
expectations have been reformulated several times.7 
The ECE parties have recently become more organically coherent 
and consciously disciplined and have reached a new level of party con­
solidation. As a result, the party formation period has been more or less 
completed with the parliamentarization of the ECE parties. This may 
go against the conventional wisdom that all "East European" parties 
are weak and fragile, but this "Prague-Vladivostok hypothesis" neglects 
both the increasing regional specificities in the postcommunist world 
and the tremendous recent developments in the ECE parties. At this 
point, the first stage of elite recruitment and political learning has come 
to an end, and the "normal" stage of party change has begun, in which 
parties react to social demands and international pressures in a quasi-
stable institutional environment and in a rather predictable way. We are, 
indeed, at the end of the beginning in the ECE, but there is still a long 
way to go until the ECE parties have become mature in their entire 
organizational structure and not just at the party elite level. 
APPENDIX: HUNGARIAN PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF)—Magyar Demokrata Forum 
(MDF) 
Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD)—Szabad Demokratak Szovetsege 
(SZDSZ) 
Independent Smallholders Party (ISP)—Ftiggetlen Kisgazda Part 
(FKGP) 
Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP)—Magyar Szocialista Part (MSZP) 
Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz)—Fiatal Democratak Szovet­
sege (Fidesz) 
Christian Democratic Peoples Party (CDPP)—Keresztenydemokrata 
Neppart (KDNP) 
NOTES 
1. I am very grateful to Professor Ronald Weber (University of Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee) for his comments on a draft of this paper. I have discussed the 
ECE party formation process in several papers: see Agh (1994b, 1995a, 
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1995b). For parliamentary developments, see Agh (1994a, 1996), Agh and 
Kurtan (1995), and Agh and Ilonszki (1996). The data used here are from the 
book I edited about the First Parliament (Agh 1994a). Most of these data 
were complied by my colleagues, Sandor Kurtan and Laszlo Szarvas. I make 
use of Szarvas's (1995, especially 207-8) material on changes in parliamen­
tary factions. 
2. In chapter 2 of this volume, Laver and Shepsle refer to parties "emerg­
ing from the primeval slime," but they do not specify the situation in regional 
cases, such as in the ECE. They characterize these ready-made parties as "uni­
tary actors" with "perfect party discipline" such that all members abide by all 
party decisions. 
3. This discussion is based on data showing participation and voting in 
the Hungarian parliament for each year of the cycle, available in Kurtan, 
Sandor, and Vass (1995), as well as Agh and Kurtan 1995) 
4. On the full data of factions voting together, see Kurtan et al. 1995, 428­
31. The First Parliament volume (Agh and Kurtan 1995) includes chapters 
on legislative activity in connection with interpellations and questions in the 
Hungarian parliament, and full data are included therein. The above data are 
taken from Papp (1995, 111, 126-27). 
5. For example, as a protest action to the drastic measures, the leader of 
the biggest Hungarian trade union confederation (National Alliance of Hun­
garian Trade Unions), Sandor Nagy, resigned from his two functions in the 
parliament. In addition, two HSP ministers (ministers of social policy and 
national security) resigned, but this did not shake the HSP faction. 
6. So far, there have been very few personnel changes in the second Hun­
garian parliament; there have been no by-elections. Only one Fidesz MP has 
resigned, but his intention was known before the elections, and he has been 
replaced from the party list. In the second half of the term, MPs will be even 
more disciplined and avoid conflicts with the party faction because they want 
to be reelected. Given space, attention could also have been paid here to the 
parliamentary committees. Committee positions are allocated by the party 
factions proportionally to their seats. The MPs on these committees behave 
more as party members than as "individuals " and, particularly since they get 
extra pay for their committee work, they are interested in keeping their com­
mittee positions. 
7. Lewis (1995, 107) cites opinions in Poland that factionalization and 
fragmentation have been part of the Polish tradition of political culture, ex­
plaining why they are higher than in other ECE countries. Ania van der Meer-
Krok-Paszkowska and Marc van der Muyzenberg (1996, 200) also compare 
Hungarian and Polish parliamentary behavior and conclude that party disci­
pline by and large is higher in Hungary than in Poland. Zdenka Mansfeldova 
in a recent paper (1996, 3) written after the end of the 1992-96 cycle of the 
Czech parliament, refers to the massive fluctuations among the parliamentary 
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factions, which have exceeded the Polish and Hungarian levels: "More than 
seventy MPs out of two hundred went over to a different party than they have 
been elected for during that term. Two MPs changed their party even more 
than once." 
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The Challenge of Diversity: 
Party Cohesion in the 
European Parliament 
TAPIO RAUNIO 
HS~ow cohesive are the transnational political groups in the -European Parliament? Is there much variation between 
the groups? What explains coalition behavior in the chamber? This 
chapter analyses the voting behavior of the party groups in the Euro­
pean Parliament (EP). The period under analysis is the third directly 
elected parliament of 1989-94. The sample consists of 159 roll call votes. 
This chapter examines the nature of the EP's party system, with par­
ticular emphasis on factors that have been argued to undermine party 
cohesion in the Strasbourg Chamber. We analyze the significance of a 
consensual mode of decision making within and between the party 
groups, the acceptability and cost of voting against the group line, and 
the connection between legislative majority requirements and coalition 
behavior. The fourth European elections were held in June 1994, and in 
the final section we discuss the relevance of our findings to the party 
structure of the 1994-99 EP 
Party Discipline in Strasbourg 
When analyzing the level of Europeanization achieved by the transna­
tional party groups in the EP and their respective Europarties, political 
scientists, without exception, agree that we still have a long way to 
go before we have true European-wide parties. Palmer (1981, 71) has 
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described political groups as "broad coalitions and alliances of parlia­
mentarians with similar, but not necessarily totally shared philosophies 
and objectives," while in a more recent account on the European 
People's Party (EPP), Hanley (1994, 194-95) has applied the term to 
describe "an organization which unites national parties of similar style 
into a loose framework for political cooperation within European insti­
tutions for the pursuit of broad goals." Regardless of the actual wording, 
academics and politicians stress both cooperation and coordination as 
the primary tools for understanding the nature of party discipline within 
the parliament's party groups. 
A number of interrelated factors are said to undermine the cohesion 
of EP party groups. The first of these is a lack of meaningful government 
and opposition roles within the chamber. The European Union (EU) lacks 
the kind of legislative-executive relationship characteristic of the indi­
vidual EU member states. Even though the parliament's power of con­
trol vis-a-vis the commission has increased, the latter institution still 
consists of individuals nominated by their respective member state gov­
ernments. Thus, with no government to defend or to bring down, the 
party groups face inevitable difficulties in enforcing voting discipline. 
A second factor is the distance of MEPs from their voters. Lack of 
public awareness of the role and work of the parliament has been de­
plored by members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and others 
seeking more powers for the EP. The citizens' knowledge of their parlia­
ment remains at an alarmingly low level. Media coverage of part-
sessions is also sporadic, with most national media interested only in 
grand or sensational themes. Individual representatives in Strasbourg 
thus need not take their voters into account when voting on a specific 
issue, unless, of course, the issue attracts considerable media attention 
in the MEP's home country. This factor thus gives the members freedom 
to maneuver when making their voting decisions. 
A third factor is national party delegations undermining consensus 
within political groups. Political groups are formations uniting various 
national parties, and these national party delegations, especially larger 
ones such as the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the British 
Labour Party, carry much weight within the transnational groups. Na­
tional party contingents have their own hierarchical structures, and "on 
important issues, groups will try to negotiate compromises among their 
national delegations before taking a decision. When groups fail to vote 
cohesively, it is usually because one or more national delegations have 
decided to opt out of a group position" (Jacobs, Corbett, and Shack­
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leton 1995, 90). While usually these national party delegations cannot 
accept the group line because of differing views on the issue decided 
upon, the reason for voting against the group position is on occasions 
much more straightforward. Over half, 54.2%, of a sample of MEPs 
from (former West) Germany identified "national egoism" and not 
"political-ideological interests" or "group interests" as the main factor 
accounting for intragroup dissent (Hrbek and Schweitzer 1989, 6). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that as the EP's legislative role con­
tinues to be strengthened, national parties will start to pay more atten­
tion to the behavior of their representatives in the parliament. 
According to Fitzmaurice (1975, 210), parties will reevaluate the EP as 
an institution: "Parties are about power and the exercise of power: they 
react to a new power center by attempting to structure it. . .  . Members 
of the EP would be called to account by their national parties for their 
votes and actions in the EP..  . . Party discipline would be imposed, but 
it might well not be the discipline of the present European party groups 
but of national parties." National parties are arguably in a better posi­
tion than the political groups to impose voting discipline on their repre­
sentatives, especially since MEPs need their parties' approval for 
nomination as candidates on their lists in the next election. 
A fourth factor is voting by nationalities and other cross-group coali­
tions. Research on the concept of representation in the EP has shown 
that MEPs regard themselves as representing multiple interests (Bardi 
1989; Bowler and Farrell 1992; Raunio 1996a). While the members' pri­
mary allegiance is to their political groups, on occasion national delega­
tions join forces in a vote with significant national implications. A good 
example was in July 1984, when the parliament rejected the Fontaine­
bleau agreement, which gave the United Kingdom a budget refund. All 
British representatives, regardless of their party group affiliation, voted 
against the rejection (Vallance and Davies 1986, 29). Standard accounts 
of the EP are replete with examples of how nationally important issues 
unite MEPs on a cross-group basis. 
Committees play a significant part in the parliament's internal or­
ganization, and individual members display high levels of specialization 
within the EP's committee structure (Bowler and Farrell 1995). Even 
though votes in the committees are often uncontested, cross-party align­
ments can occur at the committee level. The MEPs come together in 
various intergroups, approximately 50 of which were in existence after 
the 1989 and 1994 European elections, and of course MEPs main­
tain other informal contacts with their colleagues in the corridors and 
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restaurants of the parliament. Certain significant topics, such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the further deepening of inte­
gration, also attract varying levels of support within the political groups, 
their controversial nature leading to dissent within the party groups 
when votes are taken. 
A fifth factor is the acceptability and cost of voting against the group 
line. When casting their votes, MEPs must consider the cost of voting 
against the group line. Above, it was argued that since their reselection 
as candidates in the next elections is dependent on their national parties, 
MEPs have a career motive for adhering to the party view. Within the 
parliament, they develop a certain reputation, and if their activities in 
the chamber, including voting behavior, suffer from inconsistencies, they 
may not be able to cultivate support among colleagues (Lord 1994). 
Such MEPs may expect not to be given important posts within the par­
liament or their groups or to receive assignments or rapporteurships of 
their own choice. 
When asked to rate the "acceptability of forms of behavior," 53% of 
MEPs considered voting against the group line as "acceptable" or "most 
acceptable." In a comparison of the answers across the party groups, 
the highest percentages of members thinking it "unacceptable" to vote 
against the group line were in the ranks of the Socialist Group and the 
European Democratic Alliance (EDA) (Bowler and Farrell 1992). 
A sixth factor is the transnationality and/rationalization of the politi­
cal groups. According to this widely formulated view, the cohesion of a 
party group depends on the number of national parties included in the 
group. The logic is the same as in the Council of Ministers: the more 
views that need to be accommodated, the more problematic it becomes 
to find common ground. Many groups, notably the Liberals, are consid­
ered to be broad churches, with the member parties spanning a wide 
ideological spectrum. Indeed, some groups even include more than one 
party from the same member state. 
A seventh factor is the different cleavages found at the European level. 
According to this line of reasoning, the transnational party groups— 
based on cleavage structures found at the national level—do not reflect 
the cleavage structure of EU politics (Andeweg 1995). In the context of 
EU decision making, a substantial proportion of issues, or at least the 
most important of them, are on the pro/anti-integration dimension. 
Party groups, and national party delegations within them, are bound to 
face internal problems when issues concerning the future of European 
integration are on the agenda. 
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An eighth and final factor is the weakness of transnational parties. At 
the national level, the behavior of a parliamentary party group is usually 
subjected to scrutiny by the extraparliamentary organs of that party. No 
equivalent is found at the European level, where the role of transna­
tional parties has remained limited. While the three main party families, 
the Social Democrats (Party of the European Socialists [PES]), the Lib­
erals (European Liberal, Democrat, and Reformist Party [ELDR]), and 
the Conservatives (EPP), have all established their own transnational 
Europarties, these parties "have been nothing more than clearing 
houses; providing information, campaign materials, and organizing 
(poorly attended) conferences and candidate exchanges" (Hix 1995, 
535). Weak in terms of resources, with national parties in control over 
candidates and campaigns, the Europarties have hardly any power or 
means with which to exert control over "their" MEPs. 
To counterbalance these factors, EP parties have created intragroup 
mechanisms designed to foster group cohesion. A detailed analysis of 
these factors is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worthwhile 
introducing the importance of intragroup decision making and legisla­
tive majorities.1 
The political groups, at least the larger ones, have their own whips. 
However, the position of the whip should not be overestimated: 
"In terms of mechanics, the 'Whip' is normally nothing more than 
a list, prepared by the group secretariats and circulated to members' 
benches in the hemicycle before voting periods, setting out the recom­
mended group position on each amendment as well as on final resolu­
tions and reports. . . . On most uncontroversial business the group posi­
tion is determined and indicated by the group's spokesman. . .  . More 
controversial business would normally be taken to a discussion in the 
group, and a group line decided, frequently by a vote" (Westlake 1994a, 
238). 
While all groups allow their MEPs room for dissent, some groups 
invest more resources in building intragroup consensus than others. It 
is a common custom within all groups that if certain members feel they 
cannot accept the group line, they are given permission to defy it. 
Reasons behind these "opt-outs" vary, with MEPs often choosing 
to vote against the group line because of national political concerns. 
Especially in larger groups, in such situations it is expected that the 
MEP will announce his or her intentions before the vote in a group 
meeting. Group meetings provide important forums for consensus build­
ing, with extensive negotiations often taking place in search of mu­
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tually acceptable compromises. Willingness to build consensus is a cru­
cial factor in explaining group cohesion. 
To make the most of its existing powers and to fulfill its institutional 
role in passing, amending, or rejecting legislation, the EU's decision-
making rules require the parliament to muster so-called legislative ma-
jorities.2 The codecision, cooperation, assent, and budget procedures re­
quire the chamber to achieve absolute majorities; thus, in the 1989-94 
EP, the need to reach the threshold figure of 260 became a pressing 
3concern.
Since the ability of the parliament to build these majorities depends 
on cooperation between the two largest groups, the Socialists and the 
EPP, the leaders of these two groups soon recognized the necessity of 
consensual decision making based on extensive negotiations. This ap­
proach was formalized after the 1984 European elections at "the meet­
ing of the giants," where, according to Rudi Arndt (1992, 66-67), former 
chairman of the Socialist Group, the major groups "agreed that there 
was no point in a mutualflexing of ideological muscles: the only sensible 
strategy was to achieve appropriate majorities." This approach has not 
been without its negative consequences. Smaller groups have often felt 
neglected and pushed aside. Arndt (1992, 67) also admitted this fact, 
agreeing that "it has meant steamrolling the smaller factions in the 
group and, of course, the smaller groups who often got very annoyed, 
because they regarded Parliament as a forum for making known their 
views, whereas we regarded it as a forum for achieving majorities." Thus, 
the requirement to achieve legislative majorities has led to what Weiler 
(1991, 429) has called the "neutralization of ideology," with the result 
that certain MEPs have become ideologically marginalized within the 
chamber, a factor contributing to high levels of absenteeism from the 
hemicycle when votes are taken. 
The literature on the EP party system has so far been skeptical about 
the ability of party groups to achieve and maintain cohesion. While I 
certainly agree that the EP party groups are definitely more vulnerable 
to internal dissent than parliamentary parties in EU member state legis­
latures, more empirical research is needed to falsify or support the argu­
ments put forward. 
Voting in the European Parliament 
According to the ninth edition of the parliament's Rules of Procedure 
(European Parliament 1994), "The right to vote is a personal right. 
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Members shall cast their votes individually and in person" (Rule 117), 
and "Normally Parliament shall vote by show of hands. If the President 
decides that the result is doubtful, a fresh vote shall be taken using the 
electronic voting system and, if the latter is not working, by sitting and 
standing" (Rule 118). Voting by secret ballot is primarily used in the 
case of appointments to Parliament's top hierarchical positions. Rule 
119 states that "the vote shall be taken by roll-call if so requested in 
writing by at least twenty-nine Members or a political group before vo­
ting has begun... . In calculating whether a motion has been adopted 
or rejected account shall be taken only of votes cast for and against. . . . 
Voting shall be recorded in the minutes of proceedings of the sitting 
by political group in the alphabetical order of Members' names." Roll 
call voting used to be done by word of mouth, but since the installa­
tion of electronic voting machines, representatives have been able to cast 
their "Yes," "No," or "I abstain" votes by using their voting cards. If 
MEPs feel that their position on the matter needs to be clarified, 
they "may give an oral explanation on the final vote for not longer than 
one minute or give a written explanation of no more than 200 words, 
which shall be included in the verbatim report of proceedings" (Rule 
122). 
Roll call voting is mainly requested by the political groups for the 
following reasons: it enables groups to make their positions known to 
the wider audience; it can be used by groups to highlight the opposing 
view adopted by other groups; and it helps the groups in checking how 
their own MEPs voted (Jacobs et al. 1995, 160). 
Poor and erratic attendance is a problem frequently associated with 
national legislatures, and the EP is definitely no exception. Attendance 
in the chamber during voting periods tends to vary depending on the 
significance of the issue voted upon. When legislative measures requir­
ing absolute majorities are on the agenda, MEPs take their seats in the 
hemicycle. In fact, these votes are grouped together at noon on Wednes­
days to increase the probability that the required number of members is 
present in the chamber when votes are taken.4 
The Sample 
Parliament's voting records are published in the C-Series of the Official 
Journal of the European Communities. The temporal scope of this re­
search is the third term of the directly elected parliament, excluding, 
however, the plenary sessions held in the final months preceding the 
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June 1994 European elections. The sample includes 159 votes. The 
following quantitative criteria were used in selecting votes for further 
analysis. 
1. At least a quorum, one-third of the elected MEPs, were required 
to have taken part in the vote (173/518). 
2. The indices of agreement and voting likeness were calculated only 
when at least a quarter of the members of the group voted. 
3. Not only final votes but also votes on individual paragraphs and 
amendments are included in the analysis. Of the 159 votes, 62 are 
votes on paragraphs or amendments. The reason for including 
votes on amendments in the sample is that often votes on specific 
amendments are more significant and contested than the final 
votes. Indeed, while the index of agreement (IA) for the EP as 
a whole on all votes is .513, on votes on amendments it is only 
.354. 
4. No minimum level of conflict was required in this study. 
Voting behavior analysis presents obviously only one possible solu­
tion to studying party cohesion and the dimensionality of cleavages and 
alignments in legislatures.5 Roll call analysis needs to be supplemented 
by other methods before anything close to a comprehensive picture of 
the nature of political groups will emerge. However, it can be argued 
that roll call analysis is a particularly worthwhile exercise in the context 
of the EP. Considering that before most reports and resolutions are put 
to vote, lengthy negotiations have often taken place within and between 
the groups, lack of unitary voting behavior by groups can be interpreted 
as definitive evidence of intragroup conflict on the matter. 
Party Cohesion in the 1989-94 Parliament 
An IA is used to examine the cohesion of the political groups. "The 
index is a measure of the relation that exists between the three modal­
ities of votes—in favor, against and abstention—cast by the members 
of a group; more exactly, it is the percentage measure of the relation 
between (a) the difference between the highest numbering modality and 
the sum of the other two modalities in a vote by the MEPs of a group, 
and (b) the total number of votes cast by the group" (Attina 1990, 564). 
It can be expressed as follows: 
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TA - (highest modality - sum of the other two modalities)
 i n  o 
total number of votes 
The index reaches the value 1.00 when all the deputies belonging to a 
group vote in the same way. Between .999 and .001, agreement de­
creases, but more than half of the voters express the same voting mod­
ality. "At 0 we have a split in half of the votes in two modalities or, with 
three modalities, one of these is exactly equal to the sum of the other 
two. When the index has a negative value, the votes break down into 
three modalities, and even the highest number of votes in one modality 
is less than half of the total group vote" (Attina 1990, 564). To calculate 
the IAs for the EP and its party groups, the sum of the IAs of individual 
votes was divided by the number of votes. 
A methodological problem concerns those MEPs who abstain. Ac­
cording to the parliament's Rules of Procedure (European Parliament 
1994), only votes cast for or against are taken into account. From this 
point of view, it would make sense to consider abstentions as neutral 
positions. However, here abstentions (if the minority position within the 
group) are regarded as failure to accept the official group line. By ab­
staining, representatives do not actively support the position of their 
groups; thus, they increase the voting power of their opposition. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a direct relationship between party group cohesion 
and party group heterogeneity. 
National political parties have their roots in their respective political 
systems, and the behavior and ideology of these delegations are ex­
pected to reflect their experiences in the context of national politics. The 
degree of party group transnationality (the number of member states 
sending representatives to the group) and fractionalization (the number 
of party delegations in a group) is thus expected to have an effect on 
the cohesion of the groups. The more heterogeneous the group, the less 
cohesive it is, and vice versa. 
The larger groups have much higher degrees of transnationality and 
fractionalization than the smaller political groups (table 9.1). The only 
exception is the Rainbow Group. The group functioned as a loose coali­
tion, bringing together various regionalist and other smaller parties, 
including four Danish antimarketeers. The very low values of the Euro­
pean Democratic Group (EDG) result from the fact that 32 out of the 
group's 34 MEPs represented the British Conservatives. Four out of 10 
political groups—EDG, Group of the United European Left (EUL), 
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Table 9.1 
Political Groups' Transnationality and Fractionalization after the 1989 Elections and 
Their Cohesion in the 1989-1994 EP 
Groups Seats 
National 
Delegations IT* 
Party 
Delegations IF* IAC 
PES 180 12 .852 16 .858 .786 
EPP 121 12 .841 16 .873 .882 
ELDR 49 10 .851 20 .917 .857 
ED G 34 2 .111 2 .111 .922 
V 29 7 .790 12 .837 .875 
EUL 28 4 .360 4 .360 .923 
EDA 22 4 .566 4 .566 .645 
ER 17 3 .526 3 .526 .889 
LU 14 4 .653 5 .673 .938 
RB 13 8 .824 9 .840 .695 
Note: PES = Party of the European Socialists; EPP = European People's Party; ELDR = European 
Liberal, Democrat, and Reformist Party; V = The Greens; EUL = Group of the United European 
Left; EDA = European Democratic Alliance; ER = Technical Group of the European Right; LU = 
Left Unity; RB = Rainbow Group. The sizes of the groups underwent much variation during the 
1989-94 legislative term. Two groups disappeared altogether, the EDG joining the EPP in May 1992, 
and the EUL joining the Socialists in January 1993. 
aThe index of transnationality (IT) is based on Rae's index of fractionalization. The formula for its 
calculation is 
IT = 1 - f.ISC2 
where SC is the respective share of MEPs from the various countries within a group and n is the number 
of countries involved. The greater the index value, the higher the degree of transnationality of a political 
group. It should be noted, however, that the maximum value (1) is a hypothetical one. Since the number 
of units is an integral part of the index, the given number of member states limits the degree of transna­
tionality that a group within the EP can come up to (Niedermayer 1983, 241). In the 1989-94 Commu­
nity of 12 member states, a political group with member country delegations of exactly equal size from 
each member state would have had the index value of .917. 
bThe index of fractionalization (IF) is computed in the same way as the transnationality index, with 
only the number of national party delegations replacing the number of member state delegations. 
CIA = index of agreement. 
EDA, and the European Right (ER)—have coalescing transnationality 
and fractionalization indices: none of these groups included more than 
one party delegation per member state. On the other hand, 6 of the 10 
national delegations to the Liberals' group have MEPs representing two 
or more parties, and the Italian MEPs in the Greens group represent 
four different parties.6 
Political groups with high degrees of transnationality and fractional-
ization—Socialists, EPP, Liberals, and the Rainbow Group—were ex­
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pected to be less cohesive than the more homogeneous groups. The IAs 
of the Socialists and the Rainbow Group are indeed low, with the former 
remaining clearly behind EPP, the other large group in the parliament. 
The low IA of the Rainbow Group comes as no surprise. The group's 
ideologically very diverse composition was not conducive to successful 
coordination of points of view. Furthermore, the Rainbow Group was 
largely a product of the EP's internal rules. Since, in the 1989-94 parlia­
ment, 23 members from one member state, 18 from two member states, 
and only 12 from three or more member states were needed to form a 
group, the national party delegations in question decided to join a group 
to increase their influence in the chamber and to gain the material bene­
fits that group status entails. The low IA of the EDA group is also as 
expected. It is interesting to note that Socialists and the EDA both have 
low levels of party cohesion, even though their members regard voting 
against group line as unacceptable (see above). 
The high cohesion of the EDG, the ER, EUL, and the Left Unity 
(LU) result from these groups' rather homogeneous character. The 
EDG, which dissolved in the spring of 1992, consisted almost exclu­
sively of British Conservatives; the influence of Jean-Marie Le Pen's 
Front National only increased within the ER after the departure of half 
of the German contingent within the group; and the two communist 
groups, EUL and LU, were dominated by Italian (PDS—Partito Demo­
cratico della Sinistra) and French (PCF—Parti Communiste Fran^ais) 
communists respectively. The relatively high cohesion of the Greens is a 
somewhat unexpected result, considering the differences in the ideologi­
cal profiles between the parties in the group. 
The EPP and the Liberals are two groups with high degrees of trans-
nationality and fractionalization that have been able to achieve intra­
group consensus during voting periods. These two party families have 
been at the heart of the European integration process from its very be­
ginning, and both party groups like to stress in their programs and elec­
toral manifestos their commitment to achieving closer economic and 
political union. The EPP has indeed attained rather similar levels of 
cohesion throughout the directly elected parliament. The Liberals' per­
formance has been more inconsistent: having been the second most co­
hesive party group in the 1979-84 EP, the group has been much more 
prone to internal conflict in the second and fourth parliaments (Attina 
1990). 
Thus, the findings do not confirm hypothesis 1: there is no direct 
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relationship between party group heterogeneity and party group cohe­
sion. Group cohesion cannot be analyzed by counting the number of 
national parties represented in a group. 
A comparison of EP parties with parliamentary parties in national 
legislatures shows that party groups in Strasbourg are still less cohesive 
than parties in selected western European legislatures. Interestingly, the 
two parties in the U.S. Congress are behind the EP parties in terms of 
cohesion. Since the American federal system of governance resembles 
the emerging European version of federation, it can be argued that the 
Congress provides a better benchmark for comparison than EU mem­
ber state legislatures (see Raunio 1996b). 
Distances between the Groups: 
EP Party System, 1989-1994 
Despite the inevitable differences in the ideological outlook of the na­
tional parties forming party groups in the parliament, the EP party sys­
tem is based on the traditional left-right dimension. While political 
groups overlap ideologically in some cases, the cohesion of the groups 
indicates that most national parties have had surprisingly little problem 
in finding a suitable political home in the Strasbourg Chamber. Various 
analyses on the left-right placement of parties—based on MEPs' own 
coalition preferences, voting behavior, national coalition behavior, sur­
veys of party activists, and expert statements—have produced similar 
enough results to enable us to locate the party groups from the left to 
right.7 
In the 1989-94 EP, parties of the left were, from the extreme to the 
center, LU, EUL, the Greens, and the Socialists. And the parties of 
the right were, from the center to the far right, the Liberals, the EPP, 
the EDG, EDA, and the ER. The Rainbow Group cannot be placed on 
the axis due to the group's internal diversity. Overlapping is particularly 
evident between the Liberals and the EPP, with the internal diversity of 
the ELDR making it virtually impossible to locate the group firmly on 
either side of the EPP. Rice's (1928) Index of Voting Likeness (IVL) is 
used to measure the degree of voting similarity between the political 
groups: 
IVL = 100 - (A - B), 
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where A = percentage of party group A voting pro on resolution 
X, B = percentage of party group B voting pro on resolution X, 
and (A — B) = absolute value of A — B. The IVL ranges between 0 
(maximum disagreement) and 100 (maximum voting similarity). Aver­
age IVLs are calculated by summing up the IVLs on individual votes 
and then dividing the sum by the number of votes (Hurwitz 1983, 
205). 
Hypothesis 2: The voting similarity of the EP political groups reflects their 
positions on the left-right dimension. 
The left-right division is not the only existing one in the Strasbourg 
assembly. Among other possible cleavages are northern versus southern 
member states, federalists versus anti-integrationists, and the agricul­
tural lobby versus those against high levels of CAP spending. However, 
it is expected that even though—or because—coalitions in the EP are 
often ad hoc and very issue specific, the left-right division is the domi­
nant one in the parliament. 
Hypothesis 3: The ideologically extremist groups do not form coalitions 
with other parties within the chamber. 
Writing right after the 1989 European elections, Bogdanor (1989, 
213) argued that the EP party system is characterized by "an immobile 
centre and two incompatible extremes," with the center parties (Social­
ists, EPP, Liberals) all committed to further integration and leaving no 
room for effective opposition. The ER was excluded from intraparlia­
mentary appointments, and the other groups refused to work with its 
far-right members. At the left end of the axis, LU is regarded as hostile 
to the current form of European integration, and that is also the 
position of the Greens. It is thus expected that these three groups 
will be ideologically distant both from each other and from the other 
groups. 
Table 9.2 proves the existence of a left-right dimension in the cham­
ber. The political groups on the left—the Socialists, EUL and LU, and 
the Greens—have higher IVLs among them than with the groups to the 
right of the center—EPP, Liberals, EDG, and EDA—and vice versa. 
The Socialists are shown to be in the center of the axis, almost equally 
far from six of the groups. The only group relatively close to them is 
EUL, and the two indeed merged in January 1993. LU is behaviorally 
closest to the Greens and the EUL but remains far apart from the 
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Table 9.2 
Political Groups' Voting Similarity in the 1989-1994 EP 
PES EPP ELDR EDG V EUL EDA ER LU RB 
PES — 66.0 65.0 65.3 56.7 81.8 63.1 47.6 65.7 65.8 
EPP 66.0 — 78.8 94.0 48.0 59.7 72.6 47.2 39.0 58.9 
ELDR 65.0 78.8 — 90.3 52.6 60.1 64.0 46.1 38.9 70.3 
EDG 65.3 94.0 90.3 — 43.4 55.2 72.7 43.3 32.8 55.2 
V 56.7 48.0 52.6 43.4 — 66.5 49.6 53.4 75.3 72.2 
EUL 81.8 59.7 60.1 55.2 66.5 — 46.1 44.9 74.3 64.4 
EDA 63.1 72.6 64.0 72.7 49.6 46.1 — 58.8 37.0 57.1 
ER 47.6 47.2 46.1 43.3 53.4 44.9 58.8 — 52.2 53.8 
LU 65.7 39.0 38.9 32.8 75.3 74.3 37.0 52.2 — 64.5 
RB 65.8 58.9 70.3 55.2 72.2 64.4 57.1 53.8 64.5 — 
Note: For key to party acronyms, see note to table 9.1. 
center-right groups. Voting behavior analysis also confirms the Greens' 
leftist position on the axis, but the group was nevertheless fairly isolated 
in the chamber. 
On the right there is a bloc of three groups with close voting proxim­
ity: the EPP, the Liberals, and the EDG. The EDG joined the EPP in 
May 1992, and the high degree of voting similarity between the two 
groups confirms the logic of their merger. The EDA stands clearly to 
the right of the EPP and the Liberals. The ER is behaviorally very dis­
tant from the other groups, and the group no longer exists in the fourth 
parliament. The Rainbow Group behaves as expected, its voting behav­
ior reflecting the group's diverse membership. However, it is interesting 
to note that of the five groups closest to the Rainbow Group, four are 
positioned left of center. 
Hypothesis 2 is thus confirmed: party groups' voting behavior re­
flects their corresponding positions on the left-right dimension. More­
over, comparing the findings with earlier research on the parliament, it 
appears that the EP party system is fairly stable. Even though the num­
ber of political groups has varied between 1979 and 1994, their positions 
on the left-right axis have remained the same. 
Hypothesis 3 is also confirmed: the three party groups expected not 
to form coalitions with other groups in the chamber—the ER, LU, and 
the Greens—were all ideologically distant from the political center. All 
three Martin reports, for example, were adopted by overwhelming ma­
jorities, with only the ER and LU groups opposing the resolutions.8 The 
Greens and the LU were also closest to each other in their voting behav­
ior, a finding reflecting both groups' ideological opposition to the inte­
gration process. 
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Conclusion 
The fourth European elections, held in June 1994, led to further changes 
in the EP party system, with three completely new political groups 
emerging: Europe of the Nations (EN), an anti-Maastricht group built 
around representatives of the French l'Autre Europe party and the Dan­
ish antimarketeers; Forza Europa (FE), a mononational group of MEPs 
from Berlusconi's Forza Italia; and European Radical Alliance (ERA), 
led by Bernard Tapie's Energie Radicale. The ER and Rainbow Group 
no longer exist in the chamber, with the former failing to work out an 
arrangement between the Italian National Alliance (NA) and the 
French Front National that would have enabled them to form a group. 
Now the far-right MEPs sit as nonattached members. FE and EDA 
joined forces in the summer of 1995, and the new group, Union for 
Europe (UPE), is the third largest group in the parliament. 
The larger groups continue to dominate the organization of the par­
liament. With cooperation between the Socialists and the EPP necessary 
for building required legislative majorities, the political center has an 
incentive to vote together on most issues falling under the various legis­
lative procedures. The political opposition in the chamber now mainly 
comes from members of LU, the Greens, EN, and the far-right non-
attached MEPs—that is, the predominantly antifederalist bloc. Thus, 
the situation remains much the same as after 1989: the fragmentation of 
opposition has only consolidated the dominance of the political center. 
Voting power analysis of the directly elected EP has shown that the in­
fluence of the smaller groups diminishes as majority rules become more 
stringent (Wiberg and Raunio 1997). The smaller groups are also more 
vulnerable to electoral misfortunes and to defections to rival groups 
during the legislative term (Bardi 1996). 
Political groups have reached much higher levels of unity than ini­
tially expected. There is, however, much variation between the groups. 
Voting behavior analysis has shown that party cohesion in the EP is not 
dependent on the transnationality and fractionalization of the groups. 
Either the national party delegations have little difficulty in accepting 
the group positions, or the weak links between MEPs and their national 
parties have left representatives room for maneuvering in the parlia­
ment. Voting data from the 1994-99 parliament shows that party cohe­
sion remains relatively high in the fourth parliament (Hix and Lord 
1997). 
The left-right dimension dominates in the EP, but on certain subject 
matters MEPs form coalitions on a cross-group basis. However, these 
204 - Raunio 
alignments are not durable; thus, they serve only to strengthen the value 
of the left-right axis in explaining the coalition behavior of the party 
groups. According to Collie (1984, 22-23), "There is some point at 
which coalitions are so highly issue-specific that policy dimensions have 
no value," and research that I undertook on votes on foreign policy 
matters in the EP produced similar results (Raunio 1997). Considering 
that the EP is still an institution in search of a clear constitutional man­
date, the behavior of MEPs remains largely conditioned by the majority 
requirements, an explanatory variable at least as significant as the sub­
ject matter itself. 
NOTES 
1. The internal organization of the EP parties remains an underresearched 
topic. For information on the internal structures and working methods of the 
political groups, see Hix and Lord (1997) and Raunio (1996b). 
2. For a list of the required parliamentary majorities, see Westlake 
(1994b, 261-63). 
3. In the case of the assent procedure, the Maastricht Treaty removed the 
absolute majority requirement except in two cases: accession of new member 
states to the EU and uniform procedure for European elections. Apart from 
these two cases, a simple majority of those voting is enough. 
4. Absenteeism not only gives the parliament a bad image in the eyes of 
the electorate but also is an indicator of group indiscipline, since groups often 
invest many resources in mobilizing their members to be present in the cham­
ber when votes are taken. See the data in Bay Brzinski (1995). 
5. For earlier research on MEPs' voting behavior, see Attina (1990, 
1992b), Bay Brzinski (1995), Hurwitz (1983, 1987), Quanjel and Wolters 
(1992), and Zellentin (1967). The work of Fulvio Attina is particularly worthy 
of attention. Attina measures the cohesion of the political groups in the first 
(1979-84) and second (1984-89) terms of the elected EP and investigates how 
issue areas and majority requirements affect group cohesion. The volume by 
Hix and Lord (1997) contains voting data from the early 1994-99 legislature. 
An alternative approach is to concentrate on certain significant "key" votes. 
Studies on the nomination of Jacques Santer as the commission president have 
revealed the way in which domestic party political considerations undermine 
the cohesion of EP parties. See Hix and Lord (1996) and Johansson (1997). 
6. These facts need to be treated with some caution. For example, the 
party affiliation of the French members within the Liberals group is somewhat 
unclear. Different sources—including party documents provided by the 
ELDR headquarters—report different party affiliations. 
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7. See, e.g., Attina (1992a, 1994), Niedermayer (1983), Quanjel and Wol­
ters (1992), and Rattinger (1982). 
8. The Martin reports, named after their rapporteur David Martin, stated 
the EP's position with regard to the Intergovernmental Conference on Politi­
cal Union of 1991 (Vanhoonacker 1992, 216-18). Similarly, in the vote on the 
Maastricht Treaty in April 1992, the opposition came from the Greens, the 
ER, LU, and the Rainbow Group (Mengelberg 1994). 
REFERENCES 
Andeweg, Rudy. 1995. "The Reshaping of National Party Systems." West Eu­
ropean Politics 18(3): 58-78. 
Arndt, Rudi. 1992. "The Political Groups in the European Parliament." In 
The European Community in the Historical Context of its Parliament, 
Proceedings of the 40th Anniversary Symposium, Strasbourg. Stras­
bourg: European Parliament. 
Attina, Fulvio. 1990. "The Voting Behavior of the European Parliament 
Members and the Problem of the Europarties." European Journal of Po­
litical Research 18: 557-79. 
. 1992a. "Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in the European 
Union." International Spectator 27(3): 67-86. 
. 1992b. II sistema politico della Comunita Europea. Milano: Giuffre. 
. 1994. "Political Parties, Federalism and the European Union." In 
Franz Knipping, ed., Federal Conceptions in EU Member States: Tradi­
tions and Perspectives. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Bardi, Luciano. 1989. II parlamento della Comunita Europea. Legittimita e ri-
forma. Bologna: II Mulino. 
. 1996. "Transnational Trends in European Parties and the 1994 Euro­
pean Elections of the European Parliament." Party Politics 2: 99-113. 
Bay Brzinski, Joanne. 1995. "Political Group Cohesion in the European Par­
liament, 1989-1994." In Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, eds., The 
State of the European Union. Vol. 3: Building a European Polity? Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Bogdanor, Vernon. 1989. "Direct Elections, Representative Democracy and 
European Integration." Electoral Studies 8: 205-16. 
Bowler, Shaun, and David Farrell. 1992. MEPs, Voters and Interest Groups: 
Representation at the European Level. Final Report to the Commission 
of the European Community, Directorate General for Information, 
Communication, Culture. 
. 1995. "The Organizing of the European Parliament: Committees, 
Specialization and Coordination." British Journal of Political Science 
25: 219-43. 
206 - Raunio 
Collie, Melissa P. 1984. "Voting Behavior in Legislatures." Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 9: 3-50. 
European Parliament. 1994. Rules of Procedure. 9th ed. Strasbourg: Euro­
pean Parliament. 
Fitzmaurice, John. 1975. The Party Groups in the European Parliament. Farn­
borough, UK: Saxon House. 
Hanley, David. 1994. "The European People's Party: Towards a New Party 
Form?" In David Hanley, ed., Christian Democracy in Europe: A Com­
parative Perspective. London: Pinter. 
Hix, Simon. 1995. "Parties at the European Level and the Legitimacy of EU 
Socio-Economic Policy." Journal of Common Market Studies 33: 527-54. 
Hix, Simon, and Christopher Lord. 1996. "The Making of a President: The 
European Parliament and the Confirmation of Jacques Santer as Presi­
dent of the Commission." Government and Opposition 31: 62-76. 
. 1997. Political Parties in the European Union. New York: Macmillan. 
Hrbek, Rudolf, and Carl-Christoph Schweitzer. 1989. "Die deutschen Europa-
Parlamentarier" Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B3/89: 3-18. 
Hurwitz, Leon. 1983. "Partisan Ideology or National Interest? An Analysis 
of the Members of the European Parliament." In Leon Hurwitz, ed., 
The Harmonization of European Public Policy: Regional Responses to 
Transnational Challenges. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
. 1987. The European Community and the Management of International 
Cooperation. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Jacobs, Francis, Richard Corbett, and Michael Shackleton. 1995. The Euro­
pean Parliament. 3rd ed. London: Cartermill. 
Johansson, Karl Magnus. 1997. "Party Group Dynamics in the European Par­
liament." In Ernst Kuper and Uwe Jun, eds., National Interest andlnte­
grative Politics in Transnational Assemblies. London: Frank Cass. 
Lord, Christopher. 1994. "Party Groups in the European Parliament: Re­
thinking the Role of Transnational Parties in the Democratization of 
the European Union " Paper to the European Consortium of Political 
Research, April, Madrid Joint Sessions. 
Mengelberg, Sabine. 1994. "The European Parliament and the Ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty." In Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoon­
acker, eds., The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates 
and Future Implications. Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration. 
Niedermayer, Oskar. 1983. Europdische Parteien? Zur grenziiberschreitenden 
Interaktion politischer Parteien im Rahmen der Europaischen Gemein­
schaft. Frankfurt: Campus. 
Official Journal of the European Communities, C-series, 1989-94. 
Palmer, Michael. 1981. The European Parliament: What It Is, What It Does, 
How It Works. New York: Pergamon Press. 
The Challenge of Diversity • 207 
Quanjel, Marcel, and Menno Wolters. 1992. "Het Europees Parlement." In 
Menno Wolters, ed., Democratie en beleid in de Europese Gemeeschap. 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Samson H. D. Tjeenk Willink. 
Rattinger, Hans. 1982. "Abstimmimgsmacht, politische Distanzen und Ab­
stimmungskoalitionen zwischen den Fraktionen im Europaischen Par-
lament." Zeitschrift fur Soziologie 11: 133-49. 
Raunio, Tapio. 1996a. "Parliamentary Questions in the European Parliament: 
Representation, Information, and Control." Journal of Legislative Stud­
ies 2: 356-82. 
. 1996b. Party Group Behavior in the European Parliament: An Analysis 
of Transnational Political Groups in the 1989-94 Parliament. Acta Uni­
versitatis Tamperensis, Vammalan Kirjapaino, Vammala, Finland. 
-. 1997. "Cleavages and Alignments in the European Parliament: MEP 
Voting Behavior, 1989-1994." In David S. Bell and Christopher Lord, 
eds., Transnational Party Politics in the European Union. Aldershot, 
UK: Dartmouth. 
Rice, S. A. 1928. Quantitative Methods in Politics. New York: Knopf. 
Vallance, Elizabeth, and Elizabeth Davies. 1986. Women of Europe: Women 
MEPs and Equality Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vanhoonacker, Sophie. 1992. "The European Parliament and European Polit­
ical Union." In Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, eds., The Inter­
governmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New 
Policies and International Identity of the European Community. Dor­
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Weiler, J. H. H. 1991. "Problems of Legitimacy in Post 1992 Europe." Aus­
senwirtschaft 46: 411-37. 
Westlake, Martin. 1994a. Britain's Emerging Euro-Elite? The British in the 
Directly-Elected European Parliament, 1979-1992. Aldershot, UK: 
Dartmouth. 
. 1994b. A Modem Guide to the European Parliament. London: Pinter. 
Wiberg, Matti, and Tapio Raunio. 1997. "Controlling Voting Outcomes: Vot­
ing Power in the European Parliament, 1979-1995" In Ernst Kuper and 
Uwe Jun, eds., National Interest and Integrative Politics in Transnational 
Assemblies. London: Frank Cass. 
Zellentin, Gerda. 1967. "Form and Function of the Opposition in the Euro­
pean Communities." Government and Opposition 2: 416-35. 
10 
Parties and Party Discipline 
within the European 
Parliament: A Norms-Based 
Approach 
SHAU N BOWLER AND 
DAVI D M. FARRELL 
The European Parliament as a Legislature 
T: building and maintenance of coherent voting blocs is a central component of any legislative body. Within Euro­
pean parliaments, the need to maintain an executive in office provides a 
powerful incentive for members to act in unison, either for or against 
the executive. The central control of electoral resources such as money, 
party label, or list of members provides yet other incentives to keep 
members in line. Within the European Parliament (EP), however, most 
of these kinds of resources are not available to members of the central 
party groups. Nomination and election are in the hands of national bod­
ies, while the absence of an executive means a lack of one of the major 
incentives to collective action. This suggests that party discipline is 
hardly likely to be prevalent, particularly within an institution that is 
often plagued by absenteeism (Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton 1995). 
Yet party discipline within the EP is an interesting area for examina­
tion, for there are reasons to expect that the EP as an institution can 
benefit from having its members act in concert. Formal work, for ex­
ample, has recently shown that the EP does have the potential to exer­
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cise influence within the European Union (EU), provided that its 
members can act in concert. If its members can act in this way, then the 
EP can be seen as a "conditional agenda setter" (Tsebelis 1994) with the 
scope to impose its views on EU policy settlements. And in other areas 
too, such as the writing of reports, the codecision procedure, and the 
ratification of the commission president, there is scope for MEPs to 
exercise an influence on EU affairs (e.g., Hix and Lord 1997). While it 
is clear that even when we take these factors into account, no one is 
likely to claim the EP as one of the more powerful legislatures in the 
world, it is also clear that the EU is far from being the simple "talking 
shop" of the 1970s. And once space is opened up through constitutional 
developments such as the codecision procedure, there are obvious in­
centives for rival groups to mobilize in order to stamp their point of 
view on the eventual outcome. 
This makes the EP an especially intriguing legislative institution 
from the point of view of party discipline and coherence. On the one 
hand, it would seem that the EP can exercise influence, provided that it 
can muster the will to use it. On the other hand, the usual range of 
incentives and inducements open to party leaders to help shape action 
en bloc seem to be lacking—although this is not to say that the party 
group leaders are not trying to exercise control over the EP as a 
legislature. 
Even a rather cursory look at the institution shows that there are 
attempts to place parties at the center of the EP. We can show this quite 
readily by comparing the internal structure of the EP with national-
level legislatures. Table 10.1 provides a number of points of comparison 
between the EP and member states' parliaments (not including the three 
new members), relating to committee structure, role of party groups, 
and so on—areas that have been identified by previous studies as im­
portant components of legislative structure. On the basis of these com­
parisons, we can make three broad points in increasing order of 
importance. 
First, we should note that the fairly elaborate development of the 
internal organization of the EP—which is entirely under the control of 
the MEPs themselves—helps to underscore the general point that this 
institution is more than just a "talking shop." There would seem to be 
little need for MEPs to go to such lengths to develop such a detailed 
structure if they were not interested in building a serious legislative 
institution. 
Second, of all the possible parliamentary forms upon which to model 
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Table 10.1 
Comparison of the Internal Structure of the EP with National Legislatures of 
the 12 EU Member States in the Early 1990s 
EP B Dk F G GR I It L N P S UK 
Presiding body 
Collective body/bureau X X X X X X X X 
Party groups 
represented X X X X X X 
Decides order of 
business X X X X X X 
Committees 
No quorum needed for 
meeting X X X X X 
Quorum needed for 
vote X X X X X X 
Chair formally chosen 
by committee X X X X X X X X X X 
Appointment via party 
group X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Party-proportional 
membership X X X X X X X X 
Party-proporptional 
chairs X X X X X X ? 
No restriction on 
multiple membership X X X X X X X X X 
Sources: EP Rules of Procedure, 5th ed., 1989; Str0m (1984); Jacobs et al. (1995); Par­
liaments of the World, IPU, 1986. 
Note: EP = European Parliament; B = Belgium; Dk = Denmark; F = France; G = Ger­
many; GR = Greece; I = Ireland; It = Italy; L = Luxembourg; N = Netherlands; P = 
Portugal; S = Spain; UK = United Kingdom. 
itself, the EP looks more like Germany's Bundestag than like any other 
national parliament. If we simply add up the points of comparison, we 
note that the EP has more elements in common with the Bundestag 
than with any other legislature. Of particular note is the quite sharp 
distinction between the way the EP is structured internally and the inter­
nal organization of majoritarian legislatures in the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, and France. The EP, in fact, seems to bear the hallmarks of an 
institution attempting to build consensus among its members, a point 
we return to below. 
Third, and most important, we note that the internal structure of 
the EP gives a great deal of prominence to party groups. The internal 
operation of the EP is controlled by the Conference of Presidents, in 
which party groups are represented. Furthermore, committee places 
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and presidencies (chairs) are given over to party groups in proportion 
to their strength in the chamber. Given that the formal structures of 
the EP provide such scope for party group influence, this presents an 
opportunity for members of party groups to exercise considerable in­
fluence, providing they act as a group. 
Thus, the party groups can be seen as central players within the EP 
and its organization (Bardi 1996; Bowler and Farrell 1995; Jacobs et al. 
1995). Yet part of their influence depends upon the willingness of mem­
bers to submit to their constraints. One way in which we can begin to 
tap this willingness is by examining the attitudes of MEPs themselves. 
How members view the acceptability (or otherwise) of going against the 
group in some form or other will tell us about some of the limits to that 
influence. In other words, one avenue of approach to the issue of party 
discipline within the EP is to look at norms among MEPs. (The other 
avenue of approach—examining roll call votes—is dealt with by Raunio 
in chap. 9 of this volume.) 
Norms within Legislatures 
"Norms" or "folkways" within legislatures were one of the earliest sub­
jects of interest for behavioral studies of legislatures. They are regarded 
as important aspects of the social organization within parliaments. 
While there may exist written rules of procedure, much of the way in 
which the chamber operates may be determined by unwritten rules. This 
fact has shaped much of the literature on legislatures, especially in a 
comparative setting. According to Williams (1968, 204), "Norms are 
rules of conduct. . . standards by reference to which behavior is judged 
and approved or disapproved." Norms govern the behavior of individu­
als either as a principle of individual action or as a property of a social 
system (Coleman 1990; Turner 1989). Norms provide some degree of 
predictability about an individual's likely behavior, both to outside ob­
servers and to others engaged in social activities with that individual. 
The closely related idea of a "role" is defined as "a set of expectations 
held for a position by its incumbent and by the incumbents of related 
positions" (Kornberg 1967, 8). 
The common element in these ideas of norms and roles is that, to 
the extent that either are present, they imply that members of a given 
social setting have stable and convergent expectations regarding the be­
havior of other actors. More technical game-theoretic treatments of 
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norms suggest that they may be regarded as predictable behavior (evolu­
tionary stable strategies) in a repeated setting (e.g., Ordeshook 1992, 
181). A less technical study of the U.S. Senate notes: "For norms or 
folkways to be operative, the expectations about behavior must be fairly 
widely shared" (Rohde, Ornstein, and Peabody 1985, 149). Searing's 
work (1991, 1241) addresses this question by stating that "informal rules 
are critical to an organization, for it is not possible to operate without 
them. Every organization, therefore develops and maintains a structure 
of informal rules. And the principal components of these informal rules 
are norms and roles." 
To some extent, the U.S. literature tends to see norms as important 
from the point of view of the individual member rather than the institu­
tion (system) as a whole (Fenno 1973,1978; Foley 1980; Matthews 1973; 
Rohde et al. 1985; Sinclair 1989). But there is a body of literature that 
also argues that norms are important from the point of view of the over­
all institution. Norms may "contribute to the transformation of an as­
sortment of individual politicians into members of an institution 
collectively engaging in a set of common activities" (Loewenberg and 
Mans 1988, 155). 
The focus on what norms do for individual legislators (rather than 
the system) allows the literature as a whole to provide an explanation 
for changes in norms. This is an important step, since norms are, by 
definition, self-replicating, so that some motor for change is required. 
An emphasis upon the utility of norms to individual members does pro­
vide some mechanism that may account for change; if prevailing norms 
frustrate the wishes of enough individual members, then norms will 
change (e.g., Sinclair 1989, 106). But the emphasis, perhaps inevitably, 
in discussions of norms is upon stability of opinions, a stability that 
repetition, communication, and enforcement play key roles in main­
taining (Asher 1973). 
What kind of norms does the literature suggest as relevant within the 
EP? Loewenberg and Mans (1988, 162) make a useful distinction be­
tween two types of norms. First, there are "norms of parliamentary 
courtesy," which show an "underlying collegial sensitivity of MPs to­
wards each other" These courtesy norms are likely to be the easiest to 
spot. As Loewenberg and Mans note (1988, 166), norms "in parliamen­
tary bodies may help members with differing political beliefs and values 
to work with one another." At a basic minimum, therefore, we should 
expect to see simple norms of courtesy. 
A second and more telling set of norms relates to the way in which 
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decisions are made. In particular, given their importance within the 
chamber, we can examine attitudes toward party groups and party 
group discipline. Loewenberg and Mans (1988, 162) refer to these as 
norms of "parliamentary party loyalty": "Since parties are so important 
in organizing the work of these legislatures and because parties often 
make demands on the loyalties of members, it is not surprising that a set 
of norm perceptions defines the acceptable and unacceptable behavior 
linking parliamentarians and their parties." 
But some features of the EP give us reasons to suspect that some 
norms may not develop at all among MEPs. Recalling Asher's identifi­
cation of repetition and communication as important means for estab­
lishing norms, we may note that the unusual degree of diversity within 
the EP would seem to work against communicating norms, while the 
relatively high turnover rate might suggest that repetition is under­
mined. The EP is a relatively young institution with a diverse member­
ship and a very high turnover rate: for instance, around 46% of the 
1989-94 MEPs were elected in 1989. The MEPs speak 12 official lan­
guages, come from 15 different states, and are currently formed into 
eight different ideological groups.1 
This suggests yet another reason for studying the EP from the point 
of view of norm-based behavior, namely that while the literature to date 
indicates that norms are vital to the study of legislative institutions, a 
few simple facts about the EP suggest that it provides very poor soil in 
which norm-based behavior may root itself. Given this, and despite the 
importance accorded to norms for the functioning of legislatures in gen­
eral, perhaps we shall see no unwritten norms within the EP. 
But how do we recognize a norm when we see one? In this chapter 
we follow the standard practice within legislative studies of tapping 
opinions and expectations of the legislators themselves. But what kind 
of distribution is consistent with the presence of norms? While flat or 
U-shaped distributions of opinion may be read as a sign of no norms 
being present and a point distribution (unanimity) as a strong sign of 
commonly held beliefs and expectations, there is clearly scope for an 
infinite range of distributions within these end points. 
The lack of a clear yardstick is somewhat puzzling given the very 
considerable attention that social science as a whole has paid to norm-
based behavior. One question here is whether norms may be said to be 
linear with respect to individual opinions: whether they can be said to 
apply to a greater or lesser degree. The discussion in the first part of 
this chapter followed the general social science treatment of norms in 
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suggesting that they are not linear or continuous. Norms are more usu­
ally said to operate like a switch: they are either present or absent, on 
or off, and thus are more properly characterized as nonlinear and dis­
continuous with regard to opinion. 
While it may well be in keeping with general conceptions of norms 
to discuss them as holding true only after a certain proportion of the 
membership goes along with them, this simply begs the question of how 
we establish that proportion. Clearly, a majority will have to go along: 
the idea of thresholds strongly suggests that we look to supermajorities, 
but there is virtually no indication of what that figure should be. 
Of course, there is no reason to believe that all norms require the 
same supermajority. Some norms may be easily toppled, but others may 
be more robust. We are left, then, with no pat answer to the question of 
how we recognize a norm when we see one. Our answer here is some­
what arbitrary but, we suggest, at least workable. The requirement 
of a supermajority would suggest that something over two-thirds agree­
ment would provide a necessary but not sufficient condition for the pres­
ence of norms, two-thirds being a standard benchmark for voting 
supermajorities. 
Norms within the EP 
The empirical basis for this study consists of data gathered from a mail 
survey of MEPs conducted between May and December 1990.2 Our sur­
vey asked a series of 12 questions relating to the acceptability (or other­
wise) of various types of behavior that previous research on legislatures 
had identified as being especially relevant to parliamentary behavior 
(Loewenberg and Mans 1988). Our expectation here is that if norms are 
present, we should see fairly widespread agreement among MEPs that 
certain types of behavior are generally held to be acceptable (or unac­
ceptable). The MEPs were given a 5-point scale, ranging from most ac­
ceptable (scored 1) to most unacceptable (scored 5). They were asked to 
indicate their position on the scale. 
Following Loewenberg and Mans's approach, we factor-analyzed the 
responses to these questions, and results from this analysis are displayed 
in table 10.2. The factor analysis highlights two dimensions of opinion. 
On the first dimension, the party loyalty norms load highly; on the sec­
ond dimension, we see the more general courtesy, or civilized behavior, 
norms. This analysis thus suggests that the two sets of norms are distinct 
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Table 10.2 
Different Levels of Norms among MEPs: Factor Analysis 
Factor II 
Factor I Civilized Behavior 
Party Norms Norms 
Publicly speak against the position of .75 -.05 
group leaders 
Vote against the group line .74 -.13 
Introduce a motion without party group .55 -.09 
advice 
Be absent from Parliament to prevent .49 .39 
a quorum 
In principle reject unanimous decisions .36 .42 
Publicly question a colleague's sincerity .34 .40 
Give priority to special interests .31 .29 
Disclose to the press a decision taken .31 .05 
in private 
Never take a position -0.09 .77 
Always stay away from conflict -0.09 .76 
Always give priority to one's own electoral -.11 .59 
considerations 
Demand that decisions be reached by -.14 -.08 
simple majority 
% of total variance explained 18.197 17.890 
Source: 1990 Survey of MEPs. 
from each other, as indeed was also the case in Loewenberg and Mans's 
(1988) study of three national legislatures. And in fact, these results are 
remarkably similar to those obtained in Loewenberg and Mans's origi­
nal work. Attitudes toward party seem to be a distinct set of attitudes 
among MEPs. 
More revealing, however, are some of the simple descriptive data that 
underlie the factor analysis. Table 10.3 shows the basic trends, combin­
ing the "acceptable" and "most acceptable" categories and the "unac­
ceptable" and "most unacceptable" categories respectively. Numbers of 
responses vary slightly, but generally there are around 180 valid re­
sponses for each question. On several of the issues we see a high degree 
of consensus. For example, over 80% of respondents think it unaccept­
able to disclose to the press decisions taken in private, to never take a 
position and to "always stay away from conflict." Slightly lower, but still 
notable, trends are seen on other issues: for instance, whether to publicly 
question a colleague's sincerity, whether to give priority to one's own 
electoral considerations, and whether in principle to reject unanimous 
decisions. On a number of these issues, then, we do see the kind of 
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Table 10.3 
Acceptability of Forms of Behavior in the EP 
Unacceptable or Acceptable or 
Most Unacceptable Most Acceptable 
Form of Behavior (%) (%) 
Never take a position 89 0 
Always stay away from conflict 83 6 
Publicly question a colleague's sincerity 68 17 
Always give priority to one's own electoral 75 17 
considerations 
Disclose to the press a decision taken in 84 13 
private 
Be absent from Parliament to prevent a 62 21 
quorum 
In principle reject unanimous decisions 78 9 
Demand that decisions be reached by 18 57 
simple majority 
Give priority to special interests 46 37 
Publicly speak against the position of 56 30 
group leaders 
Introduce a motion without party group 36 55 
advice 
Vote against the group line 38 53 
Source: 1990 Survey of MEPs. 
clustering of opinion that would suggest that MEPs share a broadly 
similar set of expectations concerning what constitutes appropriate be­
havior. For the most part, these represent the norms of courtesy referred 
to above. 
But this is not the whole story by any means. Opinion is far more 
divided upon the remaining issues, more important for our current con­
cerns. While it is comparatively easy for MEPs to appear to be above 
the fray by denying baser motives of reelection, a much tougher test 
comes in deciding attitudes toward party groups. Opinion is divided on 
the issue of whether to give priority to special interests. And on the 
three questions concerning party group discipline (introducing motions 
without group advice, voting against the group, and speaking against 
group leaders), opinion is much more noticeably divided, so much so 
that we may reasonably argue that there is no consensus of expecta-
tions—there are no norms operating here. 
Even so, some subgroups of stable opinions may exist within the 
overall body of MEPs. Following the lead of earlier literature, it seems 
sensible to propose that those MEPs who have been in the chamber 
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Table 10.4 
Opinions of MEPs toward Party Discipline 
Publicly Speak 
Introduce a Out against the Vote against 
Motion without Position of the Group 
Group Advice Group Leaders Line 
Constant -2 .  2 -0.2 6 1.41 
Rainbow -2 .01  * -0 .  7 1.52 
(1.1) (1.2) (1.1) 
Communists 1.1 -0.5 5 1.59** 
(.81) (-89) (.8) 
European People's 0.13 0.08 0.09 
Party (.25) (.28) (.25) 
Liberals, Democrats, -0 .61* * -0.1 3 -0.27 
Reformists (-29) (.31) (.29) 
Socialists 0.06 -0.26 0.44** 
(.21) (.23) (.21) 
Entry 0.05** 0.039+ 0.013 
(.02) (.02) (.02) 
Role 0.06 0.09** 0.04 
(.04) (.05) (.04) 
Past position -0.1 0 0.50* 0.45* 
(.25) (•27) (.24) 
Leader 0.02 0.14 -0.23 
(.23) (.25) (.22) 
R2 0.11 .07 0.09 
N 173 169 169 
Source: 1990 survey of MEPs. 
**p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.10 (one-tailed). 
longer should exhibit somewhat different views than those who have 
only recently arrived. We might also suggest that those MEPs in leader­
ship positions within the chamber (i.e., those who are committee presi­
dents or vice presidents or who occupy a similar position within the 
party groups) should be more in favor of group discipline than ordinary 
members. Finally, we ought to note that MEPs do have a variety of roles 
from which they may choose by virtue of the unusual position of the 
EP as an international institution. MEPs can see themselves as repre­
senting ordinary citizens and/or as representing a party—either a na-
tional-level party or a European party group (for more details on the 
range of choices, see Bowler and Farrell 1993). It seems reasonable to 
suppose that those MEPs who already see themselves as being represen­
tatives of their party groups should be especially keen to toe the group 
line. Table 10.4 presents some simple regression analysis aimed at 
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flushing out some of the possibilities for the existence of distinct sub­
groups of opinion within the chamber. 
These regressions take as their dependent variable the 5-point re­
sponse to the three questions most connected to the issue of party disci­
pline (where 5 = most unacceptable). Independent variables examine the 
main party groups (Communists, European People's Party, Liberals, 
Democrats and Reformists, Socialist Group, Rainbow Group), and the 
variable "leader" is a dummy (scored 1 if the respondent occupies a 
leadership position as defined in the text above and 0 otherwise). "Past 
position" is similarly scored, where 1 indicates that the respondent held 
such a position in a previous EP. "Entry" is simply the year of entry of 
each MEP into the EP (the larger the number, the more recent the en­
trant). The EP has been directly elected since 1979, and it existed as an 
appointed assembly well before then. It may be objected that this is 
hardly a long time in terms of parliamentary traditions, but it is a period 
of time that roughly corresponds to that of the Bundestag at the point 
at which Loewenberg (1967) wrote his seminal study of that institution. 
"Role" is the variable that taps whether respondents see themselves as 
a representative of a party group (a 5-point scale, ranging from 5 = 
applicable to 1 = not applicable). 
A number of comments are in order here. First, the leftist groups are 
generally more willing to go along with the party group than other 
groups, a finding broadly in keeping with the roll call analysis of Attina 
(1990; though see the discussion in chap. 9 of this volume). Second, past 
experience of the chamber does have an impact in helping to reinforce 
a predisposition toward group loyalty, but only insofar as the MEP has 
previous experience of a leadership position. Coupled with this seems 
to be the arrival of a relatively new group of rank-and-file entrants who 
are predisposed toward group loyalty. But these admittedly slender 
findings can, perhaps, be understood better in a broader interpretation 
of norms within the EP. 
Discipline, Unwritten Rules, and 
Written Rules within the EP 
In an international body such as the EP, is it unusual to find evidence 
of nationally based differences of opinion? Perhaps not. Indeed, it may 
be more surprising to find that, given the levels of diversity and turnover 
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in membership noted above, there are in fact a set of expectations on 
broad patterns of parliamentary behavior shared by the majority of 
MEPs. But on what we might term the tougher issues of party group 
loyalty, there do not appear to be any shared set of expectations. We 
should also remind ourselves that any agreement we do see is drawn in 
fairly broad brushstrokes. On this basis it seems sensible to conclude 
that norms are not as well developed in the EP as in other legislatures. 
This raises the question: Is it worth making this point? 
Our answer, not surprisingly, is yes—for two reasons. First, it means 
that in the EP we have found an example of a legislature that seems to 
function without norms, which should lead to some modification of the 
view of the central importance of norms to parliaments. Whether the 
EP functions well or poorly in consequence is not the issue (though the 
evidence does appear to suggest the former; see Bowler and Farrell 
1995; chap. 9 of this volume); the fact that it functions at all is surprising 
in light of past literature on this topic. Moreover, we have no real way 
of knowing how norms will develop in the EP, which leads us to draw 
what are, perhaps, more surprising conclusions. While the standard ac­
count of the development of norms stresses the socialization of new 
members by the old, it is also entirely possible that existing "norms" 
may be upset by new subgroups. The diversity of opinion within the EP 
seems so great that it is far from obvious which opinion could conceiv­
ably form the basis for a future widely adopted norm. The subgroups 
we have found, then, may or may not be the focal point for the develop­
ment of norms; we have no way of knowing which of them will be. 
We suggest that this kind of inconclusiveness with regard to informal 
rules of behavior helps prompt the development of formal rules and 
ones that help provide a consensual approach to decision making more 
generally. In other words, the comparisons found in table 10.1 can, per­
haps, be understood as being far from accidental. The very diversity of 
the EP might mean that norm-based behavior is not likely to be a ten­
able basis for organization. This, in turn, means that formal rules of 
procedure make a great deal of sense for a body that has so many lin­
guistic and cultural diversities and hence a greater likelihood of misun­
derstanding of informal rules. Lijphart (1984) notes that one of the 
consequences of diversity at a societal level is a reliance upon written 
rules. We might further note that such diversity also presents problems 
in terms of the evolution of norms. The types of communication that 
precede norms are clearly hampered by multiple languages. Indeed, as 
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EP Rule 102 makes plain, there are likely to be occasions in which "there 
are discrepancies between different language versions" even of written 
documents (European Parliament, 1994). In such cases the president of 
the EP can decide which version is regarded as being adopted. 
As the EP has grown in both size and importance, so have the rules. 
The 1972 edition listed 54 rules, whereas the 1994 edition listed 166. Of 
course, many of these new rules reflect changes in the European Com-
munity's (and now Union's) legal and constitutional structure and the 
development of the EP's powers, such as over council legislation. These 
rules may also be used as a negotiating tool with the other institutions 
as the EP seeks to interpret institutional change to its best advantage. 
Nevertheless, a major part of the rules of procedure consists of attempts 
to govern the behavior of members within the chamber. For example, 
Rule 127.3 limits speaking time on points of order to one minute (down 
from five minutes under Rule 31.5 in the 1973 version). As a more telling 
indication of what can happen when norms of behavior may not agree, 
we note rule No. I l l  , which allows the president to suspend the sitting 
of the parliament in the face of disturbances obstructing the business of 
the House. 
In general it may be that the conditions within the EP do not provide 
a fertile ground for social governance by unwritten rules. Rather, the EP 
is a setting where written rules supplant, even if they do not replace, 
unwritten ones. Thus, our general conclusion is that the experience of 
the EP suggests that we should moderate the importance that we accord 
norms within a legislative setting and, in turn, attach greater importance 
to written rules of procedure. Clearly, this conclusion could be proven 
wrong in future research; indeed, within this chapter we have provided 
the means for us to be proven wrong. It has been our intention to estab­
lish a rough benchmark against which to check the future development 
of norms within the EP. To the extent that norms do develop, we have 
presented evidence that relates to an early (and hence crucial) period. 
If we are wrong in emphasizing the role of formal rules, the future will 
see the eventual disappearance of subgroups of opinion and of disagree­
ments; consensus will be more tightly drawn. If, however, we are correct, 
we should see continued instability and only vague agreements among 
MEPs on the issues we have discussed. Any future convergence of ex­
pectations among members is likely to reflect the effects of amendments 
to the written procedures. It is the institutional structure that will pro­
vide the grounds for stable expectations and hence norms. 
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NOTES 
This is a substantially revised version of a paper that first appeared as a Euro­
pean Policy Research Unit [EPRU] Paper 4/93, Manchester University, De­
partment of Government. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of 
the Commission of the European Union (DGX). 
1. At the time in which the survey used in this chapter was conducted, 
there were nine EU member countries and 518 MEPs, arranged into 11 
different party groups. 
2. This had a response rate of 37.6%. The national breakdowns are: 
France, 17 (out of 81 MEPs); Germany, 31/81; Belgium, 10/24; Denmark, 
6/16; Portugal, 9/24; Spain, 16/60; Netherlands, 13/25; Luxembourg, 2/6; 
United Kingdom, 60/81; Ireland, 10/15; Italy, 15/81; Greece, 6/24. For more 
details, see Bowler and Farrell (1993). 
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PART V

Parliamentary Discipline and 
Coalition Governments 

Not only are party cohesion and discipline important for the smooth 
running of parliaments, they are also crucial to the formation and sur­
vival of governments. Given that in this volume we have for the most 
part been dealing with parliamentary systems, where governments (usu­
ally coalitions) are formed by and from the ranks of the parliament 
and (with few exceptions, such as Switzerland) are reliant on the con­
tinuing support of Parliament to remain in office, it makes sense to 
round off this book with some consideration of the relationship be­
tween parliamentary discipline and coalition government stability. 
The two chapters in this part deal with this subject from different 
perspectives. Carol Mershon's chapter starts with a puzzle: how to ex­
plain prereform Italy, characterized as it was by the coexistence of in­
stability with stability. The former refers to the regular changes of 
government, the latter to the fact of low turnover in government and 
in particular the unremitting dominance of the Christian Democrats. 
Through a detailed analysis of the Italian case, buttressed with mate­
rial on four other cases (Netherlands, Finland, Norway, and Ireland), 
Mershon points to the particular spatial (the nature of the party sys­
tem and the policy space of voter preferences) and institutional (e.g., 
preferential voting, secret voting in Parliament, the committee struc­
ture) conditions that, she argues, affect the costs associated with mak­
ing and breaking coalition governments. In a nutshell, she suggests 
that the prereform Italian coalitions "were not easily sustained, since 
breakups caused little damage." 
While Mershon is concerned with assessing the institutional and 
party/voter-environmental factors influencing coalition stability, 
Paul Mitchell focuses more on the internal dynamics of debate within 
coalitions. In contrast to Laver and Shepsle's "portfolio allocation ap­
proach," which is based on office-seeking motivations (see chap. 2), 
Mitchell's analysis is centered on the policy pursuits of the different 
actors at two principal levels. First, at the interparty level, Mitchell 
stresses the importance of the coalition policy document forged be­
tween the parties on forming government, arguing that, particularly 
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with regard to the smaller party(ies), this operates as a "treaty" to pro­
tect their interests—as, for instance, in the case of those ministries con­
trolled by the larger party where there is a danger of policies not being 
implemented quite as the junior partner might want. Second, at the in­
traparty level, Mitchell's study of the Irish case shows that the ability 
of a party to bargain over policy with other parties can be significantly 
constrained by the nature of intraparty politics; this suggests that "in­
traparty politics play a greater role during the life of a government 
than assumed by traditional coalition theories that concentrate on a 
period [i.e., during government formation] when unitary behavior is 
most imperative." 
11 
The Costs of Coalition: A Five-
Nation Comparison 
CAROL MERSHON 
T: record of Italian governments displays a pattern that is deeply perplexing. As figure 11.1 shows, from 1946 to 1992, 
cabinets in Italy both changed and remained the same. The Christian 
Democratic Party (DC) always held governing power. But almost no 
government stayed in office for more than a few years, and many gov­
ernments collapsed after only a few months. Italy exhibited the lowest 
turnover rate of any parliamentary democracy (Str0tn 1990b, 128),1 yet 
it had, except for the defunct French Fourth Republic, the most short-
lived governments (King et aL 1990, 867). 
How can instability coexist with stability in this way? How can gov­
ernments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alterna­
tion? These are the key questions that animate this chapter's comparison 
of Italy and four other parliamentary democracies. 
In pursuing these questions, I am guided by the game-theoretic liter­
ature on coalitional behavior. My question about (in)stability reflects a 
central result in this literature: that voting games in multidimensional 
policy space under simple majority rule are subject to endless cycles 
among alternative decisions (e.g., McKelvey 1976, 1979; Schofield 
1983). I move beyond extant research to deal with an anomaly that to 
date has not been adequately explored: the combination of decisional 
stability and instability found in Italy. 
My question about costs, too, is rooted in the body of work on coali­
tions. An implicit but widely shared assumption of coalition theorists 
is that government coalitions, once installed, can withstand much inter­
nal tension because their members want to avoid the costs associated 
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Figure 11.1 The Composition of Italian Governments, 1946-1992. Governments are ordered chronologi­
cally on the horizontal axis, with tick marks representing separate cabinets. For simplicity, this figure al­
ways depicts the Socialists (PSI) and Social Democrats (PSDI) as separate parties, even though they were 
united before 1947 and between 1966 and 1969. 
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with destroying a coalition. As figure 11.1 suggests, however, such costs 
seem to be very limited in Italy. Why? 
The answer offered here is that politicians' purposive actions can 
reduce the costs of coalition. I argue that the costs of making, breaking, 
and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the 
array of parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial con­
ditions structure politicians' opportunities and attempts to lower costs. 
Under some conditions, as I demonstrate, coalitions are cheap and poli­
ticians can easily make coalitions even cheaper. 
Such conditions, I contend, are not unique to Italy. Figure 11.2 illus­
trates the broad correlation between cabinet duration and alternation in 
office.2 Governments in Italy, the French Fourth Republic, Israel, and 
Portugal (and to a degree Finland and Belgium) last a short while and 
are subject to limited turnover. Ireland, Iceland, and Norway (and to 
some extent Canada and the United Kingdom) evince long duration 
and high alternation. In Sweden, Spain, Denmark, and the Netherlands, 
cabinets attain an average duration resembling that of the second group 
but experience fairly restricted turnover. Italy is an extreme case, then, 
and looks anomalous in light of coalition theories. But it is not sui gene­
ris. Italy's extremity points up that a key, common assumption among 
coalition analysts—the notion that coalitions are costly to build and 
break—fails to hold under certain conditions. I reason that in Italy (and 
France, Israel, Portugal, Finland, and Belgium), institutional and spa­
tial conditions curb the costs of coalition and induce politicians to try 
to lower costs further. 
The first section of the chapter assesses the treatment of costs in 
the literature on coalition bargaining. The second section distinguishes 
several kinds of costs attached to coalitions and advances an explana­
tion for variations in those costs across party systems. The third part 
evaluates the explanation in light of evidence from five parliamentary 
democracies. The conclusion sketches additional applications of the 
argument. 
Costs in Coalition Theories 
In what follows, I outline predictions from four schools of research on 
coalitions. I discuss how each school portrays the costs of coalition and 
how each prediction fits the record of coalition governments (for a ful­
ler treatment, see Mershon 1996, n.d.). The extensive cross-national 
Figure 11.2 Cabinet Duration and Alternation in Office in 15 Parliamentary Democracies 
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aggregate evidence already accumulated enables me to devote intensive 
attention to Italy, an outlier in study after study. 
Consider first the seminal prediction in the office-driven school. 
Riker (1962) predicts the formation of minimal-winning coalitions, 
which would lose their parliamentary majority if any member party 
were to withdraw from them. This model highlights the costs of enlarg­
ing coalitions and operationalizes costs in foregone cabinet portfolios. 
The minimal-winning prediction is usually inaccurate in Italy (e.g., 
Franklin and Mackie 1984, 686). Almost all of Italy's governments have 
been either minority cabinets (less than winning) or surplus coalitions 
(more than minimal). Only one Italian government—of 52 total from 
1946 to 1992—unambiguously qualifies as a minimal-winning coalition, 
and even that cabinet contradicts the logic of minimal-winning theory.3 
Next consider institution-free models of multidimensional policy 
space, which predict that a party will control policy and will govern if it 
occupies the core—a policy position that cannot be overturned, given 
the overall configuration of actors' sizes and positions (e.g., McKelvey 
and Schofield 1987; Schofield 1986, 1993). For a core party, allies repre­
sent no gain in policy, which the core party already dictates. A core 
party is thus likely to form a minority cabinet. This school expects last­
ing governments only in the presence of a stable core (Schofield, Grof­
man, and Feld 1988,206). In Italy, the two-dimensional array of parties' 
sizes and positions qualifies the DC as a core party from 1946 to 1992 
(Laver and Schofield 1990, 136, drawing on Budge, Robertson, and 
Hearl 1987). The prediction is thus that the DC should always govern, 
and this has indeed been true. But it would be inexplicable within this 
reasoning if two fragmented systems with strong core parties (such as 
Italy and the Netherlands) featured governments with substantially 
different average durations, which is in fact the case. Why do Italian 
governments display shorter tenures (King et al. 1990, 867) and yet also 
lower turnover in office (Strom 1990b, 128) than do Dutch govern­
ments? If the balance of costs and benefits brings core parties to form 
minority governments, why are minority cabinets much less common in 
the Netherlands than in Italy? 
A third school examines how institutions restrict the alternatives 
open to politicians and thus shape the coalitions they build. Laver and 
Shepsle (1990, 1994, 1996; chap. 2 of this volume) have developed the 
most ambitious institution-focused model to date. They isolate two 
types of portfolio allocations—one held by a single party, termed a 
"strong" party, and the other constituting a coalition—that cannot be 
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overturned. Where a strong party exists, it should govern and is able to 
govern even as a one-party minority. A "dimension-by-dimension me­
dian" (DDM) cabinet always exists for any set of dimensions, but it 
cannot beat all alternative cabinets. Whether the DDM cabinet is staffed 
by one (strong) party or by a coalition, it is expected to govern—even 
as a minority—as long as it is majority-preferred to all alternative cabi­
nets. This model generally fares well in identifying incumbents (Laver 
and Shepsle 1996, chaps. 8-9). Nonetheless, since postwar Italy lacks a 
majority-preferred DDM and lacks a strong party, Laver and Shepsle 
predict "that government formation would be chaotic [in Italy], as 
any cabinet that might form can be beaten by some other" (personal 
communication). This model accounts for the short duration of Italian 
governments but does not illuminate the constant presence of the Chris­
tian Democrats in power. If "cabinet cycles" obtain in Italy (Laver and 
Shepsle, personal communication), how can the DC keep entering office 
over and over again? 
A large body of research on coalition composition and durability 
incorporates ideas from the game-theoretic literature but does not use 
formal deductive methodology (e.g., Dodd 1976; Lijphart 1984). One 
prominent contributor is Str0m (1990b), who contends that minority 
cabinets tend to result where policy benefits from governing are low 
(where strong parliamentary committees give opposition parties the op­
portunity to influence policy) and, above all, where electoral costs are 
high (where elections are competitive and decisive, so that incumbency 
carries a penalty and bargaining power hinges on electoral verdicts). 
Strom (1990b, 151) expects minorities to govern with "intermediate fre­
quency" in Italy, since electoral costs and policy benefits from governing 
there are low. As he documents, however, the percentage of minority 
cabinets in Italy stands "well above the mean" for the 15 countries he 
examines (132). Why? Str0m cites electoral costs, even though they are 
relatively low. Just how Italian politicians weigh the costs of coalition in 
bargaining over governments remains unresolved. 
In sum, anomalies appear when predictions from extant coalition 
theories are matched against Italian governments. A recurring theme 
in discussion of the anomalies is how actors think about the costs 
and benefits of sealing, keeping, and severing alliances. The alternative 
framework I propose addresses what reduces the costs of coalition and 
shows how governments can undergo constant change and yet remain 
much the same. 
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Explaining Cost Reduction in Coalition Bargaining 
The essence of my argument is that political actors do not just see 
prices; they attempt to set prices attached to coalition bargaining. I as­
sume that actors pursue gains, that they project beyond the short term, 
and that, if they anticipate losses, they do what they can to cut their 
losses. Actors will not always avoid what they identify as a costly course 
of action but will at times follow that course and try to lower its costs. I 
assume that actors face uncertainty and imperfect information. I further 
assume that all actors care to some extent about office, policy, and votes 
(Stem 1990a). The relative priority given these objectives varies, but no 
political actor is utterly unmoved by the prospect of holding office, just 
as none is completely oblivious to policy or electoral concerns. 
The game of bargaining over governments is also a game of maneu­
vering around or modifying the costs that coalitions entail. Political 
actors incur costs when they build a coalition. They must award ministe­
rial portfolios to other parties, as stressed in office-driven theory. They 
must compromise on policy in order to come up with the government's 
program, as spatial theory highlights for parties outside the core. Part­
ners in a new cabinet look ahead to the electoral benefits or burdens 
that governing will bring (Str0m 1990b). As Axelrod (1970) reasons, 
potential allies spend time and effort in negotiating to overcome differ­
ences. Similarly, it is costly to sustain a coalition. And governing parties 
meet costs when a coalition breaks apart. Actors engaged in a coalition 
risk or incur office, policy, electoral, and bargaining costs at distinct 
stages in the coalition's history. 
I contend that political actors do not simply encounter prices but 
attempt to manage them. When building a coalition, actors can increase 
the number of portfolios; they can limit public information about policy 
compromises so as to ease agreement inside the coalition; and they can 
delegitimate opponents so as to escape voters' blame. To diminish bar­
gaining costs, actors can devise rules to guide bargaining. Once in­
stalled, a coalition is sustained at relatively low cost if allies expand 
spoils and emphasize special-interest legislation. Along similar lines, 
actors can take steps to curtail risks when a coalition breaks up. 
Throughout the history of a coalition, actors can lower their costs by 
choosing to manipulate various levers, such as office benefits, informa­
tion, and rules. 
Is this sort of choice equally open and viable in all political settings? 
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I think not. Building on existing themes in the literature (Laver and 
Schofield 1990; Strom 1990a), I argue that the sizes and positions of 
parties in policy space, the distribution of voters' preferences in policy 
space, and political institutions (in particular, electoral laws, legislative 
rules, and links between the executive and the legislature) affect how 
costly it is to break, make, and maintain coalitions and affect which 
cost-reduction strategies actors are likely to see as available and poten­
tially successful. Spatial and institutional conditions are hypothesized to 
influence costs directly. For instance, when a government falls, a party 
occupying the core of policy space faces a relatively low risk of not 
regaining office. The anonymity afforded legislators by a secret ballot 
means that they can sabotage a government with little fear of losing 
office, antagonizing voters, or complicating bargaining. Spatial and in­
stitutional conditions are also hypothesized to influence costs indirectly 
by structuring the opportunities that actors have to try to lower costs. 
To illustrate: office benefits are more easily increased if a core party 
controls government for some length of time. 
Procedures and Measures in Empirical Analysis 
Before evaluating this argument, three issues of research design 
and methods deserve discussion. The first involves my two-pronged ap­
proach: I undertake broad cross-national comparisons and in-depth 
study of Italy. A multicountry comparison has the obvious advantage 
of providing substantial variation in configurations of parties and voters 
in policy space. I examine three multipolar party systems, two with 
strong core parties (Italy and the Netherlands) and one without (Fin­
land), and two unipolar systems (Ireland and Norway).4 These nations 
also present a wide range of electoral and parliamentary institutions, as 
shown below, and they evince differing patterns of cabinet duration and 
alternation in office, as seen in figure 11.2. All the same, cross-national 
empirical research on coalitions necessarily relies on fairly large leaps 
in inference about the causal mechanisms linking one aggregate indica­
tor to another. 
Detailed examination of Italy redresses this problem. Intensive study 
of one country allows the analyst to move closer to decision-making 
processes, to sift more finely through varied sources of evidence, and 
to pursue traces of politicians' reasoning and calculations in ways not 
possible when the field of observation spans many national settings. Be­
cause the Italian record poses a stiff challenge to coalition theories, and 
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because scientific understanding advances by assimilating anomalies 
into a general framework, the empirical analysis of coalition politics in 
this case holds special theoretical promise. Yet it is worth repeating that 
Italy is extreme but not unique. Several other countries feature short-
lived cabinets and limited alternation. I posit that some of the spatial 
and institutional conditions present in Italy also appear in those cases 
(and are rare or absent in still other cases, such as Ireland) and that 
some strategies deployed in Italy should appear in those cases as well. 
Second, to perform the analysis, I need to measure when govern­
ments begin and end. I count a new government with each change of 
party composition, parliamentary election, by-election altering a gov-
ernment's majority or minority status, change of prime minister, and 
accepted cabinet resignation.5 
Finally, a test of the argument offered here plainly entails measuring 
the costs of coalition. To tap office costs, I count the number of minis­
ters and junior ministers per party in a cabinet and take averages across 
cabinets; figure the percentage share of all ministerial and junior minis­
terial posts that each party controls; and compute the ratio between that 
share and the party's share of all seats in the lower house held by a 
government. I measure electoral costs and benefits as mean changes in 
parties' shares of the vote between pairs of consecutive elections to the 
lower house of Parliament. Policy payoffs are indexed by participation 
in government, which gives parties special instruments of influence on 
policy. To calculate the office, electoral, and policy costs of coalition 
breakups, I code information on which parties were (and were not) re­
sponsible for cabinet collapses.6 Bargaining costs are captured by the 
time elapsed between the fall of one government and the rise of its suc­
cessor. Further details on these measures appear in the analysis that 
follows. 
Assessing the Costs of Coalition 
in Five Parliamentary Systems 
I compare costs and strategies across parties, across time, and across 
countries to weigh the impact of spatial and institutional conditions on 
the costs of assembling and dismantling coalitions. If spatial conditions 
matter, then different parties within one country should incur different 
costs and should diverge in their pursuit of cost-reduction strategies. If 
spatial or institutional conditions change over time, then the costs and 
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strategies characteristic of different parties should also undergo some 
shift. I expect to find distinctions in the record of costs incurred and 
strategies implemented across different kinds of party systems—for ex­
ample, those with and without core parties. Distinctions should also 
appear across countries with contrasting electoral and parliamentary 
institutions. Given this logic, a useful first step in the empirical investi­
gation is to sketch political institutions and configurations of policy 
space in the five countries under study. 
Electoral and Parliamentary Institutions 
Whereas Ireland uses a single transferable vote (STV) version 
of proportional representation (PR), the other four countries feature 
some form of party-list PR. Beyond this basic categorization, the elec­
toral systems differ in the degree of proportionality attained (given dis­
trict size, method of seat allocation, and so forth) and the role of 
personalized voting. As table 11.1 displays, proportionality in transla­
tions of vote shares into seat shares reaches moderate levels in Ireland 
and Norway, high levels in Finland and Italy, and very high levels in the 
Netherlands. Each of the four list PR systems includes some provision 
for intraparty preference voting (Katz 1986, 88-91). Under STV, to the 
extent that a party puts up more candidates than it can elect, "Voters 
determine which particular candidates will be elected by determining 
the order in which they reach the quota" (91). As exhibited in table 11.1, 
preference voting has a weak impact on candidates' election (or defeat) 
in the Netherlands and Norway and a stronger impact in Finland, Ire­
land, and Italy. Indeed, it is often claimed that preference voting has 
encouraged factionalism in Italian parties (e.g., Zuckerman 1979). 
Amid mounting criticism of this effect, a 1991 referendum restricted 
preference voting in Italy. Table 11.1 registers this change and the dates 
of other major electoral reforms.7 
According to a constitutional lawyer who has twice headed the pre-
mier's office in Italy, "No government is weaker in parliament than the 
Italian" (quoted in Spotts and Wieser 1986, 111). Taken together, three 
rules summarized in table 11.1 bear out this judgment, at least for the 
five countries examined here. In particular, governments are obliged to 
pass votes of investiture only in Italy and Ireland. Government control 
of the parliament's plenary agenda is most tenuous in Italy and the 
Netherlands. Only in the Italian chamber (until 1988) were secret ballots 
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Table 11.1 
Institutional and Spatial Conditions in Five Democracies 
Finland Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway 
Electoral Institutions 
Proportionality3 High Moderate High Very high Moderate 
Preference voting5 3 2 3 1 1 
Dates of major changesc None None 1948, 1956 1956 1953 
1991, 1993 1989 
Parliamentary Institutions 
Vote of investiture No Yes Yes No No 
Govt. control over 3 7 2 1 4 
agendad 
Secret ballot Possible No Required2 No Possible 
Committee strength1" 3 1 4 2 5 
Policy Space 
Number of dimensions 1 2 2 2 1 
Effective N parties 5.2 2.7 3.4 4.6 3.2 
Core party KP median No core DC strong KVP/CDA DNA median 
core strong 1945-61 
core 
Sources: Doring (1995); Herman (1976); Katz (1986); Laver and Schofield (1990); Lijphart (1994); Noh-
len (1984); Schofield (1993); Strom (1990b). 
Note: KP = Center Party; DC = Christian Democrats; KVP = Catholic People's Party; CDA = Chris­
tian Democratic Appeal; DNA = Norwegian Labor Party. 
a
 Values on the least-squares index of ^proportionality (Lijphart 1994) are coded as follows: under 2 = 
very high proportionality; from 2 to 3 = high proportionality; from 3 to 6 = moderate. 
bIndex combines cross-national rankings on the minimum number of voters needed to modify the party-
defined order of candidates (Katz 1986, 94) and the percentage of intraparty defeats attributable to the 
preference vote (98). A value of 3 identifies the highest impact on candidates' election/defeat. 
A 20% criterion marks "major" changes in district size, thresholds, and assembly size. 
dIndex shows increasing control over plenary agenda. I reserve Doring's (1995) coding, so that a value 
of 7 means that the government alone sets the agenda. 
eChamber final votes until 1988. 
fStr0m's (1990b) index shows increasing strength, with the greatest strength assigned a score of 5. 
required on final votes. Out of these five democracies, only Italy lands 
on the side of legislative assertiveness for all three rules. 
Two additional sets of parliamentary institutions deserve mention, 
committees and supramajoritarian rules. Among these countries, as 
table 11.1 reports, the parliamentary committee system is least devel­
oped in Ireland and most developed and decentralized in Norway. A 
strong committee structure such as that found in Norway and Italy 
affords the opposition influence over policy, as already observed, and 
thus favors minority government (Strom 1990b). Supramajoritarian 
rules instead give politicians incentives to seek surplus coalitions. Such 
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rules are used often in Finland, where since 1919 a two-thirds majority 
has been required for approval of the budget, bills affecting taxation for 
over one year, price freezes, and income policies (Arter 1987, 43). From 
1919 to 1992, furthermore, one-third of Finnish MPs could postpone 
most kinds of legislation for one to two years (Anckar 1992, 161-62; 
Nousiainen 1994, 97-98). 
It should also be noted that directly elected presidents are found in 
Finland and Ireland. Finnish presidents are more powerful than their 
Irish counterparts but less powerful than presidents in the French Fifth 
Republic (Arter 1987; Lijphart 1984). Most analysts agree that Finland 
is at bottom a parliamentary system, unlike the Fifth Republic (e.g., 
Anckar 1992). 
Parties and Voters in Policy Space 
The effective number of parties and the number of dimensions 
in policy space establish Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands as "multi­
polar" party systems and Ireland and Norway as "unipolar" systems 
(Laver and Schofield 1990; Schofield 1993).8 As the labels suggest, par­
ties in multipolar systems face competitors in several directions, whereas 
a single party attracts and orients competition in a unipolar system. 
Multipolar systems have a relatively high effective number of parties 
and are often two-dimensional, as is the case in Italy and the Nether­
lands. Where the effective number of parties is quite high, as in Finland, 
multipolar competition can occur along one dimension. As noted above 
and in table 11.1, the DC in Italy qualified as a core party from 1946 to 
1992. The 1976 elections made the Socialist Party (PSI) pivotal, for it 
became the essential ally in any DC-based coalition capable of com­
manding a majority while excluding the Communist Party (Pasquino 
1981). The DCs sizable losses in the 1992 elections ended its core status 
as a party, and in 1992 the PSI ceased to be pivotal as well. In the Neth­
erlands the Catholic People's Party (KVP) or its heir, the Christian 
Democratic Appeal (CDA, which joined the KVP and two Protestant 
parties in 1977), has occupied the core of the policy space for most of 
the postwar period. The Center Party (KP, called the Agrarian Union 
before 1965) has usually been the median party in Finland. In the Nor­
wegian unipolar system, which is organized by the left-right dimen­
sion, the Labor Party (A) was located at the median from 1945 to 1961 
and again in 1973 and 1977. Otherwise, a center-right party has taken 
the median position (Str0m and Leipart 1993, 879). The Irish two­
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dimensional system has lacked a core party and thus Fianna Fail one-
party governments have alternated with Fine Gael-Labour coalitions 
(but see Mair 1987). 
The property of voters' preferences of greatest interest here is the 
degree to which a national electorate is segmented or subdivided into 
blocs, with each bloc steadfastly backing "its" party and securely insu­
lated from the appeals of rival parties. Parties that can draw on such 
reservoirs of support should meet relatively low electoral costs of coali­
tion. A salient theme in studies of Dutch and Italian electoral politics 
is that religious and class identities have indeed segmented the electorate 
and anchored particular sets of voters to particular parties (e.g., 
Daalder 1966; Galli and Prandi 1970). Thus, a well-known typology of 
Italian electoral behavior (Parisi and Pasquino 1979) distinguishes a 
vote of belonging, affirming an enduring allegiance to either the Catho­
lic or the Communist subculture; a vote of opinion, motivated by a 
broad interest in policy; and a vote of exchange, awarded in return for 
patronage goods. Mannheimer and Sani (1987, 93) use a 1985 survey to 
estimate that subcultural voters constitute 60% of the DC electorate and 
67% of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) electorate. It is accepted wis­
dom that socioeconomic change has recently eroded the subcultural 
vote and augmented the opinion vote in Italy.9 
The same measures tapping subcultural belonging have not been 
used outside Italy. Yet scholars agree that in the Netherlands the Catho­
lic, Protestant, Socialist, and Liberal "pillars," which stood firm in the 
1950s, "have now largely crumbled" under the impact of secularization, 
economic growth, and mass education (Daalder 1987, 223). Class iden­
tities long attached Finnish industrial workers to the Social Democrats 
and Communists, and farmers to the Agrarians. In the 1950s industrial 
and rural working-class Norwegians solidly voted for the Labor Party, 
while middle-class voters supported center-right parties. By the 1970s, 
however, the class lines that had once partitioned the Finnish and Nor­
wegian electorates began to blur (Arter 1987; Borre 1984). Electoral pol­
itics in Ireland has traditionally been viewed as a candidate-focused 
"politics without social bases" (Whyte 1974). Although a vigorous de­
bate has recently developed to challenge that characterization (Laver 
1992; Mair 1987, 1992; Marsh 1992), scholars concur that Ireland joins 
the prevailing European trend "toward the fragmentation and 'particu­
larization' of political preferences" (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 1995, 
226). 
In an ongoing large-scale research project (Mershon n.d.), I examine 
1946-1992 
1976-92 
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Table 11.2 
Office Payoffs (Ministers and Undersecretaries) by Type of Government, Italy 
One-Party All Coalitions Coalitions 
Governments Coalitions Including PSI Including PSI 
Office Payoffs fN = 16) (N = 36) fN = 22) (N = 11) 
Mean Share of All Cabinet Posts Held by D  O 
Ministers 94.4% 61.0% 55.3% 52.1% 
Undersecretaries 99.1% 64.2% 55.3% 54.2% 
Mean Ratios15 of Cabinet Post Shares 
to Government Seat Shares0 for DC 
Ministers .94 .82 .83 .78 
Undersecretaries .99 .85 .83 .81 
Mean No. of Posts Held by DC 
Ministers 20 15 15 15 
Undersecretaries 36 29 29 33 
Sources: Calculations based on portfolio data in Petracca (1980) and Corriere della Sera, 
various issues, and on seat data in Mershon (1996, Appendix B). 
Note: DC = Christian Democrats; PSI = Socialist Party. 
aEntries are mean percentage shares for all governments of the type listed at the head of 
each column. 
bEntries are mean ratios for all governments of the type listed at the head of each column. 
cGovernment seat share is defined as a party's percentage share of the seats in the chamber 
that are controlled by all governing parties. 
how spatial and institutional conditions shape the costs of coalition in 
the countries chosen here and in five others as well. The more limited 
analysis in this paper starts with office costs. 
The Office Costs of Building Coalitions and Strategies for 
Managing Office Costs 
Table 11.2 measures the office price that Italy's DC paid when 
it governed with coalition partners. The top two rows of the table report 
the mean percentage of portfolios held by the DC in different types of 
governments from 1946 to 1992. As the first column indicates, in one-
party governments the DC occasionally awarded a few posts to inde­
pendent experts. In coalitions (shown in the second column), the DC 
sacrificed this near-monopoly on cabinet slots. The third and fourth col­
umns disclose that the DC relinquished a greater percentage of offices 
when the coalition embraced the medium-sized Socialist Party (PSI), 
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and still more in the 1976-92 coalitions, when the PSI made a pivotal 
contribution to the government's majority. 
The middle two rows of table 11.2 establish that the division of port­
folios between the DC and its allies illustrates a well-known finding from 
cross-national portfolio studies: the largest party in a coalition obtains 
a share of senior cabinet posts that is somewhat smaller than that party's 
share of the parliamentary seats controlled by the government (Browne 
and Franklin 1973; Laver and Schofield 1990). The disadvantage that 
the DC met is only slightly less pronounced for shares of undersecretary 
posts. Intervals of one-party government thus compensated the DC for 
disproportionate shares of portfolios surrendered to allies at other times 
(see Marradi 1982). 
The last two rows of table 11.2 spotlight average numbers of offices. 
In these terms, the DC spent less to construct coalitions than might be 
expected—and much less than pure office-driven theory would predict. 
On average, it cost Italy's core party nothing in number of cabinet slots 
to include the PSI in a coalition, even when the PSI was pivotal. Indeed, 
DC undersecretaries were more numerous in coalitions containing a piv­
otal PSI than in other types of coalitions. 
As figure 11.3 reveals, portfolio inflation was the cost-management 
strategy producing these outcomes. Offices—especially undersecre-
taryships—were like balloons, inflated when needs arose. The number of 
allies changed, but the number of Christian Democrats in government 
remained remarkably stable. 
The distinction between ministers and undersecretaries is worth 
weighing. As coalitions expanded from two parties to three, four, and 
then five parties, the number of ministers was pumped up steadily, but 
the number of undersecretaries rather unevenly. The largest boosts in 
undersecretaries separated two- from three-party coalitions and four-
from five-party coalitions. Why? None of Italy's two-party coalitions 
included the PSI and all five-party coalitions governed when the PSI 
was pivotal. The competition for office between the DC and the PSI led 
to mutual accommodation and thus drove portfolio inflation. 
As figure 11.4 plots, the steepest increases in ministerial and under­
secretary posts occurred when the PSI reentered government after a so­
journ in the opposition (the early 1960s, when center-left coalitions were 
prepared and implemented, and the early 1980s, when five-party coali­
tions were instituted).10 Those hikes enabled the DC to protect or even 
add to its portfolios. Why have undersecretaryships been more elastic 
balloons than senior cabinet posts? Undersecretaries are arguably less 
Figure 11.3 Ministers and Undersecretaries in the Italian Governments, 1946-1992 
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visible to voters and imply a less permanent, more flexible commitment 
of resources. Moreover, in a long-standing "informal division of minis­
terial labour, [an undersecretary] is left free to distribute the patronage 
of the ministry in his constituency" (Allum 1973, 90). The secret ballot 
made it "necessary . .  . to satisfy the greatest possible number of depu­
ties," and coalition builders used undersecretary posts as a convenient 
currency with which to gratify deputies and buy loyalty (Dogan 1984, 
164). Since parliamentary rules require that members of government— 
both ministers and undersecretaries—step down from parliamentary 
committees (Nocifero and Valdini 1992), an increase in cabinet posts 
has the advantage of enlarging access to committee positions for parlia­
mentarians without cabinet responsibilities. Given committee powers in 
the Italian parliament, members of multiple committees are well 
equipped to pipe narrow benefits to clienteles. 
The evidence is persuasive that spatial and institutional conditions 
have influenced the office costs of building Italian coalitions. Do analo­
gous effects appear in the Netherlands, the case that most closely re­
sembles Italy in spatial terms? Figure 11.5A, like figure 11.4, displays 
average numbers of officeholders in the core party and in the entire gov­
ernment for coalitions joining different numbers of allies.11 Figure 11.5 A 
cannot fully duplicate the comparisons in figure 11.4, for the Dutch 
Christian Democrats (KVP/CDA) never governed alone between 1946 
and 1987. Figure 11.5A does show that as coalitions stretched from two 
to five parties, governmental offices overall tended to rise and the num­
ber of KVP/CDA ministers and junior ministers declined only slightly. 
Yet glances at the vertical scales of figures 11.4 and 11.5A are enough 
to establish that Dutch portfolio inflation is a pale copy of the Italian 
phenomenon. Why? Since Dutch governments do not confront votes of 
investiture, and since secret ballots are the exception rather than the 
rule in the Dutch parliament, the builders of Dutch cabinets lack the 
incentives that their Italian counterparts face to use office as "glue" to 
bind assertive parliamentarians to governments. Disincentives operate 
as well. Additions of cabinet posts can trigger resignations in Dutch 
parliamentary parties, for in the Netherlands (and Norway) ministers 
cannot hold seats in Parliament; the same is true for Dutch junior minis­
ters since 1948 (Andeweg and Bakema 1994; Gladdish 1991; Strom 
1994). Finally, unlike the Italian DC, the KVP/CDA lost its core status a 
few times—while retaining office—before the early 1990s (see note 11). 
The Finnish Agrarian/Center Party (KP) briefly lost core status in 
the early postwar period, unlike the Italian DC and the Dutch KVP/ 
Figure 11.5 Office Payoffs, by Party Number of Parties in Dutch (A) and Finnish (B) Government, 1946-87
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CDA.12 Moreover, the KP has not achieved the uninterrupted incum­
bency that sets apart the DC and the KVP/CDA. Although "green-red" 
coalitions dominated by the KP and Social Democrats (SSDP) have 
been rather common, the SSDP has occasionally governed without the 
KP (even in 1972, when the KP was the median party; Laver and Scho­
field 1990, 117). Seven nonpartisan cabinets have formed, which in part 
testifies to the prerogatives of the Finnish president (Arter 1987). 
Given these contrasts between Italy and the Netherlands, on the one 
hand, and Finland, on the other, some differences in outcomes should 
emerge. And some do. Figure 11.5B depicts only those governments be­
tween 1946 and 1987 that contained the KP.13 It reveals that the number 
of ministers and junior ministers remained roughly the same, on aver­
age, across the KP's one-party governments and coalitions—even for 
coalitions spanningfive parties. The Center Party paid an obvious office 
price for assembling coalitions. All the same, it responded to institu­
tional incentives to coalesce: the Finnish parliament follows suprama­
joritarian rules. Those rules also raise obstacles to manipulating offices, 
for "a change in law is required to establish a new ministry" in Finland 
(Nousiainen 1994, 89). 
Consider now Norway and Ireland, which introduce greater spatial 
variations. The comparisons just executed for Finland—of the KP's 
one-party governments and coalitions—cannot be duplicated for Nor­
way, for the Labor Party (A) has always governed alone. In Ireland, 
Fianna Fail (FF) maintained a commitment to one-party government 
throughout the four decades studied here.14 Labor was Norway's median 
party from 1945 to 1961 and in 1973 and 1977, as observed above. If 
the Irish party system were unidimensional, FF would generally qualify 
as the median party on the left-right spectrum, but Irish politics is prob­
ably best characterized as two-dimensional. 
As figures 11.6A and 11.6B chart, the one-party governments staffed 
by Labor and FF between 1946 and 1987 looked rather similar. Further­
more, for both Norway and Ireland, fluctuations in the totals of min­
isterial and junior ministerial posts did not prevent parties from 
relinquishing offices as governments embraced additional allies. In par­
ticular, even though the Center Party (SP) was Norway's median party 
in 1981 and 1985, both the smallish SP and in Ireland the bigger Fine 
Gael (FG) paid an office price when they governed with more parties 
rather than fewer. The similarities should not be overstressed: when the 
SP governed as a median party, it received weighted shares of cabinet 
posts (the well-known measures reported for Italy in table 11.2) that 
Figure 11.6 Office Payoffs, by Number of Parties in Norwegian (A) and Irish (B) Governments, 
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were relatively high—relative to the SP's weighted shares at other times 
and relative to Fine Gael. Yet despite spatial differences, similarities do 
exist. They may be explained by institutional constraints. In Norway, 
as stated earlier, ministerial office is incompatible with membership in 
Parliament. The 1937 Irish constitution specifies that the number of 
ministers should range from 7 to 15 (Farrell 1994). 
Given Italy's spatial and institutional conditions, Italian politicians 
have been able and willing to manipulate offices so as to offset the office 
costs of building coalitions. An echo of this pattern appears in the Neth­
erlands, where the party system roughly resembles the Italian. That the 
echo is faint becomes comprehensible when institutions and finer spatial 
distinctions are taken into account. Beyond those two fairly similar 
cases, as differences in party systems become more pronounced—that 
is, as attention shifts to Finland and then to Norway and Ireland—more 
pronounced differences in outcomes emerge. Variations in institutions 
also contribute to variations in the office costs incurred in the construc­
tion of governments. Analysis of the costs of dismantling governments 
begins with Italy 
The Office and Policy Costs of Ending Governments 
and Strategies for Managing Costs 
As typically measured, the office price of ending governments 
is negligible in Italy. As table 11.3 exhibits, all five governing parties in 
Italy received a weighted share of senior cabinet posts that stayed 
roughly steady, on average, whether or not they had overthrown the 
preceding government. The same statement holds true for weighted 
shares of undersecretary posts. Not a single pair of ratios in the top two 
rows of table 11.3 is significantly different. This finding runs counter to 
conventional assumptions about the office costs of breakups. It becomes 
even more remarkable when average numbers are considered. The total 
of cabinet posts varied little according to whether or not the Social 
Democrats (PSDI), Republicans (PRI), and Liberals (PLI) had pulled 
down the prior government. But an Italian government's ministers and 
undersecretaries, on average, were significantly more numerous after the 
Socialists had sabotaged, as compared to sustained, its predecessor. 
With the PSFs percentage of offices unaltered and the number of all 
offices up, more Socialists filled cabinet slots. Office benefits went to the 
PSI after it had eliminated a government, above all when the PSI was 
pivotal. Along similar lines, but only from 1976 to 1992, a constant 
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Table 11.3 
Office Payoffs, by Party and Responsibility for Government Collapse, Italy 1946-1992 
Was Party Responsible for Collapse at Time t — 1? 
15c ¥si PSDI RRI TLI 
Offices at t No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Ratios of Cabinet Post Shares to Government Seat 
Shares3 (Means) 
Party ministers O89 083 L30 L23 L84 1.84 3.00 2.25 2.09 2.12 
Party undersecretaries 0.91 0.89 1.39 1.34 1.70 1.53 1.85 1.55 2.16 1.85 
N cabinets (21) (30) (3) (18) (21) (8) (17) (8) (12) (4) 
No. of Posts (Means) 
All ministers 23 24 21 25** 24 23 23 25 24 24 
All undersecretaries 42 45 35 49** 44 44 41 48 44 44 
N cabinets (21) (30) (20) (31) (33) (18) (35) (16) (43) (8) 
No. of Posts 1976-92 (Means) 
All ministers 26 30* NA 27 27 30 28 26 27 28 
All undersecretaries 53 62* NA 56 55 61 55 56 55 59 
N cabinets (5) ( I  D (0) (16) (14) (2) (ID (5) (11) (3) 
Sources: Calculations based on portfolio data in Petracca (1980) and Corriere della Sera, various 
issues, seat data in Mershon (1996, Appendix B), and coding of information in Keesing's Contem­
porary Archives. 
Notes: DC = Christian Democrats; PSI = Socialist Party; PSDI = Social Democrats; PRI = Republi­
cans; PLI = Liberals. 
Means are computed, party by party, for two groups of cabinets: those whose predecessor was a 
cabinet the party helped to topple, and those whose predecessor fell for reasons other than the party's 
withdrawal of support. T-tests compare the means of the two groups (i.e., for each party, entries in the 
"yes " and "no" columns). Numbers of applicable cabinets are in parentheses. NA = not applicable. 
"Government seat share = a party's share of the chamber seats controlled by all governing parties. 
*p < .05 (separate-variances f-test); **p < .001 (separate-variances /-test). 
share and a significantly larger total of offices meant that more Chris­
tian Democrats attained cabinet positions after the DC had toppled a 
government. In this sense, too, the competition between the DC and 
PSI drove portfolio inflation. 
Membership in government offers parties special opportunities to 
influence policy. Hence, table 11.4 examines policy benefits at risk by 
designating the governing status of parties behind government falls in 
Italy. It shows the policy payoffs by reporting how often parties that 
bring about one government's demise participate in the next government 
and produce a change in incumbent parties.15 Table 11.4A illustrates the 
DCs unerring ability to regain office after an exit. Yet three similari­
ties across Italian governing parties are noteworthy. First, as detailed 
in table 11.4B, they tended to overturn cabinets only when assigned 
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Table 11.4 
Party Status in Government and Coalition Formula, and Government 
Composition, at and after Government Collapses, by Party Responsible for 
Government Collapse, Italy, 1946-1992 
Party Responsible for 
Collapse At Time t ­ 1? 
DC PSI PSDI PRI PLI 
All Collapses 1946-92 
A. Status in government at / — 1 
In government 100.0% 62.5% 66.7% 25.0% 25.0% 
Out of government 0 37.5 33.3 75.0 75.0 
B. Status in coalition formula at t ­ 1 
In coalition formula 100.0% 84.4% 100.0% 87.5% 87.5% 
Out of coalition formula 0 15.6 0 12.5 12.5 
C. Status in government at t 
In government 100.0% 59.4% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 
Out of government 0 40.6 50.0 50.0 50.0 
D. Government composition at t 
Parties change after fall 58.1% 68.8% 72.2% 56.3% 50.0% 
Parties same as before fall 41.9 31.2 27.8 44.7 50.0 
N collapses (31) (32) (18) (16) (8) 
Coalition Collapses i 1946-92 
E. Status in government at t 
In government 100.0% 68.2% 45.5% 55.6% 66.7% 
Out of government 0 31.8 54.5 44.4 33.3 
F. Government composition at t 
Parties change after fall 50.0% 68.2% 72.7% 66.7% 66.7% 
Parties same as before fall 50.0 31.8 27.3 33.3 33.3 
N coalition collapses (18) (22) (11) (9) (3) 
All Collapses 1976-92 
G. Status in government at t 
In government 100.0% 75.0% 100.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Out of government 0 25.0 0 20.0 0 
H. Government composition at t 
Parties change after fall 54.5% 62.5% 50.0% 60.0% 66.7% 
Parties same as before fall 45.5 37.5 50.0 40.0 33.3 
N collapses 1976-92 (11) (16) (2) (5) (3) 
Sources: Calculations based on coding of information in Keesing's Contemporary Ar­
chives; and on government status data in Mershon (1996, Appendix A). 
Notes: See table 11.3 for party acronyms. 
Entries are the percentage of cases in which a party (or government) had the designated 
status. A "coalition formula" refers to a relatively durable coalition design (e.g., the centrist 
formula, composed of the DC, PSDI, PRI, and PLI, lasted from 1947 to 1963); a party 
included in a formula need not serve in every cabinet ruling under the formula (e.g., the PLI 
served in 5 of the 17 cabinets formed under centrism). Parties are coded as included in 
coalition formulas during the following periods: DC 1946-92; PSI 1946-47, 1963-76, 
1979-92; PSDI 1947-76, 1979-92; PRI 1947-76, 1979-92; PLI 1947-63, 1979-92. 
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long-term governing roles in one of Italy's coalition formulas—one of 
the lasting designs for government composition that have helped to de­
fine political eras in Italy (Mershon 1994). This pattern applied even to 
the leftmost PSI, excluded from the centrist formula, and the rightmost 
PLI, excluded from center-left coalitions. The security and stability of 
coalition formulas freed component parties to destabilize cabinets. Sec­
ond, parties responsible for cabinet collapses rather often ruled in suc­
cessor governments, especially after 1976, when the PSI was pivotal. 
Finally, parties responsible for breakups more often than not triggered 
a change in government composition. By this criterion, the policy conse­
quences of rupturing coalitions or one-party cabinets, before or after 
the PSI became pivotal, are roughly alike. 
From 1976 to 1992, the PSI decided governments' fate with aston­
ishing frequency. At the same time, the contest between the DC and the 
pivotal PSI altered the ties between the executive and the legislature. 
Cabinets met increased difficulties in relying on parliamentary majori­
ties. For instance, the first Italian government with a Socialist premier— 
Craxi I, a surplus coalition—saw defectors reduce its support to a 
minority 163 times (Di Scala 1988). As a result of such challenges, exec­
utive decrees became much more common after 1976 (Delia Sala 1987; 
Nocifero and Valdini 1992). These changes generated reactions in turn. 
Legislation in August 1988 limited the conditions under which executive 
decrees could be issued, and in October 1988 the chamber radically cir­
cumscribed use of the secret ballot (Barrera 1989). Further institutional 
reforms are discussed below. 
In Italy spatial conditions have a clear impact on the office and pol­
icy costs of destroying governments. What effects can be discerned in 
the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, and Ireland? Table 11.5 lists for these 
countries the same sorts of measures of office payoffs that appear in 
table 11.3: weighted shares and total numbers of cabinet posts. On aver­
age, for almost all parties, between 1946 and 1987 weighted shares 
dipped slightly and—in contrast to the findings for the DC and PSI— 
total offices stayed roughly constant after the party had contributed to 
a government's fall. In these systems, then, almost all parties suffered a 
small penalty in office terms after having upset a cabinet. These state­
ments hold true even for the Dutch KVP/CDA and the Finnish KP, for 
those core parties have faced the institutional disincentives and ob­
stacles to adding offices identified above. Only four of the differences 
within pairs arrayed in table 11.5 attain statistical significance; close 
scrutiny reveals that the substantive significance of those findings is 
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Table 11.5 
Office Payoffs, by Party and Responsibility for Government Collapse, 1946-1987: 
Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Ireland 
Was Party Responsible for Collapse at Time t - 1? 
Offices at t No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Netherlands KVP/CDA PvdA CHU VVD 
Ratios of Cabinet Post Shares to Government Seat Shares3 (Means) 
Party ministers 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.88 1.05 1.18 1.04 0.63 
Party junior ministers 0.95 0.93 1.12 0.35 1.05 0 0.71 0 
N cabinets (12) (6) (6) (1) (9) (1) (9) (1) 
No. of Posts (Means) 
All ministers 15 14 14 13 15 12 15 13 
All junior ministers 10 9 10 6 10 6 10 6* 
TV cabinets (12) (6) (15) (3) (15) (3) (14) (4) 
Finland KP> SSD SKDL SFP LKI> 
Ratios of Cabinet Post Shares to Government Seat Sharesa (Means) 
Party ministers 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.81 0.61 1.25 NA 1.79 NA 
Party junior ministers 0.99 0.76 1.16 0.62 0.67 1.23 0.69 NA 0 NA 
No. of cabinets (19) (8) (15) (5) (5) (2) (21) (16) 
No. of Posts (Means) 
All ministers 11 11 11 11 11 12 11 11 11 11 
All junior ministers 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 
N cabinets (25) (12) (22) (15) (28) (9) (34) (3) (34) (3) 
Norway A H V KR F SP 
aRatios of Cabinet Post Shares to Government Seat Shares  (Means) 
Party ministers 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.88 1.08 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.03 1.22 
Party junior ministers 1.00 LOO LOO 1.03 0.76 0.59 1.34 1.05 0.93 1.20 
N cabinets (9) (4) (4) (2) (3) (1) (4) (2) (4) (2) 
No. of Posts (Means) 
All ministers 16 14 15 16 15 15 15 16 15 17 
All junior ministers 14 9 13 15 13 13 13 15 13 15 
N cabinets (16) (4) (17) (3) (18) (2) (17) (3) (18) (2) 
limited. As the top rows of the table indicate, the Dutch Liberals (VVD) 
sacrificed offices after having undermined the executive, but that finding 
hinges on one case of responsibility for a fall. The office benefits ex­
tracted from government falls by Fine Gael and Labour in Ireland, de­
picted in the bottom rows, are more apparent than real.16 
Table 11.6 records the policy consequences of breaking up govern­
ments. As was the case for Italy, the parties responsible for cabinet col­
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Table 11.5 
Office Payoffs, by Party and Responsibility for Government Collapse, 1946-1987: 
Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Ireland continued 
Ireland FG Labour FF 
Ratios of Cabinet Post Shares to Government Seat Shares41 (Means) 
Party ministers 0.91 0.89 1.20 1.42 LOO LOO 
Party junior ministers 1.06 0.97 0.56 1.11 LOO LOO 
N cabinets (1) (3) (1) (3) (5) (6) 
No. of Posts (Means) 
All ministers 14 15* 14 15* 14 14 
All junior ministers 8 11 7 13* 10 7 
N cabinets (11) (4) (11) (4) (7) (8) 
Sources: Calculations based on portfolio data and seat data in Mershon (n.d.), and on coding of 
information in Keesings Contemporary Archives and other sources. 
Note: Means are computed for two groups of cabinets: those whose predecessor was a cabinet the party 
helped to topple; and those whose predecessor fell for reasons other than the party's withdrawal of 
support. T tests compare the means of the two groups (i.e., for each party, entries in the "yes" and 
"no" columns). Numbers of applicable cabinets are in parentheses. NA = not applicable. 
KVP = Catholic People's Party; CDA = Christian Democratic Appeal; PvdA = Labor Party; VVD = 
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy; KP = Center Party; SSD = Social Democrats; SKDL = 
Finnish People's Democratic League; SFP = Swedish People's Party; LKP = Liberal People's Party; 
A = Labour; H = Conservatives; V = Liberals; KRF = Christian People's Party; SP = Center Party; 
FG = Fine Gael; FF = Fianna Fail. 
"Government seat share = a party's share of lower house seats controlled by all governing parties. 
*p < .05 (separate variances t test). 
lapses in the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, and Ireland tended to 
produce shifts in government composition. The most striking contrast 
between Italy and these four countries is that parties here toppled gov­
ernments less often. To be sure, in a sense this is obvious: Italy has 
had more governments. Even in relative terms, though, the contrast 
holds up. The DC and PSI moved to terminate, respectively, 60% 
and 62% of the 52 governments that ruled Italy from 1946 to 1992. 
The Christian Democrats (KVP/CDA) overthrew governments most 
often among Dutch parties and were responsible for the fall of only 
32% of Dutch cabinets from 1946 to 1987. To cite other examples, 
the Finnish Social Democrats (SSD) were responsible for the fall of 
38% of Finnish governments, and the Norwegian Labor (A) and Con­
servative (H) parties were responsible for the fall of 19% of Norwegian 
governments.17 Why were Italian parties—and above all the DC and 
PSI—so ready to destroy cabinets? Electoral costs should also be 
considered. 
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Table 11.6 
Party Status in Government and Government Composition, after Government 
Collapses, by Party Responsible for Government Collapse, 1946-1987: Netherlands, 
Finland, Norway, Ireland 
Party Responsible for Collapse At Time t — 1 
Netherlands KVP/CDA PvdA CHU VVD 
A. Status in government at t 
In government 100.0% 33.3% 33.3% 25.0% 
Out of government 0 66.7% 66.7% 75.0%) 
B. Government composition at t 
Parties change after fall 83.3% 100.0% 66.7% 75.0% 
Parties same as before fall 16.7%) 0% 33.3% 25.0%) 
N collapses (6) (3) (3) (4) 
Finland KP SSD SKDL SFP LKP 
C. Status in government at / 
In government 58.3% 33.3% 22.2% 0 0 
Out of government 41.7% 66.7% 78.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
D. Government composition at t 
Parties change after fall 83.3% 86.7% 78.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
Parties same as before fall 16.7% 13.3% 22.2% 0 0 
TV collapses (12) (15) (9) (3) (3) 
Norway A H V KR F SP 
E. Status in government at / 
In government 100.0% 75.0% 50.0% 66.7% 100.0% 
Out of government 0 25.0% 50.0% 33.3% 0 
F. Government composition at / 
Governing parties change 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Parties same as before fall 50.0% 0 0 0 0 
N collapses (4) (4) (2) (3) (2) 
Ireland FG Labour FF 
G. Status in government at t 
In government 75.0% 75.0% 75.0% 
Out of government 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 
H. Government composition at t 
Governing parties change 100.0% 100.0% 75.0% 
Parties same as before fall 0 0 25.0% 
N collapses (4) (4) (8) 
Source: Calculations based on coding of information in Keesing's Contemporary Archives and 
other sources and on government status data in Mershon (n.d.). 
Notes: Entries are the percentage of cases in which a party (or government) had the designated status. 
See table 11.5 for party acronyms. 
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The Electoral Costs of Ending Governments 
My concern is to ascertain how a party fares at the polls after 
it has contributed to the fall of most governments formed in the span 
between two elections. Of course, factors other than a party's role in 
provoking or preventing cabinet dissolutions—such as levels of inflation 
and unemployment—can bring voters to penalize or reward incumbent 
parties (e.g., Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Powell and Whitten 1993). I 
simply wish to observe whether parties that have caused cabinet failures 
encounter electoral punishment. 
Until 1992, the Christian Democrats and Socialists in Italy benefited 
electorally from knocking down governments. Yet as table 11.7 shows, 
distinctions separate the DC and PSI in this regard. The top row of the 
table discloses that the DC gained at the polls when it helped upset most 
cabinets governing between two successive elections (advancing 0.3%, 
on average), whereas the PSI contained its electoral losses when it top­
pled governments (slipping only 0.03%, on average). The bottom row of 
table 11.7 isolates the years when the PSI held pivotal status. From 1976 
to 1992, the PSI won votes despite, or due to, its responsibility for termi­
nating every government launched after 1974. The DC, in contrast, 
suffered for its role in government falls since 1976. 
The electoral payoffs for demolishing Italian governments have re­
flected spatial conditions and the segmentation of the electorate. For 
decades the DC undid governments with impunity, since loyal subcul­
tural voters long dominated the DC electorate, and exchange voters long 
expected a continuing flow of spoils from the large, centrally located 
DC1 8 Cabinet dissolutions cost the DC votes after 1976 because subcul­
tural voting waned, opinion voting increased, the pivotal PSI put up 
stiffer competition for spoils, and ideological justifications for delegiti­
mating opponents had less force. After 1976, furthermore, responsibil­
ity for breakups became more of an electoral liability for the PSDI and 
PRI and more of an electoral advantage for the PSI. Some voters seem 
to have defected in response to perceived disruptions of policy (opinion 
voters prevalent within the PRI electorate), others in response to poten­
tial complications in patronage (the PSDI's exchange voters). Still other 
voters rewarded the pivotal PSI for its capacity to influence policy and 
tap spoils, a capacity exhibited and exploited in government falls (see 
Mannheimer and Sani 1987, 167-82). The rightmost PLI was exposed 
to relatively severe electoral punishment for dismantling cabinets, which 
helps explain why it risked punishment relatively rarely. On the whole, 
Table 11.7 
Electoral Gain or Loss, by Party and Responsibility for Government Collapse, Italy, 1948-1992 
Dominant Role in Collapses 
between Elections DC PSI PSDI PRI PLI 
Responsible +0.30 (N = 10) -0.03 (N = 8) -0.50 (TV = 4) -0.10 {N = 4) -0.80 (N = 1) 
Not responsible -8.40 (N = 1) -1.73 (N = 3) -0.40 (N = 7) +0.06 (N = 1) -0.32 (N = 10) 
Responsible, 1976-92 -2.25 (N = 4) +1.00 (N = 4) -1.10 (iV = 1) -0.75 (N = 2) -0.80 (iV ­ 1) 
Source: Calculations based on coding of information in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, and on electoral data in Mershon (1996, Appendix B). 
Note: See table 11.3 for party acronyms. 
Entries are mean changes in parties' percentage share of the vote between pairs of consecutive elections to the Chambers of Deputies. Numbers of 
applicable inter-electoral periods are in parentheses, The baseline year is 1946 for all parties except the PSDI, which first contested elections in 1948. 
Dominant role is coded as whatever role (responsible or not responsible for collapse) was most frequent between two successive elections. 
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though, these differences across Italian parties were small. No party 
courted electoral disaster when it extinguished a government. 
In ongoing research, I extend the study of electoral costs to the Neth­
erlands, Finland, Norway, and Ireland and investigate bargaining costs 
as well. For now, I make additional comparisons across time in Italy. 
System Change in Italy 
The April 1992 parliamentary elections marked a profound 
shift in spatial and institutional conditions in Italy. The Lombard/ 
Northern League and the Rete (anti-Mafia Network) recast dimensions 
of party competition and campaigned against corruption. The DCs 
support dipped below 30%, which meant that the DC no longer quali­
fied as a core party (Schofield 1993). The 1992 elections were the first 
national elections held after the secret ballot was restricted in Parlia­
ment, the single-preference vote was introduced, and the PCI was con­
verted into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). According to my 
argument, some change in the costs of coalition and cost reduction 
strategies should have ensued. 
The first postelection coalition joined the same four parties that gov­
erned on election eve. But the allies were led by Italy's second Socialist 
premier, their coalition had minimal winning size, and they divided 
among them a total of 60 portfolios. The preelection coalition contained 
99 portfolios overall. The second postelection government was headed 
by Italy's first nonparty premier, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who almost suc­
ceeded in allying with the PDS, Greens, and PRI; last-minute disagree­
ments left him with a four-party minimal-winning coalition, a new 
edition of its predecessor that allocated an unprecedented share of port­
folios (12 out of 62) to nonparty experts.19 In August 1993, pressured by 
referendum results and Ciampi's exhortations, Parliament passed new 
electoral laws, which combine plurality and proportional rules for 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate elections and impose a 4% threshold 
for representation in the chamber. 
Held under the new laws, the March 1994 elections produced even 
more sweeping change: the end of 50 years of uninterrupted DC incum­
bency. Public outrage at widespread corruption inflicted devastating 
losses on the Popular Party (as the DC renamed itself in January 1994) 
and the PSI. Undone by corruption, the PLI and PSDI did not even 
contest the elections. In May, media magnate Silvio Berlusconi became 
premier. His government embraced Forza Italia, the movement he 
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founded in early 1994; the Northern League; the National Alliance, the 
renamed MSI; and the Centrist Union (UDC) and the Christian Demo­
cratic Center (CCD, a right-wing splinter from the DC), which were 
Forza Italia's electoral allies in some constituencies. The coalition con­
tained 64 portfolios and by one standard had minimal-winning size.20 
Berlusconi resigned in December 1994 when the Northern League with­
drew. In January 1995 economist Lamberto Dini became Italy's second 
nonparty premier, guiding a cabinet made up of 55 ministers and under­
secretaries. For the first time in postwar Italy, not a single member of 
Parliament was included in the executive. The Dini government passed 
its votes of investiture thanks to support from the PDS. 
From 1946 to 1992 in Italy, the office costs of building cabinets, even 
surplus coalitions, were low Some parties under some conditions 
achieved office benefits from undoing governments. Breakups tended to 
bring influence over policy. Most Italian voters appeared to be "indul­
gent [and] . . . rapidly forgetful" about cabinet collapses (according to 
an ex-deputy quoted in Corriere della Sera, June 28, 1986). In such a 
system, as Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti once summarized in a 
noted saying, "Power wears out those without it" and power reinforces 
the powerful. That Italy no longer exists. And the roots of the transfor­
mation lie in the two classes of explanatory factors highlighted here. 
Conclusion 
In postwar Italy until 1992, transitory cabinets were staffed by perma­
nent incumbents. These empirical outcomes make Italy an extreme but 
not a unique case among parliamentary democracies. The outcomes 
pose vexing questions when viewed in the light of game-theoretic predic­
tions. What explains the combination of instability and stability? How 
can governments break up at such low cost? 
The framework that I develop solves this puzzle. The evidence indi­
cates that particular spatial and institutional conditions in Italy lowered 
the costs associated with breaking and building coalitions and favored 
strategies that further lowered those costs. Italy's coalitions were not 
easily sustained, since breakups caused little damage. When policy 
space and institutions were redefined in the early 1990s, costs and out­
comes in Italian coalition politics were transformed. 
Even among multipolar party systems, Italy's governments display 
the shortest average duration and the lowest turnover rate. The country 
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that most nearly resembles Italy in spatial terms, the Netherlands, pre­
sents relatively long-lived governments and fairly ample turnover. Dutch 
institutions, working through their influence on the costs of coalition, 
account for the difference in outcomes. Cabinet duration in Finland ap­
proximates that in Italy, but alternation in Finland is somewhat greater. 
One reason is that Finnish parties have paid a stiffer price for govern­
ment breakups, as table 11.6 shows. Not only for Italy but also for the 
Netherlands, Finland, Norway, and Ireland, the findings suggest that 
spatial and institutional environments shape the costs of coalition that 
politicians face and structure politicians' efforts to deflate those costs. 
I need to do more to explore the posited linkages among spatial and 
institutional conditions, costs incurred, and records of duration and 
turnover. I am engaged in weighing electoral costs outside Italy and 
comparing bargaining costs across countries. Additional intertemporal 
comparisons within countries (e.g., comparison of costs in Norway be­
fore and after 1961) will yield further assessments of the impact of 
changes in spatial and institutional conditions. A larger set of countries 
will encompass greater spatial and institutional variation. The study of 
Belgium and Denmark holds special interest, since both countries saw 
vast changes in their party systems in the early 1970s (which, for Bel­
gium, contributed to a lengthy process of institutional reform). 
The preliminary results support the framework advanced here. To 
judge from the evidence now available, this explanation accounts for 
Italy's extremes and for the degrees of stability found in other parlia­
mentary democracies. 
NOTES 
I thank Janet Adamski, Kerstin Hamann, and Sally Roever for research assis­
tance and David Farrell, Bingham Powell, Herman Schwartz, John Sprague, 
and seminar participants at Washington University for helpful comments. I 
am also grateful for the suggestions offered by fellow participants in the work­
shop "Party Discipline and the Organization of Parliaments," Joint Sessions 
of the European Consortium for Political Research, Bordeaux, April 27 to 
May 2, 1995. This chapter presents preliminary findings from my 10-nation 
study, a book manuscript entitled The Costs of Coalition (Mershon n.d.). The 
evidence from Italy discussed in the chapter is also treated in Mershon 1996. 
1. Stram (1990b, 125) defines the turnover or alternation rate as "the pro­
portion of legislative seats held by parties changing status between govern­
ment and opposition," averaged across a country's governments. 
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2. My thanks to Kaare Strom for providing me with these data on the 
measure of alternation (or rate of turnover). The Pearson correlation between 
alternation and duration is 0.575. 
3. The three-party cabinet built by Amintore Fanfani in 1962 controlled 
51% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, whereas three other coalitions 
held exactly half. The Socialists (PSI) abstained on Fanfani's investiture, ex­
tending support that a pure search for power would render superfluous. The 
architects of the Fanfani coalition saw it as a second-best solution, designed 
to pave the way for the larger, long-term alliance they preferred, an alliance 
embracing the PSI. 
4. Below, I elaborate on this classification, which is drawn from Laver and 
Schofield (1990). I am investigating additional country cases in ongoing 
research. 
5. These criteria replicate those used by Strom (1990b) and others who 
have borrowed Strom's data (King et al. 1990). I differ from Laver and Scho­
field (1990), who use only the first two criteria. By each set of criteria, Italy 
has the most short-lived governments of any extant parliamentary democracy. 
6. This identification relies primarily on Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
a source often used in coalition studies (e.g., Dodd 1976; Strom 1990b). Desig­
nation of responsibility for a cabinet's fall was usually straightforward. For 
example, in October 1954, the two largest parties in the Finnish government, 
the Agrarians (KP) and Social Democrats (SSDP), publicized their differences 
over economic policy. The KP pushed for prices for farm products higher than 
those proposed in Prime Minister Torngren's anti-inflation package, whereas 
the SSDP urged lower food prices. Torngren then submitted his resignation. 
Responsibility for his government's collapse lay with the KP and SSDP. 
7. Following Lijphart (1994), I use a 20% criterion for identifying "major" 
changes in district size, thresholds, and assembly size. 
8. The "effective number" of parties, a well-known index, takes into ac­
count not only the number but also the relative strength of parties (Lijphart 
1994). Content analyses of parties' election manifestos furnish data on dimen­
sions and party positions in Europe (Budge et al. 1987; Laver and Budge 
1992). This paragraph's discussion of median and core parties (which paves 
the way for cross-party comparisons below) relies primarily on Schofield's 
publications (Laver and Schofield 1990; Schofield 1987, 1993), with supple­
mentary sources as noted in the text. 
9. Mannheimer and Sani's composite measures for subcultural belonging 
include reports of behavior (e.g., attendance at mass) and attitudinal items 
(sympathy toward the Church). Other data for Italy suggest that exchange 
voters form sizable proportions of the DC and PSDI electorates, that opinion 
voters predominate in the PLI and PRI electorates, and that the PSI draws 
opinion and exchange voters (e.g., Cazzola 1985; Katz 1985). 
10. See Mershon 1994 on center-left (DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI) coalitions, typi­
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cal from 1963 to 1976, and five-party coalitions (DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI), 
which prevailed from 1979 to 1992. 
11. Figure 11.5A excludes the few governments formed when the KVP/ 
CDA did not occupy the core of Dutch policy space: den Uyl (installed in 
1973 after the November 1972 elections), van Agt I (1977), and Lubbers I 
(1982) and II (1986). The CDA's severe losses in the 1994 elections surely dis­
qualified it as the core, as discussed in Mershon (n.d., chaps. 7-8). 
12. The KP did not control the median legislator in the parliaments 
elected in 1958 and 1966. This judgment is based on seat data and a compari­
son of Laver and Schofield (1990, 117-18), Mylly and Berry (1984), and Soik-
kanen(1981). 
13. To be specific, figure 11.5B excludes the seven nonpartisan cabinets 
just noted and excludes three party-based governments: Fagerholm I (formed 
in 1948), Paasio II (1972), and Holkeri I (1987). In all postwar Finnish govern­
ments, at least a few important ministries are assigned two ministers, with one 
of the two "formally considered as the [single] head of the entire ministerial 
unit" (Nousiainen 1988, 214). Analysts differ as to whether the so-called "sec­
ond ministers" (those not identified as heads) are to be viewed as junior minis­
ters (Arter 1987) or as full ministers (Nousiainen 1988). Figure 11.5B portrays 
them as junior ministers. No matter how the definitional question is settled, 
the bottom line stays the same: the KP sacrifices posts when it builds 
coalitions. 
14. Fianna Fail initiated its first coalition in July 1989, as discussed in 
Mershon (n.d., chaps. 7-8). 
15. These measures have shortcomings. For instance, two DC-only cabi­
nets may have distinct policy colorations, and not all governing parties influ­
ence policy to the same extent. Yet parties in government clearly have the 
potential to shape policy, as the measures capture (Strom 1990b). In ongoing 
research, I am probing alternative indices of the policy costs and benefits of 
governing. 
16. As in the case of the W D  , the catch is small N. FG and Labour ruled 
four times during the period covered in table 11.5. The entries in the "no" 
column for FG and Labour reflect their participation in one cabinet, Costello 
II, which was also Ireland's only three-party coalition. Naturally, the third ally 
in Costello II (Clann na Talmhan, literally "People of the Land") obtained 
some offices. And comparing the division of posts in Ireland's one three-party 
coalition and three FG-Labour coalitions is equivalent to comparing FG and 
Labour as incumbents when they held, as opposed to lacked, responsibility 
for the preceding government's fall. 
17. But FF has brought half of Irish governments to a premature end, 
reflecting the frequency with which FF one-party majority governments have 
exercised the prerogative to call early elections. 
18. The DCs drop when not responsible for cabinet collapses rests on one 
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datum alone: the difference between 1948, when voters rallied around the DC 
at the onset of the Cold War, and 1953, when controversy over a newly ap­
proved majoritarian electoral law (soon rescinded) repulsed some voters. 
19. Even though a PRI senator was undersecretary to Ciampi, the PRI 
did not consider itself a member of the coalition and abstained on the cabinet's 
vote of investiture {Cornere delta Sera, April 29 to May 13, 1993). 
20. The Berlusconi government qualifies as minimal winning if electoral 
alliances (the Freedom Alliance and the Good Government Alliance) are 
counted as its component units. If parliamentary parties are counted as the 
units comprising the coalition, it has surplus status and a superfluous member 
in the CCD. 
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Coalition Discipline, 
Enforcement Mechanisms, 
and Intraparty Politics 
PAUL MITCHELL 
M;
"uch of what happens in party competition is driven by
.policy pursuit. This supposition does not require lengthy 
speculation concerning whether politicians are sincerely committed to 
public policy.1 The crucial assumption is that since voters are motivated 
by policy concerns,2 parties interested in their future electoral prospects 
will at least pretend to be interested in policy. Put another way, while 
politicians may harbor all manner of private desires, policy pursuit is 
the acceptable language of competition, at least on the public stage. 
Parties fear that they will suffer tangible reputational costs if they are 
not seen to be exerting every effort to implement the key policy promises 
that they advertised to their activists and electorate. 
Consequently, parties do in practice bargain vigorously over policy 
commitments, and many of the key events that destabilize coalition gov­
ernments are policy conflicts. While the precise relationship between 
"performance" in government and electoral prospects has proved 
difficult for academics to establish (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1986, 
1988; Powell and Whitten 1993), political parties clearly believe that 
their electoral futures significantly depend upon perceptions of their 
policy performance in government and expend enormous effort and re­
sources to this end. 
Recently, some studies of coalition politics have extended the tradi­
tional focus on government formation and dissolution to examine the 
actual "life" of real coalition governments in power (Mitchell 1996; 
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Timmermans 1996). Central to these studies is the proposition that the 
life of a government should be interpreted as an ongoing bargaining 
process in which there is much still to be played for. In other words, 
the "spoils" of office are not all distributed at the point of government 
formation, as tends to be assumed by most traditional coalition theories. 
In particular, the government's policy program is not in any sense simply 
"implemented" by virtue of the portfolio allocation and the drafting of 
the coalition policy document. Likewise, while coalition attributes and 
the initial division of portfolios are clearly important, governments do 
not automatically continue as a result of formation conditions any more 
than political parties survive simply because they were present during a 
country's democratization. Given that governments are confronted with 
all manner of disturbances, they survive only if key participants choose 
to work to maintain them. 
Parties in office pursue their goals, competing to have their policies 
adopted as a means of satisfying their members and improving their 
electoral prospects. However, once parties form a government, they are 
confronted by a wide range of potentially destabilizing events that 
threaten their continued tenure in government, their favorite policies, 
and their electoral expectations. The destabilizing event could be an "ex­
ternal" shock or an integral component of the bargaining process inside 
cabinet coalitions, such as an attempt by one coalition party to defect 
from policy concessions made as part of the coalition formation 
process. 
Parties attempt to reduce uncertainty by resorting to a range of en­
forcement devices. Prominent among these is the negotiation of the gov­
ernment program. European coalition cabinets increasingly resort to 
lengthy and detailed government policy programs, both to impose some 
structure on subsequent bargaining and to attempt to ensure that a par-
ty's key policies will be included in the government's agenda for action. 
The Search for Credible Commitment 
Reputation and Credibility 
Reputation and credibility are the currency with which politi­
cians and parties hope to procure executive power. "Credibility is a poli-
tician's main stock in trade. . . . Part of the essence of being a senior 
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politician is the association with a set of policy positions believed by 
others to be either sincere or strategic positions with which the politi­
cian has become so inextricably associated that the reputational costs 
of deviating from them are very high" (Laver and Shepsle 1996, 248). In 
Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation approach, the forecasted policy 
output of any particular cabinet depends upon the distribution of port­
folios. In other words, policy promises are made credible by appointing 
politicians with particular policy reputations to particular ministries. 
The portfolio distribution matters because although cabinet govern­
ments are formally collectively responsible, there is a departmental struc­
ture to actual cabinet decision making. 
While Laver and Shepsle are undoubtedly correct in pointing out the 
"very strongly departmental character [of] government decision mak­
ing" (1996, 31), this, of course, is not the whole story. Given the volume 
of work in each ministry and the time and information costs incurred in 
"interfering" in other ministries, ministers concern themselves primarily 
with the work of their own department.3 However, precisely because the 
ministerial structure of cabinet government provides ministers (and, by 
implication, parties) with considerable discretion over the policy out­
comes of the departments that they direct, parties are always in danger 
of losing control of government policy in the departments managed by 
their coalition partners. This is a potentially serious problem if the port­
folios not held by a party are responsible for policy jurisdictions that 
are of major concern to the party. And of course, this is likely to happen 
in practice unless a party manages to capture all of the important minis­
tries. Assuming that this rarely happens, a party has credibility and en­
forcement problems when it does not control the ministry involved. 
Thus, even if a key policy of party A was agreed on at coalition forma­
tion, there is a real danger that it may be sabotaged if party B controls 
the relevant ministry. While ministers do not have the time or resources 
to check on all of the details of all the policy areas, there is a party 
incentive to cross-check on the key policies that define the party's raison 
d'etre. And while such intervention is an uphill task, parties simply can­
not afford to allow full ministerial discretion, essentially because politi­
cians from party B cannot be trusted to implement policies close to 
party A, even if these were previously accepted as part of the initial 
policy bargain. 
Thus, parties have incentives to underwrite the credibility of their 
key policies—their brand identity items—by negotiating their inclusion 
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in the coalition policy document drafted at government formation. The 
coalition policy document is part of the process whereby a party at­
tempts to credibly commit its coalition partners to at least some of the 
party's main policies. 
Coalition Policy Documents 
The coalition policy document4 is the immediate policy output 
of the government formation process and can be interpreted as a state­
ment of the initial policy equilibrium of the incoming government. It 
also provides a rough estimate of the relative bargaining strengths of the 
parties concerned. This does not require the naive assumption that the 
content of the document should be read in a strictly literal fashion. 
Since the document is highly strategic (Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver 
and Budge 1992), some items that are included are almost entirely aspi­
rational and have little prospect of even being attempted, while con­
versely other key areas of outstanding policy dispute may be omitted 
altogether in order to deemphasize discord. Nevertheless, the parties' 
own election manifestos and a whole range of policy documents and 
leaders' speeches set out the policy basis on which parties appeal to 
voters. It is against performance of these policies that credibility ulti­
mately is assumed to be judged. 
It is worth being a little more explicit about the highly strategic na­
ture of coalition policy documents. This is best illustrated with a stra­
tegic scenario. Consider a bargaining structure—like the coalition 
governments that formed in Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s—of a pro­
spective two-party coalition with one "large" party (Fine Gael) and one 
"small" party (the Labour Party). Given the respective size of the poten­
tial coalition partners, there was a structural imbalance in the negotia-
tions—not so much in terms of formal bargaining power (after all, both 
parties were necessary to be minimum winning) as in terms of what each 
wanted to get out of the talks. It might be assumed that since Fine Gael's 
overriding motivation was to get into office, its leader (and prospective 
prime minister) had an interest in keeping the program for government 
as vague and aspirational as possible, especially given the likelihood 
of retrospective voting. For the Labour Party the negotiations had a 
different logic. Clearly, in the short term the Labour leadership had an 
interest in satisfying their own office-seeking motivations by negotiating 
what they believed their wider party would consider a "good" policy 
package (hence allowing the coalition to form).5 
Coalition Discipline, Enforcement Mechanisms, and Intraparty Politics • 273 
Such considerations are likely to be reinforced by longer-term mo­
tivations in that small parties in government are always in danger of 
having their policies blocked in cabinet. Given Irish governments' ad­
herence to the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility, and because 
a threat to bring down the government can be used only infrequently if 
it is to remain credible, a minority coalition partner has an incentive to 
demand that specific and detailed policy commitments be written into 
the coalition document as an insurance policy. Fine Gael as the far 
larger partner could afford to trade away a section of its preferred poli­
cies in order to get into office, since it could be confident of controlling 
a large proportion of the government's ongoing policy agenda by virtue 
of its control of over 70% of cabinet votes (and ministries). A minority 
partner like Labour, on the other hand, is always fearful of the progres­
sive erosion of its policy commitments and political identity through 
the accumulation of lost cabinet votes.6 It therefore had an incentive to 
attempt to imprint a selection of its key policies on the "tablet of stone" 
(the coalition policy document) in an attempt to stem the tide of policy 
erosion by executive decision in cabinet. In this vision, then, the coali­
tion policy document for a minority partner in government is a kind of 
court of appeals, outside the logic of cabinet arithmetic and portfolio 
distribution, that can be periodically summoned to protect the junior 
partner's vital interests. 
European political parties increasingly resort to lengthy and detailed 
coalition policy documents (e.g., Muller and Strom 1997; Laver and 
Shepsle 1994). Despite this, it remains an interesting but as yet open 
question as to whether this development has a conflict-increasing or 
conflict-reducing function in the life of cabinet governments. On the one 
hand, such documents seem to provide a useful purpose in terms of 
forcing explicit or at least implicit policy trade-offs between parties with 
perhaps widely different priorities, hence providing a mechanism for es­
tablishing an initial minimum level of policy coherence that might other­
wise be totally lacking. On the other hand, the detailed enunciation of 
coalition policy, as distinct from party policy, in such a joint government 
program, means that each party has publicly accepted a cost: the dis­
tance that it has moved away from its own preferred policy position. 
Given, then, that a party is likely to have suffered substantial costs 
(the extent depending on how successful it was) during coalition forma­
tion, in terms of the watering down or elimination of part of its policy 
agenda, it becomes even more likely that the party will be prepared to 
fight tooth and nail for those of its policies that were included in the 
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coalition document. The tendency of the media to evaluate each party 
in terms of the extent to which it is successful in implementing its parts 
of the supposedly joint policy program is likely to exacerbate these ten­
sions further. 
It may be, then, that in a government whose constituent parties have 
substantially diverging policy positions, the role of published coalition 
policy documents is 
1. To identify the benefits and costs of the opening phase of policy 
bargaining 
2. To provide a "holy grail" of bottom-line policy commitments as 
an insurance device 
3. To map out the likely battleground of future conflicts 
Part of the explanation as to why the coalition policy document often 
fails to exercise a conflict-reducing function is, of course, that a policy 
commitment in a coalition document is a long way from an enacted 
policy and that even in a long document the crucial details of the mea­
sure usually must still be fought over.7 Moreover, experienced politicians 
are aware in advance that the inclusion of an item in a coalition 
agreement is only the first stage in a long battle. "The real settlement of 
the issue will take place later: by including many types of issues within 
the government agreement, they seek a tentative assurance that they 
will have a voice in that settlement" (Nousiainen 1993, 264). What then 
becomes important for any given policy is the battle to decide who is 
accepted as the interpreter of the spirit of intention behind the policy as 
it appears in the government program. Clearly, the power to decide on 
the detail may well amount to the power to undermine totally the origi­
nal aim of the policy.8 
Nevertheless, at least for the subsequent life of the government, the 
coalition policy document does impose some structure on policy bar­
gaining, identifying some areas of "legitimate" debate and almost "rul­
ing out" other items. It is an institutional evolution that plays some 
role in reducing uncertainty: "Political institutions constitute ex ante 
agreements over cooperation among politicians. They reduce uncer­
tainty by creating a stable exchange structure" (North 1990a, 191). 
Thus, the negotiation and subsequent policing of the coalition treaty 
induce some stability by defining the areas of legitimate contestation. 
Of course, the amount of detail in the coalition policy document and 
how strictly its provisions are adhered to are empirical matters that vary 
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from country to country. In Germany, for example, the "treaty" appears 
to be almost a binding contract: ministers are "bound to the coalition 
policy 'treaty,' which is a very precise agreement over draft bills and 
leaves hardly any room for deviation or interpretation. Bureaucrats in 
the ministries as well as in the chancellor's office constantly control and 
monitor the implementation of this coalition treaty" (Muller-Rommel 
1994, 165). One former minister in the Netherlands is reported to have 
said, "The coalition agreement has gradually assumed greater signifi­
cance. Eventually we have come to regard it as something like a law" 
(Andeweg and Bakema 1994, 64). 
Thus, coalition treaties now play a substantial role in European cabi­
net government. Their utility for parties is that they help underwrite the 
credibility of their most electorally salient policies and help commit 
their coalition partners to their implementation. Of course, one of the 
reasons that political markets are inefficient is that there is "no direct 
enforcement mechanism to see that 'contractual agreements' are carried 
out" (North 1993, 18). Nevertheless, while coalition policy documents 
amount to more than the "cheap talk" (Strom, Budge, and Laver 1994) 
of many manifesto commitments, ultimately the only reliable "enforce­
ment mechanism" is the competitive behavior of the parties themselves.9 
Interparty Competition: The Incentive to Defect 
In anticipation of trouble, parties attempt to ensure ongoing 
government commitment to at least some of their key policies by trying 
to negotiate their inclusion in the coalition policy document as insur­
ance. However, while this document provides some protective armor in 
future battles, it does not ensure victory. Interparty coalition bargaining 
is characterized by a pervasive incentive to defect from prior commit­
ments. Thus, the policy output of the government is not decided at co­
alition formation but is the subject of continual and sometimes fierce 
bargaining throughout the life of the government. 
Indeed, much of what makes coalition politics so intriguing is the 
continual battles by parties to push their favored policies to the top of 
the government's agenda. The policies with which the parties entered 
government are not simply "implemented" in some technocratic or pre­
ordained fashion. While this is also true of single-party administrations 
that might be thwarted in their policy efforts by the civil service or "eco­
nomic realities"—to name just two possible obstacles—the key differ­
ence with coalition governments is that parties have electoral rivals 
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within the cabinet who may try to undermine and subvert their policies. 
Even if some collegiality develops between parties in a coalition, they 
will rarely lose sight of the fact that they will soon be opponents once 
again in a forthcoming election. Parties are always concerned with their 
underlying level of popularity because their anticipated electoral pros­
pects may condition their current, and certainly their future, bar­
gaining strengths. 
Attempted defections from commitments made in the coalition for­
mation document will be vigorously resisted by parties keen to demon­
strate that they can "deliver" the key party policies that they have 
advertised to supporters. If a precise commitment was secured at forma­
tion and included in the coalition policy document, attempted defec­
tions from this policy by a party's coalition partners will be highly 
destabilizing, since they will be regarded not simply as "ordinary" pol­
icy debate but as a "breach of faith" and an assault on formation condi­
tions. Nevertheless, despite the foreknowledge that defections from 
commitments will be resisted, there is a constant incentive to defect. 
This is partly because parties are induced to make "insincere" promises 
at formation as the immediate attraction of getting into government 
clouds (or overrides) the policy costs involved. Once the parties are 
installed in office, the policy costs quickly come into focus, and the 
parties will typically find good reasons that certain costly commitments 
cannot be implemented, at least as specified. However, the incentive 
to defect is ultimately based on much more than the fact that each party 
at formation may have made "insincere" policy promises. More signi­
ficantly, the incentive derives from the exigencies of day-to-day party 
competition. 
While the coalition policy document is an important regulatory de­
vice in the life of coalition governments, it is not in any sense a "done 
deal." Coalition cabinets are an ongoing bargaining process in which 
much still exists to be played for. It is almost always in the interests of 
an incumbent party to try to drag government policy toward party pol­
icy (the limit being the extent that would cause coalition breakup). 
Thus, there is a constant tension as parties attempt to avoid implement­
ing policies that have been identified as deriving from their colleagues' 
preferences and endeavor to substitute their own policies. Although oc­
casionally this tension manifests itself in well publicized head-to-head 
coalition conflicts, it will more frequently take subtler forms, partial en­
gagements in which ministers and parties aim to disguise their defec­
tions as "policy development." In short, a party that is less than vigilant 
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in policing its policies will quickly find that they have been subjected to 
stealth attacks and erosion by detail, irrespective of what the coalition 
agreement says.10 
Unitary Actor Status and Intraparty Revolts 
Intraparty Dynamics 
Battles between party leaders in a coalition government are 
only one type of destabilizing policy event that can undermine policy 
implementation. While ministers can make any kind of deals they like 
behind the secrecy of the cabinet door, these are all to no avail if they 
cannot secure the support or at least the acquiescence of their parlia­
mentary parties. As the first chapter in this volume argues, "Party cohe­
sion and discipline are very much two-way streets, and certainly much 
more than the emphasis on whipping—with its connotations of disci­
plining the unruly rank and file—might suggest" Clearly, rebellious 
backbenchers have the potential to torpedo even the most carefully 
crafted compromises between ministers. 
The unitary actor assumption implicit in almost all studies of coali­
tion formation (for exceptions, see Luebbert 1986 and chap. 2 of this 
volume) is reasonably serviceable, given the generally high level of party 
discipline in most European countries. At least for the purposes of gov­
ernment formation and dissolution, European political parties can be 
treated as if they were unitary actors, primarily on the basis that "parties 
do in practice tend to go into and come out of government as single 
actors, however painful the wounds inflicted upon them inside the black 
box [of intraparty decision making] might have been" (Laver and Scho­
field 1990, 15). The implication of unitary actor status is that "decisions 
will be adhered to once they have been arrived at by the whole party, 
whatever its method of arriving at them" (14). Obviously the monolithic 
actor assumption is a stylization, and in practice, parties sometimes 
split, backbenchers rebel, and some resign or are even expelled. 
One exception to this silence on what happens inside parties is Greg­
ory Luebbert's (1986) study, which develops an approach to coalition 
formation premised on assumptions about intraparty politics. Luebbert 
assumes that while party leaders are highly office oriented, they 
are "motivated above all by a desire to remain party leaders" (46). 
Thus, since leaders are anxious to get into government and since party 
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activists (who derive little or no office benefit) are more likely to be mili­
tant and uncompromising, for Luebbert, lengthy periods of government 
formation are likely to be all about the leaders' generating intraparty 
consent. Thus, "Most negotiation in cases of protracted government 
formation takes place between leaders and their followers and among 
rival factions within parties" (52). Luebbert's approach is both theoreti­
cally intriguing and intuitively plausible. Many analysts (and party ac­
tivists) have long suspected that most leaders would do just about 
anything to get into government if only they could circumvent the costs 
inherent in sacrificing their policy credibility with followers. This need 
for credibility greatly reduces their latitude for maneuvering. Of course, 
this does not mean that intraparty politics governs all else. Leaders (at 
least of European political parties) typically have immense resources 
with which to seduce, cajole, or discipline recalcitrant militants who get 
in their way (as shown in various chapters throughout this volume). 
Powers of promotion and patronage, especially when in government, 
provide a substantial array of "sweeteners" for the rank-and-file mem­
ber struggling with his or her conscience.11 
Nevertheless, credible revolts do occur. Most cases of serious revolt 
involve intraparty objections to the interparty concessions made in cabi­
net by a party's ministers. A destabilizing event occurs if the cabinet 
ministers have miscalculated the preferences of their supporters and a 
revolt ensues. The revolt generally becomes "serious" if it threatens the 
government's legislative coalition12 or the continued leadership of the 
party's ministers. Once a revolt occurs, two outcomes are possible: 
the revolt either fails or succeeds. Failure of a revolt typically means that 
the threatened legislation passes (the legislative coalition holds) and/or 
that the defectors either are effectively disciplined or back down from 
the standoff with their leaders. In this sense the policy jointly announced 
by the cabinet continues or is implemented. A successful revolt means 
that the government is defeated in the legislature or, more likely, that 
the parties, anticipating defeat, renegotiate the policy at cabinet level. 
A government with any chance of surviving and implementing its 
policies must be able to manage most of these standoffs with its support­
ing legislative coalition. Sometimes the government will play tough and 
face down the conflict with its supporters (the revolt fails). However, 
any revolts that are credible and from which the instigators do not 
quickly back down should be treated as serious warnings by the cabinet. 
The viability of the government will depend on how it responds to such 
revolts. Faced with a credible revolt, the party's ministers will often de­
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Table 12.1 
Events Destabilizing Irish Coalition Governments in the 1980s, by Arena 
No. of Events 
Arena 1981-82 1982-87 Total 
Policy: 
Interparty conflicts 3 12 15 
Intraparty conflicts 2 12 14 
Electoral — 4 4 
Legislative (confidence motions) 1 1 2 
Party organization — 2 2 
"Other" — 2 2 
Total 6 33 39 
cide that the troublesome policy will have to be renegotiated by the cabi­
net (the revolt succeeds). Alternatively, if the party leaders feel that the 
policy must be upheld, the party will have to impose (expel) or accept 
(resignation) losses. Either way, the government's legislative coalition 
will atrophy. In sum, a governing party cannot simply ignore intraparty 
pressures; it must manage those revolts by sections of the parliamentary 
party that do occur. Any losses are highly significant for the party's 
reputation and strength as a coalition actor. 
Intraparty Revolts: Some Evidence from Ireland 
A recent study of coalition governments in Ireland in the 1980s 
examined the types of events that typically destabilize cabinets and the 
event management techniques with which parties respond (Mitchell 
1996). One of the surprises to emerge from the identification of the 
events that destabilized these coalitions (the 1981-82 and 1982-87 gov­
ernments) was just how many of them were primarily revolts within the 
coalition's parliamentary parties. 
Indeed, almost half of all destabilizing policy events were intraparty 
revolts (table 12.1). Numerous government decisions were undermined 
by backbench revolts. The clear pattern that emerged was that sections 
of the parliamentary parties periodically punished their leaders either 
for conceding too much of party policy at the cabinet table or for taking 
decisions (especially spending cuts) that backbenchers believed would 
bring opprobrium on the party and thereby threaten their parliamentary 
seats. The evidence strongly suggests that intraparty politics may be a 
very significant constraint on interparty coalition policy bargaining. 
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Table 12.2 
Intraparty Revolts in Ireland 
Coalition Policy Area Period Principal Instigator Outcome 
1981-82 
Education Nov. 81 Indep. MPs; unions Succeeded 
Food subsidies Jan. 82 Lab. PP and org. Succeeded 
1982-87 
Education Dec. 82-Feb. 83 Community; unions Succeeded 
Social welfare Mar. 83 Lab. PP, esp. 2 MPs Failed 
Abortion Apr.-Jun. 83 FG PP; community Succeeded 
Food subsidies Jan. 84 Lab. PP Succeeded 
Food subsidies Aug.-Sep. 84 Lab. PP Succeeded 
Farm tax Aug.-Sep. 84 FGPP Failed 
Contraception Nov. 84-Feb. 85 FG and Lab. PPs Failed 
Industrial policy Apr. 85 Lab. PP Succeeded 
Local radio Jun.-Jul 85 Lab. PP Succeeded 
Divorce Apr.-Jun. 86 FGPP Succeeded 
Social welfare Nov. 86 2 Lab. MPs Succeeded 
Social welfare Nov. 86 1FGMP Failed 
Notes: Total (both coalitions): 14 revolts. Succeeded: 10. Failed: 4. 
PP = parliamentary party; FG = Fine Gael; Lab. = Labour. 
Moreover, most of these revolts (10 of 14) "succeeded" in the sense 
that they destabilized the policy compromise made by the cabinet and 
forced a renegotiation of the policy (table 12.2). While leaders have gen­
eral incentives to retain the consent of their parties, many of these re­
volts succeeded because their instigators threatened to defect in pending 
legislative votes. 
Clearly, the legislative weight of these governments—the first was a 
minority coalition and the second had a small majority—did help to 
empower potentially dissident parliamentarians; certainly, the cabinet 
ministers in a government with a 100-seat majority would be expected 
to have more latitude to face down revolts. Nevertheless, since many 
European governments have slim majorities and around 35% have no 
majorities at all (Str0m 1990), credible backbench revolts are not unique 
to Ireland. 
Unitary Actor Status Reconsidered 
From time to time, credible revolts do occur that must be man­
aged by party leaders. This need not be interpreted, however, as evidence 
that the unitary actor assumption of most coalition theory is entirely 
unwarranted and unrealistic.13 The parties in these Irish governments, 
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like most other European parties, generally behaved in a disciplined 
fashion, most obviously in legislative votes. Indeed, perhaps one of the 
more significant conclusions is that parties typically behave "as if" they 
were unitary actors when they have to, in situations where undisciplined 
behavior will impose high collective costs. Election campaigns and the 
government formation arena are two such occasions when fractious be­
havior is likely to seriously damage a party's reputation and strength. 
Of course, one of the reasons that most of the coalition theoretic litera­
ture has been able to retain the unitary actor assumption is that it deals 
primarily with the formation of coalitions. However, even if the key 
actors in a party have incentives to behave in a fairly unified manner at 
the point of government formation, this does not mandate continued 
unitary behavior during the actual life of the government (Daalder 
1983, 21; Laver and Schofield 1990, 14-19). 
The strategic incentives change once the government is installed. 
During the life of any particular coalition, intraparty conflicts may be 
unleashed and do not impose such high collective costs because they 
are not essentially about choosing between the current coalition and 
some alternative government. Whatever else they may do, backbenchers 
rarely endeavor to bring down their own government and facilitate its 
replacement by a coalition of their rivals. But what they can do without 
setting out to break the government is to rebel on particular policy 
items, punishing the party's ministers for drifting too far away from 
party policies and reminding their leaders that they cannot always be 
taken for granted. Most of this activity will not be revealed in a legisla­
tive roll call analysis, since European parties usually behave in a very 
disciplined fashion once a vote is called. Of the revolts listed in table 
12.2, very few resulted in government MPs' actually voting against the 
government. For example, in March 1983 two Labour MPs planned to 
vote against a social welfare bill. The government decided to "hang 
tough," warning that anyone voting against the government would be 
expelled. One of the backbenchers backed down, but another, Michael 
Bell, did vote against the bill. Anticipating certain expulsion, he re­
signed the party whip in advance of the vote. This, however, was very 
unusual, and rebellions by individual MPs are often faced down. One 
of the more dramatic examples was the rebellion in November 1986 by 
Michael O'Leary. By this time the coalition was a minority government 
that needed O'Leary's vote to survive. Even though he had been clearly 
stating all day (on national radio and television) that he would vote 
against the government, O'Leary ultimately acceded to the pressure to 
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remain loyal. One of his colleagues "told O'Leary in no uncertain terms 
that he was dead, gone as far as Fine Gael was concerned if he didn't 
support the government" (Kenny and Keane 1987, 19). Control of can­
didate selection meant that Fine Gael could credibly threaten to end 
his political career. Of course, this may be less feasible if a group of 
backbenchers threaten rebellion. The only other cases of backbenchers' 
actually voting against the government were the revolts that concerned 
abortion and contraception policies. In both cases a few conservative 
MPs felt that these were issues of moral conscience that outweighed 
normal loyalty to the party. 
However, even if parties are highly disciplined and generally behave 
as unitary actors in actual legislative votes, to leave matters there would 
be to miss much of what is going on during a coalition's time in govern­
ment. The clear pattern that emerges from these cases is that intraparty 
politics were a significant constraint on coalition bargaining between the 
parties' ministerial teams. Typically, these revolts consisted of hostile 
reactions by sections of the government's parliamentary parties to pol­
icy compromises made by the party leaders in cabinet. The structure 
of incentives and opportunities facing cabinet ministers and ordinary 
members of the parliamentary parties may diverge. In particular, the 
parliamentary party may see little virtue (and much danger) in effec­
tively abandoning some party policies. Key party policies included in 
the coalition policy document are promises made by the leadership to 
the parliamentary party. In a sense they are the latter's price for agreeing 
to the compromises involved in forming a government. By contrast, a 
party's ministers, facing the constraints of governing and the incentives 
of ambition, are more likely to recognize and accept the necessity of 
compromising some of the party's policy agenda. 
In discussing the impact of intraparty politics on coalition forma­
tion, Laver and Schofield (1990, 24) highlight the possible conflict of 
interest between the parliamentary party and the party as a whole: "The 
general rule is that the rank-and-file, more concerned with ideology and 
less in line for the other spoils of office, tend to resent the policy compro­
mises necessary to enter coalition and hence to oppose them." The same 
logic applies to the life of a coalition government, although the key con­
flict of interest shifts to a party's cabinet ministers versus the rest of the 
parliamentary party. Since the existing set of cabinet ministers have the 
top jobs and therefore have strong incentives to try to keep them, they 
are more likely to manage interparty conflicts by recognizing the virtues 
of policy compromise in cabinet. By contrast, other members of the 
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parliamentary parties (who are not in line for the top jobs) are less likely 
to tolerate clear departures from party policy or decisions that they be­
lieve will hurt their reelection prospects. 
Table 12.2 makes it clear that almost all of the dissent that resulted 
in destabilizing events was instigated by members or sections of the par­
liamentary parties. This is because, at least for the life of any particular 
government, only the parliamentary party has the resources—the 
votes—to force a policy reversal. While other sections of the party or­
ganization or the party rank and file may make a lot of trouble—and 
may be able to replace leaders in the longer term—at least during the 
government's tenure this is mostly just "noise." Activists do not have the 
resources to bring ministers to heel on particular policy questions unless 
they can convince members of the parliamentary party to act on their 
behalf and rebel. 
Conclusion 
Political markets are inefficient because it is difficult to measure what 
is being exchanged and because there are no immediate enforcement 
mechanisms that guarantee that commitments will be honored in the 
future (North 1990a, 1993). Nevertheless, since politics is all about 
promise and performance, politicians assiduously cultivate the reputa­
tion that they are committed to their policy promises. However, since 
coalition formation and governing involve reputational costs in terms 
of concessions to coalition partners, there is a subsequent incentive to 
renege on these compromises. This produces further uncertainty such 
that parties will find that they have to spend considerable time and re­
sources policing commitments that they thought they had secured at 
formation. Hence the increasing importance of coalition policy docu­
ments that perform the dual functions of underwriting the credibility 
of a party's brand-item policies (promises to activists and voters) while 
attempting to commit one's coalition partners to implementation of 
the measure. 
Intraparty politics play a greater role during the life of a government 
than assumed by traditional coalition theories that concentrate on a 
period when unitary behavior is most imperative. In reality, coalition 
policy bargaining is clearly multilateral. Coalition maintenance primar­
ily involves continuous bargaining in which a delicate trade-off has to 
be struck between negotiations among and within parties. In particular, 
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interparty negotiations in cabinet occur in the context of an anticipated 
need to "carry" the coalition's parliamentary parties. Intraparty revolts 
that do materialize can be interpreted as miscalculations by the cabinet 
as to how much compromise their backbenchers will tolerate. And while 
the ministers in the Irish examples occasionally tried to face down the 
rebellion (with mixed results), the more typical response was to take 
the threat seriously and renegotiate the policy. In this sense, intraparty 
dynamics form an important part of an enforcement process for the 
coalition policy document, a counterbalance to the policy drift em­
braced by a party's ministerial team due to the institutional pressure to 
compromise entailed in cabinet bargaining. 
Most rebellions (even those that are "successful") are quickly forgot­
ten and become a part of the government's policy development phase, 
since the proposal is sent back to the cabinet for amendment. Thus, 
most revolts do not show up as legislative defections. Unless the govern­
ment has a huge majority, the threatened revolt may be enough to force 
a policy change. Thus, despite generally high levels of party discipline 
in legislative votes, the cabinets of most European coalition govern­
ments will not play fast and loose with their parliamentary supporters. 
NOTES 
1. Opinions vary on this and are extensively reviewed in Laver and Scho­
field (1990, 36-61). 
2. The assumption that voters are motivated by policy is common to both 
office-seeking and policy-seeking accounts of party behavior and is an under-
researched area. The assumption is essentially residual in that since voters are 
assumed to receive no office benefits, "they must" therefore be motivated by 
policy concerns. While voters may be motivated by other incentives, such as 
patronage benefits or symbolic aspects of party identification, it does seem 
reasonable to assume that voters are to some extent motivated by public pol­
icy, notwithstanding doubts about the "purity" of voters' policy motivations. 
3. Blondel (1993,191) concludes, "Ministers are more anxious to be better 
departmental heads than to be part of a collective decision-making process in 
the cabinet, as if, for many at least, to participate truly in collective decision-
making was a kind of luxury while the "real" activity with which they have to 
be concerned is that of their department." After all, the ministry represents 
the ministers' "own turf," a particularized arena in which the minister can 
demonstrate his or her personal contribution, in contrast to the diffusion of 
responsibilities (and benefits) inherent in collective decision making. 
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4. Coalition policy document here refers to the formal government policy 
program and not to any preballot electoral pacts signed by prospective coali­
tion partners. 
5. The Labour Party had decentralized the final decision on entering co­
alitions to a party Special Delegate Conference. See Gallagher (1982,232-33). 
6. This is not intended to suggest that formal voting is common practice 
in cabinets. This is usually unnecessary, since the outcome can be predicted in 
advance. The imbalance in bargaining power is manifest irrespective of 
whether a formal vote takes place. 
7. Commenting on the first conservative-socialist coalition formed in Fin­
land in 1987, Nousiainen (1994, 95) notes: "With respect to these general 
goals, the parties reached an agreement easily, but the following year was filled 
with heated discussion over the precise specification of these goals and the 
proper means to achieve them. In more general terms it is clear that a cabinet's 
agenda can never be fully determined in advance. New problems, goals, and 
solutions are introduced continually during a policy process." 
8. This is not intended to imply that the respective parties necessarily 
shared the same interpretation of the original aims of the policy. 
9. The parties may devise explicit mechanisms to monitor the coalition 
policy document. For example, in Austria, "All coalitions had their own forum 
for permanent interparty negotiations, namely the coalition committee, which 
consisted of a small number of high-ranking politicians from both parties" 
(Miiller 1994, 29). 
10. Of course, the transaction costs inherent in such policing are not zero 
(North 1990b, 1993). 
11. Laver and Schofield (1990) also point out that it is usually much more 
difficult for the rank and file to control leaders once they are in government. 
When in opposition the parliamentary party is subject to party rules. In gov­
ernment, ministers are subject to constitutional rules such as collective cabinet 
responsibility Thus, at the extreme, "The actual moment of going into govern­
ment . .  . may represent the point at which the rank-and-file loses control of 
the parliamentary party" (23). 
12. Strictly speaking, then, "serious" revolts are not exclusively intraparty 
but rather are those that threaten the government's legislative coalition, its 
ability to win periodic legislative votes. 
13. See Laver and Schofield (1990) for an extensive review of the utility of 
this assumption. 
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